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Summary
The issue
Launched in 2003, the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) scheme was designed to 
test the effectiveness of a unique combination of services to help both unemployed individuals who 
have entered work as well as low-paid workers remain and progress in work. The innovative package 
of support once in work combined job coaching and advisory services with a new set of financial 
incentives rewarding sustained full-time work, as well as the completion of training or education 
courses whilst employed.
Three groups traditionally characterised by a weak labour market position and low job attachment 
were eligible for ERA: long-term unemployed people over the age of 25 who were mandated to start 
the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) programme, lone parents who had volunteered for the New Deal 
for Lone Parents (NDLP) programme, and lone parents who were already working part-time and 
receiving Working Tax Credit (WTC).
The effectiveness of the ERA programme, which operated in six regions across the UK between 
October 2003 and October 2007, has been carefully evaluated through a large-scale randomised 
control trial.
ERA was designed to make a difference to employment chances and earnings over a period of years 
and the experimental design offers a very reliable way to test whether this has indeed been the 
case. However, it cannot directly address questions that relate to the impact of ERA on any outcome 
which is only defined conditional on being in work – such as wage rates, hours, fringe benefits, 
other job quality measures and wage progression. This is because the ERA programme itself may 
influence who it is that works (and who it is that stays in work). In this case, the sub-sample of ERA 
participants who have found (and retained) work might have different observed and unobserved 
characteristics from the sub-sample of controls who have found (and retained) work. If these 
different characteristics in turn affect other outcomes conditional on employment such as wage 
rates, a simple comparison of workers from the programme and from the control groups will suffer 
from post-random assignment (RA) selection bias. An assessment of ERA’s impacts on advancement 
has thus to rely on more complex non-experimental methods. This is particularly important since as 
the programme’s name suggests, advancement was one of the key ERA objectives.
Research objectives
The report aims at estimating the impact of ERA on a number of measures of retention and 
advancement of workers.
For the two lone parent groups, research questions include the impact of offering ERA services and 
incentives on remuneration (monetary wages and non-pecuniary benefits), work hours (including 
workers’ chances to work full-time as opposed to part-time), other measures of job quality 
(mainly in terms of job stability, workers’ responsibilities at work, promotions and opportunities 
for promotions, workers’ own assessment of their jobs), workers’ chances of combining work 
with training as well as of achieving formal qualifications, workers’ patterns of engagement with 
Jobcentre Plus, workers’ advancement behaviour (in terms of any step taken while working to help 
improve work situation or earnings, as well as to find another job), workers’ future training and work 
aspirations and a few indicators of overall well-being.
2 Summary
For NDLP and WTC workers, ERA impacts have been assessed both two and five years after RA. 
While both are discussed, focus is on impacts at year 5 as they are key in understanding whether 
ERA has had any impact that lasted beyond the period of ERA participation. Covering more than two 
years post-programme, impacts at year 5 offer a sufficiently long post-programme period to assess 
whether the financial incentives and adviser support provided under ERA were enough to have a 
lasting impact on placing and keeping its participants in well-paying and good quality jobs, or else 
whether any effects faded away once that support was withdrawn.
For the ND25+ group, the report had to rely on administrative records alone, and has considered the 
more limited question of whether the availability of ERA incentives and services has affected the tax 
year earnings of ND25+ workers, with workers being defined as those with positive earnings in the 
relevant tax year(s). Earnings have been evaluated for four tax years, covering 1-2, 2-3, 3-4 and 4-5 
years after RA. Focus is on ERA impacts after the programme has ended, that is 4-5 years post RA 
(corresponding to the 2008/09 tax year).
Types of non-experimental analyses
ERA’s impacts on workers’ outcomes have been estimated under alternative assumptions on the 
process of selection into work.
a Assuming that selection into employment is the same for ERA and control group members.
 Indirect support for this assumption can be obtained by considering whether all relevant 
characteristics that are observed are balanced between ERA and control group workers.
b Controlling for observable differences between ERA and control group workers. 
 Under the assumption that the only outcome-relevant differences between the two groups of 
workers are those which are captured in the many characteristics observed in the data (such 
as age, gender, education, duration on benefit, labour market history), one can use the wage 
outcomes of those control group workers who are observationally similar to the ERA workers to 
estimate what the wage outcomes of the former would have been had they not received ERA. 
c Recognising that ERA workers may differ from control group workers in important ways that the 
analyst cannot directly observe.
 Under a set of assumptions, one can not only test whether this is in fact the case, but 
experiment with a control function approach to allow for this residual bias.
Key findings
The report has extensively analysed the impact that ERA has had on a variety of outcomes 
experienced by working members of the NDLP and WTC target groups, as well as on the tax year 
earnings of working members of the ND25+ target group. 
• ERA appears to have had a sizeable impact on workers’ hours – in particular in terms of 
encouraging full-time work – for both lone parent groups during the programme period. For NDLP 
workers, though, such impact has subsequently faded away, as participation in full-time work has 
caught up among control group workers. By contrast, ERA appears to have induced WTC workers 
to work longer hours (and indeed to work full-time) well into the post-programme period. It thus 
seems that the time-limited in-work support offered by ERA was able to encourage a permanent 
move to full-time only among the group of lone parents who were already in part-time work at 
the time of RA.
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• ERA has had no impact on NDLP or WTC workers’ employment retention, as measured by the 
share of the five follow-up years spent in employment. (There is some weak evidence of a positive 
impact on retention for NDLP workers whose children were aged five to six years at RA.)
• For both lone parent workers, ERA has had no impact on hourly wages either during or after the 
programme. (There is some indication that ERA might have increased wages for NDLP workers in 
Wales through increased job mobility.)
• In the absence of a wage impact, any impact on weekly earnings would need to be driven by 
impacts on hours worked. Even though the impact on hours was found to persist post-programme 
for the WTC workers, it was relatively small (+1.1 hours/week), not allowing the corresponding 
impact on weekly earnings (+£9.3) to reach statistical significance.
• There is no evidence of improved job quality as a result of ERA for NDLP workers both during and 
after the programme. For WTC workers, the overall impression is that ERA did not affect job quality 
in any dimension except for a sustained increase in sick pay eligibility. 
• ERA impacts on the take-up of training while in work and on workers’ attainment of qualifications 
were found to critically differ between the two lone parent groups.
– For NDLP workers, ERA appears to have only changed the timing of training: ERA has increased 
training among workers while the programme was operational, but during the post-programme 
period, the workers from the control group have been catching up, so that overall, between 
RA and five years, ERA has had no impact on training take-up. It would thus seem that ERA 
has mostly led to a reallocation over time of training activities that would have taken place in 
any case over the five years. Furthermore, ERA failed to foster the attainment of qualifications 
among workers. (An exception appear to be NDLP workers in North East England, a district 
where ERA has affected workers mainly through human capital acquisition channels (having 
undertaken education/training while in work and having obtained relevant qualifications since 
RA), while it has strongly discouraged taking steps towards advancement, in particular towards 
increasing one’s hours.)
– While the increase induced by ERA on WTC workers’ participation in training was entirely 
concentrated during the time when ERA’s training incentives were available, WTC workers 
from the control group did not fully catch up. As opposed to NDLP workers, at least over a 
5-year follow-up period, the ERA-induced training of WTC workers thus appears to have indeed 
been additional, suggesting that ERA succeeded in encouraging training among those in work 
over and above what they would have done anyway over such a comparatively long time 
horizon. Furthermore, there seems to have been an impact on the attainment of work-related 
qualifications which was sustained after the end of the programme.
• No impact on any advancement measure was detected for NDLP workers either during or after 
the programme. ERA has by contrast given rise to a significant increase in the advancement 
efforts of WTC workers both during and, most crucially, after the programme. In particular, a 
sustained effect has been uncovered on the likelihood that WTC workers tried to increase working 
hours and have taken steps to look for a better job with a different employer. ERA does not, 
however, appear to have affected their future advancement intentions. Thus, though ERA’s impact 
on workers’ advancement behaviour appears to have lasted until the fifth year post RA, it might in 
fact have come to an end. 
4 Summary
• As to the well-being of workers five years after RA, ERA appears to have raised overall life 
satisfaction for NDLP workers, leaving their self-assessed financial situation, health, parental 
involvement in their child and the child’s well-being unaffected. The evidence for WTC workers at 
year 5 is by contrast quite mixed, as while no adverse impact could be detected on self-reported 
health, ERA did appear to decrease the proportion of workers reporting that their child‘s life was 
going very well.
• Some impact heterogeneity has been uncovered for NDLP workers, with ERA at times displaying 
larger effects (even in absolute terms) for more disadvantaged subgroups.
– Non-white workers appear to have experienced much larger and more favourable impacts than 
white workers, enjoying increased hours, weekly earnings (via increased hours only), training 
take-up and experience (gained in full-time jobs).
– Through specific advice and/or the training bonus, ERA seems to have encouraged the most 
disadvantaged group (with at most GCSE qualifications, without work in the three years prior 
to RA and with at least one barrier to employment) to aim at entering the labour market via a 
part-time job and to focus on improving their skills via training. For this group, there is also weak 
evidence of an increase in hourly wage.
– Finally, it is interesting to note that ERA impacts appear to have been driven by the low-
education group of WTC workers and by the high-education group of NDLP workers.
• For both lone parent groups, no significant ERA impact could be detected on the yearly earnings 
of workers in any tax year post RA.
• The yearly earnings of those ND25+ participants who were employed in any of the tax years 
considered have not been affected by ERA. This finding might not be very surprising given the 
absence of an effect for lone parent workers and once it is considered that at the time of RA the 
ND25+ group was facing far more severe labour market disadvantages and higher barriers to 
work, in addition to being the most hard-to-help group. 
Conclusions
While ERA has significantly increased the employment chances of the ND25+ group for most of the 
follow-up period, no impact could be detected on the earnings of those in employment.
ERA appears to have had only two effects on NDLP workers: an increase in hours worked while the 
programme was in operation which disappeared once participation in full-time work caught up 
among control group workers, and a reallocation over time of training activities that would have 
taken place anyway over the 5-year follow-up period. For NDLP workers ERA has thus accelerated 
changes that in time would have occurred anyway, but has not any long-term impacts.
For WTC workers, by contrast, the impact on hours was sustained, and so was the impact on 
advancement efforts in terms of increasing one’s working hours and in terms of job mobility. 
Furthermore, ERA appears to have induced a net increase in training take-up together with a 
sustained increase in the attainment of work-related qualifications. There is, however, no evidence 
to suggest that such increased training participation, concomitant rise in qualifications, renewed 
advancement efforts, enhanced job mobility and indeed the increased incidence of full-time 
work and attendant increase in work experience among workers have actually translated into 
demonstrable work advancement in terms of higher wages or an otherwise improved job quality.
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Indeed, for either lone parent group no lasting nor temporary impact could be detected on hourly 
wages, on weekly earnings, on job quality, on yearly earnings or on the time spent in employment, 
all outcomes that one would expect to see increase if there were an effect on retention and 
advancement. 
A final comment relates to the delicate issue of whether having induced WTC lone parent workers 
to increase their hours and work full-time has had any adverse consequence on their children. 
Although ERA appears to have reduced the proportion of WTC workers reporting that their child‘s life 
was going very well, the mechanisms behind such an impact remain unclear, as workers’ overall life 
satisfaction was left unaffected and indeed the time they reported spending helping their child with 
homework appears to have been increased.
6 Background, research questions and overview
1 Background, research  
 questions and overview
1.1 Background
Launched in 2003, the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) scheme was envisioned as 
a ‘next step’ in British welfare-to-work policies, which had been hitherto focused on getting people 
back into work. ERA added a new unique combination of services to help unemployed individuals 
who have entered work as well as low-paid workers remain and progress in work.
The ERA scheme was designed to test the effectiveness of an innovative package of support 
once in work, combining job coaching and advisory services with a new set of financial incentives 
rewarding sustained full-time work, as well as completing training or education whilst employed. 
Specifically, working participants were entitled to employment-related assistance from a dedicated 
Advancement Support Adviser (ASA). Those in full-time work for a sustained period (13 out of every 
17 weeks, i.e. about 75 per cent of the time) would additionally qualify for a retention bonus of 
£400 three times a year for up to two years. Combining training with (at least part-time) work was 
encouraged through subsidised tuition fees (up to £1,000) and a financial bonus (also up to £1,000) 
for those completing training. Participants also had access to in-work emergency payments to 
overcome short-term barriers to staying in work.
Three groups, traditionally characterised by a weak labour market position and low job attachment, 
were eligible for this new set of support and financial incentives conditional on work:
1 Long-term unemployed people over the age of 25 who were mandated to start the New Deal 25 
Plus (ND25+) programme.
2 Lone parents who had volunteered for the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) programme.
3 Lone parents who were already working part-time (between 16 and 29 hours a week) and were 
receiving Working Tax Credit (WTC).
The programme was administered by Jobcentre Plus in six regions across the UK (East Midlands, 
London, North East England, North West England, Scotland, and Wales) between October 2003 and 
October 2007. 
The effectiveness of ERA in supporting sustained employment and advancement in the labour 
market has been carefully evaluated through a large-scale randomised control trial. Eligible 
participants in the six districts were randomly assigned to a programme group, which was offered 
the new ERA services, or to a control group, which just received the existing pre-employment New 
Deal services (if from either New Deal entrant groups). Indeed, with over 16,000 individuals being 
randomly assigned between October 2003 and the end of 2004, the ERA study represented at its 
inception the largest randomised controlled trial of a social programme in the UK.
Experimental findings have considered impacts on employment, annual earnings and benefit receipt 
up to five years since random assignment (RA) (Hendra et	al., 2011). The 5-year Impacts are of 
particular interest as they cover more than two years post-programme, thus being able to identify, 
for the first time, whether ERA had any sustained impact beyond the period of ERA participation.
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Although by far the most reliable measures of programme effects are provided by the experimental 
estimates which directly compare the outcomes of the randomly assigned programme group 
members to the outcomes of the randomly assigned controls, there are a number of important 
evaluation questions that the experimental design simply cannot answer. These questions all 
relate to the impact of ERA on any outcome which is only defined conditional on being in work or 
having found a job at a specific point in time – such as wage rates, hours, fringe benefits, job quality 
measures and wage progression.
Since such outcomes – to fix ideas let us consider wage rates – are by construction only available for 
individuals who are in work, any programme group-control group comparison of wage rates must 
be confined to people in work. Indeed, examination of wage progression must rely on individuals 
who were in work at two separate points in time. Since, however, the ERA programme itself may 
influence who it is that works (and who it is that stays in work), the sub-sample of ERA participants 
who have found (and retained) work might have different observed and unobserved characteristics 
from the sub-sample of controls who have found (and retained) work. Indeed, the more effective 
ERA is in getting and keeping participants in work, the more the employed ERA and control 
subgroups will differ. If these different characteristics in turn affect other outcomes conditional on 
employment (wage rates in the example), a simple comparison of the employed programme and 
control subgroups will suffer from selection bias. When trying to assess ERA’s impacts on workers, 
non-experimental methods are thus needed to remove the potential selection bias. 
An assessment of ERA’s impacts on advancement has thus to rely on more complex non-
experimental methods. This is particularly important since as the programme’s acronym suggests, 
advancement was one of the key ERA objectives.
1.2 Research questions 
The non-experimental analyses carried out in this report aim at estimating the impact of ERA on 
measures of retention and advancement of workers. 
For the two lone parent group, it addresses such questions as: 
• Does the availability of ERA incentives and services raise the hourly wage for those in work? 
• Does it increase the non-pecuniary work-related benefits or the fringe benefits received by those 
in work? 
• Does ERA foster advancement (e.g. in terms of growth in hourly wage rates or in work-related 
benefits) for those in work?
• Does the offer of ERA incentives and services increase the chance that workers work full-time as 
opposed to part-time?
• Does the availability of ERA incentives and services increase the chance that workers participate in 
education or training?
More generally, research questions considered include the impact of offering ERA services and 
incentives on any relevant outcome related to individuals who are in work (see Box 1.1). Apart 
from remuneration (monetary wages and non-pecuniary benefits) and from work hours (including 
workers’ chances to work full-time as opposed to part-time), outcomes considered include several 
other measures of job quality (mainly in terms of job stability, workers’ responsibilities at work, 
promotions and opportunities for promotions, workers’ own assessment of their jobs), workers’ 
chances of combining work with training as well as of achieving formal qualifications, workers’ 
patterns of engagement with Jobcentre Plus, workers’ advancement behaviour (in terms of any 
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step taken while working to help improve work situation or earnings, as well as to find another job), 
workers’ future training and work aspirations and a few indicators of overall well-being.
For NDLP and WTC workers, ERA impacts have been assessed both two and five years after RA. 
While both are discussed, focus is on impacts at year 5 as they are key in understanding whether 
ERA has had any impact that lasted beyond the period of ERA participation. Covering more than two 
years post-programme, impacts at year 5 offer a sufficiently long post-programme period to assess 
whether the financial incentives and adviser support provided under ERA were enough to have a 
lasting impact on placing and keeping its participants in well-paying and good quality jobs, or else 
whether any effects faded away once that support was withdrawn.
These detailed questions have to rely on measures collected via surveys. For one intake group, 
ND25+, the survey two years after RA was, however, not deemed reliable enough to be used to 
derive the experimental impact estimates (due to low response rates coupled with the survey 
sample consisting of early entrants into ERA), and administrative employment and earnings records 
were used instead. 
For ND25+, thus, this report too has to rely on administrative records and consider the more limited 
question of whether the availability of ERA incentives and services has affected the tax year earnings 
of ND25+ workers, with workers being defined as those with positive earnings in the relevant tax 
year(s).
Administrative data do not allow for an assessment of hours worked nor an in-depth exploration of 
the types of jobs found by ERA and control group members. They do, however, allow one to consider 
ERA impacts on the yearly earnings for workers – an important question given how few actually 
worked among the ND25+ group (almost half (47 per cent) of this group never worked in the tax 
years covering 1-2 to 4-5 years after RA).
Earnings are evaluated for four tax years, covering 1-2, 2-3, 3-4 and 4-5 years after RA. Focus is 
on ERA impacts after the programme has ended, that is 4-5 years post RA (corresponding to the 
2008/09 tax year).
For comparison to the ND25+ group as well as to the more detailed survey outcomes, the analysis 
on administrative earnings outcomes has been performed for the other two intake groups too. 
Box 1.1: Additional outcomes for working lone parents
Does the availability of ERA incentives and services affect
• Worker’s rewards:
– net hourly/weekly wage;
– non-pecuniary work-related or fringe benefits (pension, paid holidays, flexible working 
hours, paid or unpaid time off for family reasons, sick pay, car or van for own private use, 
crèche or nursery at workplace, trade union membership).
• Other job quality measures:
– job stability (permanent job, job consists of shift work most of the time, job includes 
daytime hours, had days absent in the last month);
– worker’s responsibilities at work (self-employed, has formal responsibility for supervising 
others);
(Continued)
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– advancement prospects (employer offers training for advancing, received promotions 
or increased responsibility, foresees further opportunities for promotions or increased 
responsibility, received a pay rise);
– worker’s own assessment of their jobs (agrees/strongly agrees about having some say 
over the way they work, likes the job a great deal, job is very/extremely stressful, often/
always has unrealistic time pressures at work);
– employment travel costs.
• Worker’s chances to work full-time as opposed to part-time.
• Worker’s chances of combining work with training and of obtaining qualifications.
• Worker’s advancement behaviour:
– taking steps while working to help improve work situation or earnings (tried to increase 
hours of work, to get a pay rise, to negotiate better terms, to change to different sort of 
work with the same employer);
– taking steps while working to find another job (tried to get a better job with a different 
employer, put name on the books of a private recruitment agency, went to a career office, 
career advice department or used Connexions service, looked for another job on own, did 
something else to find another job).
• Advancement: worker’s growth in hourly wage rates or in work-related benefits.
• Workers’ patterns of engagement with Jobcentre Plus (any contact with Jobcentre Plus 
staff while in work, received any help or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff on retention and 
advancement while in work, unprompted Jobcentre Plus help/advice).
• Future intentions (training intentions, labour supply intentions, work intentions).
• Subjective well-being measures (overall life satisfaction, stress/health, appraisal of one’s 
financial situation, children’s well-being, time with children).
1.3 Overview 
The rest of the report is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 briefly describes the data sources, including the available background characteristics and 
the outcomes considered, and provides the definition of the samples of workers. 
Chapter 3 discusses the problem of ‘post-RA selection bias’ that needs to be addressed in order 
to analyse ERA impacts on workers. It also looks in more detail at how this issue arises when 
considering important outcomes such as wages, hours worked and work progression and at the 
limitations experimental methods face in these instances.
The analysis framework and methodological approaches explored in the report are outlined in 
Chapter 4.
The results of all empirical analyses are presented and discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 5 focuses on the two lone parent groups. Section 5.1 briefly describes the benchmark 
outcomes experienced by the employed members of the control group and provides a descriptive 
analysis of the wages and hours observed for the employed ERA and control subgroups. Section 5.2 
subsequently assesses how different the composition of the employed ERA and control subgroups 
is in terms of the rich set of observed characteristics. Overall, ERA impacts on a wide range of survey 
outcomes are presented in Section 5.3 for NDLP and WTC workers, both 2 and 5 years post-RA. 
Section 5.4 assesses whether ERA impacts have been heterogeneous across districts and selected 
subgroups of lone parents. Section 5.5 contains a rather speculative analysis aiming to shed some 
light on whether an unusually large or unusually small individual ERA impact on the take-up of 
education/training or on obtaining educational qualifications is accompanied by an unusually large 
or unusually small individual ERA impact on wages. Finally, ERA impacts on administrative tax year 
earnings for the lone parent subsamples who are employed in each post-RA tax year are presented 
in Section 5.6.
Chapter 6 presents and discusses ERA impacts on administrative tax earnings for the groups of 
ND25+ participants employed in each post-RA tax year. This section contains both the overall impact 
estimates and the estimates at the district level.
Chapter 7 summaries the findings and concludes.
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2 Data and sample definition
2.1 Data
This report exploits a number of data sources: 
• the administrative data held by Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), the Work and Pensions 
Longitudinal Study (WPLS) dataset on benefit and employment spells and on tax-year earnings 
(since these data are collected by Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) through P14 returns, 
for convenience in the following they are referred to as P14 earnings data); 
• baseline characteristics data collected at intake specifically for the Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) experimental sample in the form of the Basic Information Form (BIF); 
• local-area level data; and 
• data from the three waves of surveys covering the experiences of a sample of the programme 
group and the control group during the first 12, 24 and 60 months following individuals’ date of 
random assignment (RA) (surveys at 24 and 60 months only covered the experiences of the two 
lone parent groups).
An extensive collection of background variables has been put together to capture the widest 
possible range of individual, office and local area characteristics that are most likely to affect 
individuals’ labour market outcomes. Characteristics at the time of RA collected specifically for 
all participants in the BIF have been supplemented with detailed employment, past programme 
participation and benefit histories from the administrative WPLS data held by DWP, as well as with 
Jobcentre Plus office-level data and local-area level data (Census, travel-to-work and super-output 
area data).
Table 2.1 organises and summarises the various observable factors used in the analysis, and briefly 
comments on the variables.
In-depth outcome data were collected in three waves of surveys for the two lone parent groups 
(1, 2 and 5 years after programme start). This report mainly focuses on 5-year post-programme 
outcomes, but also looks at 2-year outcomes. The survey outcomes considered are organised and 
listed in Table 2.3.
The New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) group second year survey was not deemed representative enough to 
be used for impact measures (due to low response rates coupled with the survey sample consisting 
of early entrants into ERA), and it was decided not to survey this group again. To estimate ERA 
impacts for the ND25+ target group one has thus to exclusively rely on administrative data. 
Specifically, the administrative outcomes considered are tax-year earnings filed under the Employer 
Annual Return (P14) and contained in the WPLS (originally obtained from HMRC). As listed in Table 
2.2, the analysis considers earnings for the 2005/06 through the 2008/09 tax year. The tax year runs 
between the start of April and the end of March of the following year, so for instance the 2005/06 
earnings roughly cover earnings in the first follow-up year for individuals randomly assigned late in 
the intake period and earnings in the second follow-up year for those randomly assigned early in the 
intake period (intake period taking place between October 2003 and the end of 2004). Given that the 
ERA intervention ended in October 2007, earnings during the 2008/09 tax year are post-programme 
earnings for all individuals, as they cover a time period where nobody has been receiving any ERA 
services.
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Table 2.1 Observed characteristics 
ERA DISTRICT
District dummies
COHORT OF RA
Time period when randomly assigned New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and ND25+: Oct03-
Mar04; Apr04-Jun04; Jul04-Sep04; Oct04-Dec04  
Working Tack Credit (WTC): Dec03-Jul04; Aug04-
Nov04; Dec04-Jan05
DEMOGRAPHICS (at RA)
Gender
Age band <30; 30 to 39; ≥40
Ethnic minority 
Single
1 child NDLP and WTC LP
2 or more children NDLP and WTC LP
Any children ND25
Age of youngest child NDLP and WTC LP: ≤1; (1, 5]; (5, 16], >16 
Missing child/child age information ND25: aged 5 or less
Education 
Academic education
Levels 0-1; level 2; level 3; levels 4-5
Housing status Social or private housing
BARRIERS TO WORK (at RA)
Disability indicator NDLP and ND25: has a disability at RA and/or if 
claiming Incapacity Benefits at RA
Missing disability status
Health problem
No driving license or lack of access to vehicle
Transport problem
Housing problem
Childcare problem
Basic skills problem
Other problem
CURRENT SPELL (at RA)
Employed at random assignment
Has currently >1 paid job WTC LP
Current total weekly hours WTC LP: Non eligible hours (i.e. <16 or ≥30); [16, 20); 
[20, 30)
Months in main current job WTC LP
Quintile of pay in current job amongst WTC LP WTC LP
Days before showing up Same day, within 30 days, after >30 days  
NDLP and ND25+: Showing up defined as the time 
between becoming mandatory for ND25+ and 
starting the Gateway (for ND25+ group), or between 
being told about NDLP and volunteering for it (for 
NDLP group)
Early entrant into ND25+ programme ND25+: Spent <540 days on Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA) before entering 
Continued
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Table 2.1 Continued 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (at RA)
In work before RA/previous to current jobs 
Quintile of pay in previous job amongst group 
Previous total weekly hours 
 
 
WTC LP: <16; [16, 20); [20, 30); ≥30
In work before previous job 
Quintile of pay in that job amongst group 
Total weekly hours in that job
 
 
WTC LP: <16; [16, 20); [20, 30); ≥30
Number of jobs in the three years prior to RA None, one, two or more 
Total work experience in the three years prior to RA 7-12m; 13-24m; 25-36m
Hours per week worked in the three years prior to RA <16; [16-30); ≥30
BENEFIT/PROGRAMME PARTICIPATION HISTORY (at RA)
Past participation in basic skills ND25+: Indicator of basic skills need
Past participation in ND25+ programme ND25+
Past participation in NDLP programme NDLP and WTC LP: indicator of past participation and 
how many times 
On benefits at inflow WTC LP
Summary of inactive benefit history in the three 
years prior to RA; Inactive benefits are Income 
Support (IS) and Incapacity Benefits (IB)
NDLP and ND25+: Spent >50% of past three years on 
inactive benefits
WTC LP: Has been on inactive benefits in past  
three years
Summary of active benefit history in the three years 
prior to RA; Active benefits are JSA and compensation 
from New Deal for Young People (NDYP), ND25+, 
Employment Zones and WBLA and Basic Skills
NDLP: 0%; (0%, 50%); ≥50%  
ND25+: (0%, 50%); [50%, 100%); 100%
SPECIAL INDICATORS 
Looked for job on own while unemployed NDLP and ND25+
LOCAL CONDITIONS (at RA)
Total New Deal caseload at office (100s) Office indicator
Share of lone parents in New Deal caseload at office Office indicator
Quintiles of the index of multiple deprivation:  
bottom, 2nd, 3rd and 4th and top
Index of local deprivation at the super-output area 
level
Note: top quintile is the most disadvantaged
Local unemployment rate Travel-to-work-level unemployment rate
Table 2.2 Administrative outcomes
P14 earnings during 2005/06 tax year Earnings 1-2 years post-RA
P14 earnings during 2006/07 tax year Earnings 2-3 years post-RA
P14 earnings during 2007/08 tax year Earnings 3-4 years post-RA
P14 earnings during 2008/09 tax year Earnings 4-5 years post-RA
P14 earnings 2005/06 to 2008/09 Cumulative earnings 1-2 to 4-5 years post-RA
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Table 2.3 Additional survey-based outcomes for lone parent workers
HOURS
Weekly hours and whether works part- or full-time in 
the main and all current jobs
Hours per week for main current job  
Works ≤15 hours in main current job 
Works 16-29 hours in main current job 
Works ≥30 hours in main current job 
Hours per week for all current jobs 
Works ≤15 hours in all current jobs 
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs 
Works ≥30 hours in all current jobs
Future labour supply intentions/desired hours Would like to work part-time 
Would like to work full-time
EARNINGS
Hourly and weekly earnings in the main and all 
current jobs
Gross weekly earnings for main current job
Gross hourly wage for main current job
EDUCATION/TRAINING
Education/training while in work Education/training while in work 
Has obtained work-related qualifications
Future training intentions Very/fairly likely to do training next year
FRINGE BENEFITS
Fringe benefits: any, how many and specific Any fringe benefits  
Number of fringe benefits 
Pension 
Paid holidays 
Flexible hours 
Time off for family 
Sick pay 
Car/van for own use 
Crèche/nursery 
Trade union membership
JOB QUALITY
Actual and perceived measures of job quality – 
stability, patterns, roles, pressure
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work features  
Permanent job 
Shift work most of the time 
Usual work pattern during day 
Working pattern is inconvenient 
Has formal supervisory responsibilities 
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures at work 
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how they work 
Job is very/extremely stressful 
Likes job a great deal
ADVANCEMENT PROSPECTS
Advancement opportunities and actual pay rises Employer offers training for advancing  
Any promotions since started work 
Any opportunities for promotions 
Had pay rise since the previous wave/since first 
started job
Continued
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Table 2.3 Continued
ADVANCEMENT BEHAVIOUR
Various measures of advancement steps taken  
while in work 
Took steps to improve work situation/pay  
Tried to increase hours 
Tried to get a pay raise 
Tried to negotiate better terms 
Tried to change work with same employer 
Tried to get better job with different employer 
Took steps to look for other job while in work,  
since RA 
Looked for other job while in work: private 
recruitment agency 
Looked for other job while in work: career office, etc 
Looked for other job while in work: on own 
Looked for other job while in work: something else 
Wants to improve pay and terms
Future work intentions Very/fairly likely to look for different job next year  
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year
CONTACT WITH JOBCENTRE PLUS (year 2 only)
Contact with and advice from Jobcentre Plus  
when working
Contact with Jobcentre Plus when in work since RA  
Advice/help from Jobcentre Plus when in work  
since RA 
Unprompted help/advice when in work since RA
VARIOUS
Miscellaneous outcomes Self-employed 
Cost of travel to work per week 
Days off rather that holidays in the last month 
Has not been late to work in the last month
Tenure and time in employment Tenure of main current job (year 2 only) 
Share of two years since RA spent in employment, in 
part-time work and in full-time work
Subjective measures of overall well-being (Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole 
Always/often tired/depressed/bad headache  
(year 5 only) 
Child’s life is going very well (year 5 only) 
Spends >2.5h helping child with homework, etc.  
(year 5 only) 
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 
Very/quite easy financial situation now
GROWTH1
Change in hours and wages Growth rate: Hours/week, main job 
Growth rate: Hours/week, all jobs 
Growth rate: Hourly wage, main job
For NDLP only Increase in number of fringe benefits 
Any improvement in non-pecuniary work/life 
conditions
Notes: Unless otherwise specified, outcomes are measured at interview date.
1 Growth rate of y defined as [y(t) - y(t-1)]/y(t-1).
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2.2 Sample selection
In order to assess impacts for workers, one has of course to start by deciding on how to define  
a ‘worker’. 
2.2.1 Survey outcomes for the lone parent groups
While a number of definitions would have been possible and have been explored, the final choice 
has been the cleanest one: NDLP workers and WTC workers are those ‘currently’ working, i.e. those 
who are employed at the time of the 5-year survey.1 (When earlier 2-year outcomes are considered, 
workers are correspondingly defined as those in work at the 2-year survey.)
The most relevant alternative definition would have encompassed anyone who was employed at 
some point during the 5-year follow up. A number of reasons have, however, favoured focusing only 
on those employed at the time of the survey:
• For those employed at the time of the survey, considerable more outcome information is 
available, such as fringe benefits, detailed job quality indicators, advancement efforts whilst in 
work, etc.
• Preliminary analyses on year-2 survey respondents have uncovered basically the same impacts 
(and exactly the same story) for NDLP respondents ever employed within the first two years 
compared to those employed at year 2 on the subset of outcomes that are available for the ever 
employed.
• It was noted in particular that there was no loss in precision compared to the larger sample of the 
ever employed.
• A worker definition based on being ever employed in the follow-up period would not be meaningful 
for the WTC group, all of whom were supposed to be employed at random assignment. The choice 
of worker definition taken in the report is thus the same for both ERA lone parent groups.
• The change in work outcomes is more clearly defined between two waves.
When assessing the impact of ERA on outcome changes such as wage growth, the longest available 
time span to allow a change to take place has been considered. When considering outcome 
changes, NDLP workers are defined as those in work both at the 1-year survey and at the 5-year 
survey, while WTC workers are defined as those employed at random assignment (basically all of 
them) and at the 5-year survey.
2.2.2 Administrative outcomes
When looking at administrative earnings data, ‘workers’ are defined as that subset of the full ERA 
group who was ever employed during the relevant tax year in the sense of having had positive 
earnings in that tax year. Using P14 earnings data2 one can thus obtain a reliable indicator of being 
‘ever-employed in that fiscal year’.
1 This refers to employment status at the time of the 5-year survey, which took place earlier or 
later than month 60 for some respondents.
2 P14 data shows all earnings during the tax year which were assessed for income tax under 
the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) scheme for employees. While they are very accurate within that 
definition, it is important to note that this will not include any income from self-employment, 
and might not include some earnings as low as to fall below the ‘NIC Lower Earnings Limit’.  
For further details on these data see Hendra et	al. (2011).
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Note, thus that for administrative earnings outcomes, workers are drawn from the full ERA 
participant sample, not from the subset that was surveyed and that responded. The outcome is, 
however, quite broad, reflecting total earnings in a tax year.
For the ND25+ target group, only this outcome can be looked at.
Five definitions of workers are considered – four relating to the four post-inflow tax years (2005/06, 
2006/07, 2007/08 and 2008/09) and one encompassing the whole post-inflow duration (2005/06 to 
2008/09).
Box 2.1 summarises the various definitions of ‘workers’ considered in the report.
Table B.1 displays the average characteristics at the time of random assignment of the sample 
subsequently in employment (at year 5 for the lone parent groups and during the 2008/09 tax year 
for the ND25+ group) by random assignment status. 
Box 2.1: Definition of workers
a Administrative tax year earnings: ‘workers’ are those:
1 ever employed in 2005/06;
2 ever employed in 2006/07;
3 ever employed in 2007/08;
4 ever employed in 2008/09 (main group);
5 ever employed at any time between 2005/06 and 2008/09.
Ever employed means having had positive earnings in the relevant tax year.
b Additional survey outcomes for the lone parent groups:
1 main group: employed at Wave 3 (five years after random assignment);
2 employed at Wave 1 (NDLP) or at RA (WTC) and at Wave 3 for change in outcomes;
3 additional analysis: employed at Wave 2 (two years after RA);
4 additional analysis: employed at Wave 1 (NDLP) or at RA (WTC) and at Wave 2 for change 
in outcomes.
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3 Analysing ERA impacts on  
 workers: post-random  
 assignment selection bias
3.1 Post-random assignment selection bias
A carefully designed and well-administered randomised experiment such as Employment Retention 
and Advancement (ERA) can provide unbiased impact estimates only for the overall programme 
group or for subgroups defined in terms of characteristics which have not been affected by the 
programme, in particular time-invariant individual characteristics such as age (date of birth) or 
ethnicity, or characteristics measured prior to random assignment (RA), such as pre-RA education or 
local conditions. 
By contrast, subgroups defined on the basis of characteristics which may themselves have been 
affected by the programme may no longer be made up of properly balanced programme and 
control subgroups. In particular, the experimental contrast cannot be directly used to assess the 
impact of ERA on any outcome conditional on subsequent employment, such as wage rates, hours 
or wage growth. This is because the sub-sample of employed participants will in general have 
different observed and unobserved characteristics from the sub-sample of employed controls, and 
these different characteristics may in turn affect the outcome of interest. 
Figure 3.1 Post-RA selection bias
ERA participants
Program 
Group
Control
Group
Unemployed
Unemployed
Unemployed
Unemployed
Employed
Employed
RA + 1 yearRA Time
No longer 
random
ERA }
}
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Following Figure 3.1, randomisation has ensured that the (observed and unobserved) characteristics 
of the programme and control group members are the same at baseline. In order to consider wages, 
attention has to be restricted to subgroups defined on the basis of employment status after one 
year (a post-RA characteristic). The experimental contrast may, however, no longer hold between 
the employed programme and control subgroups, since the composition of those who are employed 
one year after RA may itself have been affected by the programme. If these different characteristics 
in turn affect wage rates, a simple comparison of employed treated and control subgroups will suffer 
from the so-called ‘post-RA selection bias’ (see e.g. Ham and LaLonde, 1996), with the true ERA 
impact on wages being confounded with the effect that the systematically different characteristics 
in the two selected subgroups have on wages. In other words, the experimental contrast cannot 
separate out differences between the average observed wages in the programme and control 
groups that result from the effect of the programme on wage rates from those that result from the 
effect of the programme on selection into employment.
Specifically, it is clear that if ERA affects job-finding or job-retention probabilities, the sub-sample of 
employed ERA participants is likely to have different characteristics from the employed control group 
members. For example, if the ERA treatment helps those nearest the lower margin of employability 
find and maintain employment, this will reduce the average wage rate of the programme group 
relative to the average wage rate of the control group because the treatment group will, on average, 
have characteristics that are less attractive to employers than the control group. This could be due 
to differences in either ‘observables’ (i.e. characteristics such as age, labour market experience or 
education) or ‘unobservables’ (characteristics such as motivation and self-esteem).
One might argue that if ERA has had no effect on employment probabilities (which is testable using 
experimental data3), the experimental contrast on the two employed subgroups will be unbiased. 
While strictly speaking this is not an a priori valid inference (as even in the absence of a programme 
employment effect, the programme might still have affected the composition of who it is that is 
employed), it is a plausible conjecture and one that can be further corroborated with additional 
analyses.4
In sum, the key problem to be addressed is of the standard selection bias type, that is, the 
possibility that outcomes differ between the groups being compared because their characteristics 
systematically differ, rather than because of differences resulting from the treatment being tested. 
In the case of post-RA selection bias, the characteristics of the ERA participants who have found 
(and retained) work might systematically differ from the characteristics of the controls who have 
found (and retained) work, and this imbalance in characteristics might confound any ERA impact on 
the outcomes observed for workers, such as wages.
3 One would also need to bear in mind that the failing to detect a statistically significant 
difference does not mean that there is no difference.
4 The characteristics between the two employed subgroups can be imbalanced even in the 
absence of programme impacts on average employment probabilities if:
 1 the programme has had heterogeneous employment impacts according to observed and/or 
unobserved characteristics;
 2 heterogeneity is such that it has a different signs, in particular it also has to damage the 
employment prospects of some subgroup; and 
 3 these different signs have to balance out in the overall mean.
 From a practical point of view, these conditions might be deemed quite restrictive. Note that 
it is always possible to test for heterogeneity in employment impacts based on observed 
characteristics, as well as to check the extent of balancing of observed characteristics between 
employed treated and controls.
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3.2 Experimental and non-experimental methods to measure  
 work advancement
The impact of ERA on earnings can and has been evaluated experimentally. It does not, however, 
provide a completely informative picture, since higher earnings might reflect any combination of:
• being more likely to be employed;
• working longer hours; and 
• earning a higher hourly wage. 
While the impact of ERA on employment rates can be directly evaluated experimentally, a separate 
analysis of the other two earnings-enhancing channels – hours worked and hourly wages – would be 
very informative for policy purposes. 
3.2.1 Wages, non-pecuniary benefits and job quality 
The evaluation of the wage returns from participating in ERA allows one to assess the extent to 
which individual productivity is increased by ERA services, notably via Advancement Support Adviser 
(ASA) advice and by financial incentives to undertake work-related training and to prefer full-time 
(hence possibly higher paying) jobs. 
Employment advancement might also take the form of an improvement in terms and conditions 
quite distinct from increases in wage rates. Specifically, one would want to test whether ERA has 
resulted in higher levels of non-pecuniary work-related benefits and better job characteristics. While 
this hypothesis can be tested experimentally, it can only be tested in relation to the whole eligible 
population, whether working or not. However, this case might not be particularly interesting, as 
changes in, e.g. levels of non-pecuniary benefits measured this way will also reflect changes in 
employment; even if ERA caused no increase in non-pecuniary benefits, an ERA-induced increase 
in employment would translate into an experimental increase in average levels of work-related 
benefits. On the other hand, as argued above, the experimental contrast on workers alone will not 
provide unbiased impact estimates if ERA has influenced the composition of the employed.
Workers’ outcomes such as average hourly net wages, receipt of fringe benefits, average levels of 
non-pecuniary work-related benefits and other measures of job quality thus need to be evaluated 
non-experimentally, accounting for selection into (continued) employment.
3.2.2 Hours and full-time work
In the design of ERA, full-time work was deemed as a better route out of poverty as well as to 
advancement than part-time work. In order to improve workers’ access to better jobs, ERA thus 
provided direct and strong incentives to look for a full-time job if unemployed, or to switch from 
part- to full-time work if employed. Thus, in addition to disentangling any ERA impact on earnings, 
evaluating its impact on hours worked and indeed on the probability of working full-time allows 
one to directly assess how successful ASA’s encouragement and the retention bonus have been in 
promoting full-time work.
It is again important to clarify that one can experimentally test whether ERA has led to an increase 
in full-time work, but only relative to a state made up by unemployment and part-time work, as 
one cannot experimentally test whether ERA has led to an increase in full-time work among the 
employed. With a sufficiently large ERA-induced increase in overall employment, an experimental 
increase in full-time work among the whole eligible population is in principle compatible with an 
ERA-induced reduction in full-time work amongst the employed.
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3.2.3 Direct measures of progression
Similarly, non-experimental methods are required to assess ERA impacts on direct measures of the 
change in the quality of jobs (e.g. growth in hourly wage rate or in work-related benefits) over time.  
In these cases, the subgroups of interest would be restricted to those individuals observed to be in 
work in two periods of time, where ERA may again influence who it is that works and remains in work.
3.2.4 Other measures of ERA impacts 
Another dimension of ERA’s effectiveness where non-experimental methods can potentially shed 
more light than experimental ones is in terms of undertaking training or education while in work. 
This is directly encouraged by the training bonus, as well as arguably by the ASAs.
While the finding of an experimental increase in the probability of combining work and training 
among the whole eligible population would be interesting per se, it would not imply that ERA 
increased training for those in work, as it could equally be the case that employees are more likely to 
participate in training and that the observed increase in training while in work is simply capturing the 
ERA-induced increase in employment. 
Finally, to assess the ‘intensity’ of the underlying ERA treatment once in work, a critical evaluation 
question relates to how much working members of the programme group were actually involved 
with Jobcentre Plus and used its support compared to working members of the control group. While 
one might expect that Jobcentre Plus services stopped for the controls upon finding a job, survey 
information showed that this was far from the case, highlighting the presence of a demand for 
continued support by newly employed lone parents and long term unemployed. To fully appreciate 
any ERA impact for workers it is thus essential to assess the differential intensity of  
post-employment support among workers.
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4 Methodological approaches 
This chapter starts by setting up the framework and basic notation. It then briefly outlines in some 
more detail the different methodological approaches and their underlying assumptions, mainly 
to be in a position to highlight some issues which are important for a correct interpretation of the 
empirical results. 
Throughout, the discussion is kept as informal as its rather technical nature allows. For those who 
would still rather skip this section, the following is a very straightforward summary of the three 
approaches that have been adopted, which should be sufficient to allow one to follow the results in 
Chapters 5 and 6:
a Assuming that selection into employment is the same for Employment and Retention 
Advancement (ERA) and control group members.
 Indirect support for this assumption can be obtained by considering whether all relevant 
characteristics that are observed are balanced between ERA and control group workers.
b Controlling for observable differences between ERA and control group workers. 
 Under the assumption that the only outcome-relevant differences between the two groups of 
workers are those which are captured in the many characteristics observed in the data (such 
as age, gender, education, duration on benefit, labour market history), one can use the wage 
outcomes of those control group workers who are observationally similar to the ERA workers to 
estimate what the wage outcomes of the former would have been had they not received ERA. 
c Recognising that ERA workers may differ from control group workers in important ways that the 
analyst cannot directly observe.
 Under a set of assumptions, one can not only test whether this is in fact the case, but 
experiment with a control function approach to allow for this residual bias.
4.1 Analysis framework and overview
In order to estimate the causal impact of offering ERA services and incentives on employment-
related outcomes of workers, such as hourly wages, one would ideally need to compare the average 
wage of the employed ERA group to the average wage that these same individuals would have 
received had they not been entitled to ERA – an unobserved counterfactual. The evaluation problem 
thus consists in providing unbiased estimates of this average counterfactual through the use of 
appropriate methods and usually untestable assumptions. 
Trying to estimate the counterfactual non-ERA wage for the employed ERA participants with the 
observed mean wage of the employed controls will yield unbiased estimates only if employed ERA 
and employed controls do not systematically differ in terms of any characteristic affecting wages.  
If ERA had been randomised on the subgroup of workers, this would indeed have been the case.  
ERA was, however, randomly assigned on the full sample at baseline, so that nothing ensures that 
the above condition holds. Indeed, as argued in Chapter 3, post-random assignment (RA) selection 
bias would be present if ERA has affected the composition of who it is that is employed at the point 
of evaluation. In this case, some of the difference in wages observed between ERA and control 
workers is attributable to these individual differences, not to ERA itself.
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Formally, let Y be the observed wage, Y
1
 be the wage of a given worker if they received ERA and Y
0
 
the wage of the same worker if they did not receive ERA, and let the dummy variable ERA∈ {0,1} 
denote ERA eligibility. 
The parameter of interest is the average effect of ERA on ERA workers (the so-called average effect 
of treatment on the treated, ATT):
 ATT ≡ E(Y
1
–Y
0
 | work, ERA=1) = E(Y
1
 | work, ERA=1) – E(Y
0
 | work, ERA=1)  (1)
Note that this set-up is general enough to allow the ERA impact, Y
1
–Y
0
, to differ among workers. 
In fact, a priori there is no reason to expect all workers to benefit from the ERA services and 
incentives in exactly the same way. 
As to the estimation of (1), the average observed wage of ERA workers is an unbiased estimate of 
the first component, E(Y | work, ERA=1) = E(Y
1
 | work, ERA=1). The average wage that ERA workers 
would have earned had they not received ERA, E(Y
0
 | work, ERA=1), is the unobserved counterfactual 
to be estimated through an appropriate choice of methods and assumptions. 
To proceed, one can invoke three alternative types of assumptions:
1 Assume balancing biases between the working members of the programme and control groups.
2 Assume that there is selection on observable characteristics, but not on outcome-relevant 
unobservables or, alternatively, that biases resulting from unobservables balance once the 
observables are taken into account.
3 Allow for selection on both the observables and the unobservables.
Scenario (1) allows one to directly compare the employment-related outcomes of the working 
programme and control group members, as it assumes away the post-random assignment selection 
bias. In this scenario, E(Y
0
 | work, ERA=1) = E(Y
0
 | work, ERA=0), so that the average observed wage of 
working controls can be taken as an unbiased estimate of the average wage that ERA workers would 
have earned had they not received ERA.
Alternatively, there are broadly two categories of non-experimental methods to account for 
selection bias when evaluating outcomes conditional on employment those that attempt to: 
• measure all individual factors that may be the cause of such dependence and then match on 
these observed variables – Scenario (2); and 
• control for the correlation between individual factors and employment choices by assuming that 
a subset of the observed variables drive selection into employment but not the employment 
outcomes directly (exclusion restriction) and generally invoking parametric assumptions – 
Scenario (3). 
Before considering the three scenarios in more detail, it is important to summarise that the different 
approaches address the selection process into (continued) employment in different ways, seem a 
priori quite feasible in the ERA evaluation and present both advantages and disadvantages. Indeed 
no single non-experimental method is a priori uniformly superior to others, as they all rely on 
alternative and ultimately untestable assumptions. When the data has allowed it, both types of 
non-experimental analyses have thus been performed and compared in terms of the sensitivity of 
the resulting estimates when applied to a common dataset. By contrasting the relative magnitude 
of the different estimates, the report has tried to infer what kind of selection and outcome models 
underlie the data. 
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4.2 Balancing biases 
In this scenario, it is acknowledged that biases will result from restricting the analysis to only 
members of the sample who work, because such individuals are most likely to significantly differ 
from those who do not work. 
However, it is assumed that the biases are similar for the programme and control groups, in other 
words, that the selection process into employment is the same for the ERA and control samples. 
Comparing the working members of the two groups, the biases are thus offsetting and cancel 
out. In this case, the observed mean wage of control workers, E(Y
0
 | work, ERA=0), would be an 
unbiased estimate of the counterfactual non-ERA wage for ERA workers, E(Y
0
 | work, ERA=1), and just 
comparing average wages between employed programme and employed control group members 
would provide unbiased ERA impact estimates.
This assumption is most plausible if ERA has had no impact on who it is that works, hence on 
the sample selection process resulting in the sample of those in work (see footnote 4). A test of 
whether ERA has had an impact on employment probabilities can reliably be performed by using 
experimental data. 
However, even in the presence of an ERA impact on employment probabilities, the two sub-
groups might still happen to be balanced in terms of wage-relevant observable and unobservable 
characteristics.
Hence indirect support for this scenario can further be obtained by considering whether 
observed characteristics are balanced between ERA and control workers. If all outcome-relevant 
characteristics one can observe happened to be balanced, it might be defensible to argue that those 
characteristics that happen not to be recorded in the data are likely to be balanced as well.
One can test the amount of balancing between the observables between the two employed 
subgroups. In addition to testing whether characteristics are individually unbalanced between the 
two subsamples (e.g. using two-tailed t-tests), the following are some simple indicators of the 
existing extent of overall balancing:
• pseudo R2: from probit estimation of the conditional probability of being an ERA worker as opposed 
to a control worker, this measure can help gauge how well the observable characteristics explain 
programme assignment among workers;
• p>chi2: a formal test of how different the two groups are in terms of observed characteristics. 
Specifically, it is the p-value of the likelihood-ratio test, testing the hypothesis that the regressors 
taken jointly do not help predict programme assignment among workers. Another way to look 
at this is as a test that the two groups being considered do not significantly differ in terms of the 
observables taken jointly;
• median and mean bias: median and mean standardised percentage difference, median and 
mean taken over all the characteristics. For a given characteristic X, the standardised difference is 
the difference of the sample means in the two groups as a percentage of the square root of the 
average of the sample variances in the two groups pooled.
So, the lower the pseudo R2, the higher p>chi2 and the lower the mean or median bias, the more 
balanced are the groups. In particular, if (p>chi2) > 0.010, the groups can be regarded as balanced.
As a final note, such balancing tests are cast within the usual inferential paradigm of a null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the groups. It is this important to note that even if 
this null hypothesis of balance cannot be rejected, there may still be some selection on observables. 
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Impact estimates from methods that do control for observables should always be preferred, 
because (apart from higher precision) they would control for chance or residual imbalance in 
observables.
4.3 Selection on observable characteristics
This scenario relaxes the previous one in that it allows the selection process into employment to 
differ between ERA and control group members in terms of observable characteristics – but not in 
terms of outcome-relevant unobservables or, alternatively, that biases resulting from unobservables 
balance out once the observables are taken into account.
Formally, it is required that conditional on a sufficiently rich set of observed characteristics X, the 
employed ERA and control group members would have experienced the same non-ERA wage, on 
average:
 E(Y
0
 | work, ERA=1, X) = E(Y
0
 | work, ERA=0, X)
This ‘selection-on-observables assumption’ thus requires the analyst to capture all the outcome-
relevant differences between employed ERA and control group members. To the extent that 
unobserved differences remain between the two groups that are important determinants of 
employment-related outcomes such as wages, such differences will erroneously show up as part of 
the ERA impact estimates. 
The reliability of such estimates thus crucially depends on the range and quality of characteristics 
observed. Section 2.1 has summarised the comprehensive data that has been assembled; in the 
following, its content in relation to the estimation problem to be addressed is briefly considered. 
The available background information – an extensive collection of individual, office and local area 
characteristics most likely to affect individuals’ labour market performance – is believed to be of 
good quality and scope. 
In particular, the BIF combined with the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)/Work and 
Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) data provide:
• demographics (gender, age, ethnicity, partner and children, housing) and human capital  
indicators (education);
• information on an individual’s current spell at random assignment (indicators of a very recent/
current employment spell, how long it took them to start the Gateway or volunteer for New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) once having become mandatory for it or being told about it, and of 
whether ND25 Plus (ND25+) entrants volunteered for the Gateway ahead of time);
• very detailed work history (pay, hours, experience), active and inactive benefit history and past 
programme participation history, going back to the three years prior to random assignment.5 
Specifically, in addition to variables summarising the proportion of time employed and the 
proportion spent on benefits – separately on active benefits (Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and 
compensation whilst on a labour market programme) and inactive benefits (Income Support 
(IS) and Incapacity Benefits (IB)) – the data also include variables capturing the extent of past 
participation in voluntary employment programmes (as a crude indicator of willingness to improve 
one’s circumstances), in the ND25+ (a mandatory programme) and in Basic Skills (a programme 
designed to address basic literacy, numeracy and IT skills).
5 The previous literature has indicated the potential for detailed labour market histories (like 
those constructed here) to help proxy unobserved traits (see, for example, Heckman and 
Smith, 1999, Heckman et	al., 1998, and Heckman et	al., 1999).
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• a number of direct indicators of individual heterogeneity such as basic skills needs, disability and 
health barriers, transport barriers (including access to car and having a driving licence), childcare, 
housing or other problems, and for the New Deal groups, whether the individual has looked for job 
on their own while unemployed;
• travel-to-work area unemployment rates and the deprivation of the area the individual lives in 
(local index of multiple deprivation).
Local area-level data further provides important information on the conditions of the local labour 
market in which persons reside, which are known to affect both the levels and dynamics of earnings 
and employment.
Such strong baseline information could warrant the use of strategies based on the selection-on-
observables assumption, whereby unbiased ERA impact estimates are obtained by appropriately 
controlling for any imbalance between working members of the programme and control groups that 
is observed in terms of measured characteristics X.
Differences between working ERA and control group members that result from observables can be 
corrected statistically in a regression framework (simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), interacted 
regression and, for binary outcomes, a Probit model) or more robustly by using matching methods.
Simple OLS regression can suffer from misspecification bias if the observed characteristics affect 
the outcome in a non-linear fashion and/or if the impact of ERA varies according to workers’ 
characteristics. Both these biases are further exacerbated if some workers fall outside of the 
so-called common support of the observables, i.e. if there are ERA workers for whom there are 
no comparable control group workers. In this case, performing OLS might hide the fact that the 
researcher is actually comparing incomparable individuals by using the (linear) extrapolation.
A fully interacted linear (regression) model (FILM) allows the effect of ERA to vary according to each 
observable characteristic. An additional advantage of this specification is that one can actually test 
for the presence of such heterogeneous effects.
OLS regression (simple or interacted) does not take into account the potentially binary nature of the 
outcome variable. Probit models by contrast do appropriately model binary outcomes, but do so on 
the basis of a distributional assumption.
Non-parametric matching methods are by contrast very robust: they do not restrict at all the way in 
which workers’ characteristics affect either the outcome or the impact of ERA. In addition, matching 
methods simply compare means, and are thus equally appropriate for either continuous or binary 
outcomes. Finally, the focus of matching methods is on the actual comparability of groups. Indeed, 
one of the main advantages of matching methods is that one can easily check how well matching 
has balanced the available observables between the ERA and the matched control workers. If 
balancing cannot be achieved, the researcher needs to accept the fact that the working ERA and 
working control group members are just too different in terms of the observables and that there 
simply is not enough information in the available data to achieve sufficiently close – and thus 
reliable – matches. Matching quality is typically summarised with the balancing indicators described 
in Section 4.2.
As a final note, if no heterogeneity in impacts is found, the estimate of the effect of ERA from simple 
OLS will basically coincide with the one from the fully interacted model. If in addition the two groups 
of interest can be selected so as to be comparable (i.e. there is no serious common support problem 
and matching can achieve a good balancing of characteristics), both sets of estimates will be very 
close to the one from the matching estimator. As Section 5.3 shows, this often turns out to be the 
case in the analysis in this report.
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4.4 Selection on observables and unobservables
The most general case is the one where the selection process into employment is allowed to differ 
between ERA and control group members in terms of both observed and unobserved factors. 
Approaches to deal with these two sources of bias fall within the ‘control function’ method. 
These models, which build upon the classical sample selection model introduced by Heckman 
(1979), add a selection term to the wage regression to control for differences in outcome-relevant 
unobservables between the two groups of workers.
The selection term itself is obtained from a separate Probit model in which employment status is 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables, which differ from the set of explanatory variables 
included in the outcome (here wage) regression. 
The model thus crucially relies on an ‘exclusion restriction’ – an observable variable which affects 
the probability to be in work, but does not affect work outcomes directly. Potential excluded 
variables that could be thought of affecting work probabilities but, conditional on the other observed 
variables, be excluded from the outcomes equation include, e.g. barriers to work due to transport 
problems or childcare problems, not having access to a car or not having a driving licence, local 
unemployment rates, the presence of a partner or other adult in the household who is in work. 
There are thus a number of potential instruments in the available data; it is, however, crucial to test 
their power first, i.e. to test whether they do in fact have a strong impact on the chance of being in 
work. It has in any case be kept in mind that although their validity can be discussed and defended, 
eventually all instruments rely on untestable exclusion restriction. 
The success of this approach, however, depends on how well a set of fairly strong assumptions is 
satisfied; these models are framed within a formal set-up and require additional technical conditions 
for identification of the effects and at times quite complex estimation methods, suffering at times 
from unstable estimates and the possibility of convergence problems. 
In particular, these models usually impose that the unobservables are jointly normal and 
homoskedastic, though such parametric assumptions can be relaxed. The control function approach 
can also be modified to properly model a binary outcome variable, such as working full-time as 
opposed to part-time.
A particularly attractive feature of these types of models is that (relying on the validity of the 
exclusion restriction and of the other control function assumptions) they allow one to test for 
selection into work based on unobserved characteristics such as ‘ability’, or in other words, to test 
the appropriateness of approaches relying on the selection-on-observable assumption.
The control function model was further extended to allow the unobserved determinants of the 
probability to be in work to be potentially correlated with both unobserved individual characteristics 
and idiosyncratic ERA impacts. The extended model thus allows for selection into work to be 
potentially based on both unobserved characteristics as well as on unobserved individual-specific 
ERA impacts, and provides the analyst with the basis for separately assessing the importance 
of residual selection on unobserved ERA impacts and on unobserved individual heterogeneity, 
evidence which can be of interest in its own right. Noteworthy is the fact that to achieve separate 
identification of the two selection terms the randomised nature of ERA has been exploited 
throughout.
The model was further extended to allow for heterogeneity in ERA impacts based on observed 
characteristics (e.g. age, education, ethnicity) in the underlying wage model. In this case, impacts can 
be estimated for the ERA workers (ATT), for the control group workers (ATNT) and for all workers (ATE).
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Appendix A derives the standard control function model as well as its extension to allow for 
selection into work based on unobserved ERA impacts.
In the sections discussing the empirical results (Chapters 5 and 6), a number of boxes present in a 
concise way the control function results, model summary and relevant diagnostics. Specifically, for 
each outcome considered, the box shows:
• the instrument(s) used, together with their first stage power (i.e. their significance in predicting 
employment status);
• a brief description of the type of control function model that was chosen based on specification 
tests (i.e. whether heterogeneity in ERA impacts based on observables, selection on unobserved 
ERA impacts or non-normality were detected and hence allowed for);
• evidence that was uncovered on the presence (i.e. whether statistically significant or not) and 
direction (i.e. positive or negative) of selection into work based on unobserved characteristics; and
• the control function estimate of the impact of ERA on the outcome of interest; if allowing for 
observed heterogeneity in impacts, estimates for ERA group workers, control group workers and 
all workers are presented.
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5 Impacts of Employment  
 Retention and Advancement  
 on working lone parents 
5.1 Descriptive analysis of outcomes of lone parent workers
This chapter first establishes the benchmark against which to assess the impacts of Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) conditional on work by briefly describing the outcomes 
experienced by the employed members of the control group. It then moves on to show the results of 
a descriptive analysis of the wages and hours observed for the employed ERA and control subgroups 
among the lone parent target groups. 
5.1.1 Establishing the benchmark: outcomes of the control group workers
The workers from the control group provide the baseline non-ERA outcomes for those lone parents 
who found a job following New Deal Lone Parents (NDLP) and those Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
recipients who were (still) in work five years after random assignment (RA). Table 5.1 displays the 
average values for the detailed survey-based outcomes in terms of which ERA will be assessed in the 
following sections. 
Both lone parent groups are normally (i.e. without ERA) found to work around 27 hours per week on 
average; there is an interesting distinction between the two groups, though, as almost half (46.4 per 
cent) of former NDLP participants work full-time (30 hours or more), compared to 41.8 per cent of 
the WTC group. The hours of the latter group are concentrated between 16 and 19 hours per week. 
Both groups, however, would like to work full-time in the future to the same extent (26 per cent). 
The share of both groups investing in training or education courses while in employment is 
remarkably high, with two-thirds of the WTC group and slightly over half of the NDLP group having 
participated in such activities since having been assigned to the control group. Participation has 
mostly been concentrated in the latter part of the follow-up period (three to five years after RA). 
The control group is by itself engaging in such activities to a considerable extent without any ERA 
training incentives or bonuses; it transpires though that 40 per cent of WTC workers’ employers do 
offer training for advancing, so this might be the most likely channel behind the large take-up rates. 
Whatever its origins, though, this is an important benchmark to keep in mind when assessing ERA’s 
impacts on the take-up of training once in work (for an in-depth analysis of the delivery, take-up, 
and outcomes of the training support and incentives provided through ERA see Hendra et	al., 2011). 
Intentions to engage in training or education activities in the next year are particularly strong, with 
67 per cent of both working groups having expressed such an objective.
Despite having engaged in more training activities whilst employed, the working WTC control group is 
just as likely to have obtained formal qualifications as the working NDLP control group (40 per cent). 
In terms of job quality, WTC group members are in better jobs across a range of job characteristics 
compared to workers from the NDLP control group. Hourly remuneration is slightly higher on average 
(£8.4 compared to 7.5), they have a slightly higher probability of enjoying any fringe benefit (98 per 
cent compared to 96 per cent) and slightly more fringe benefits (4.5 compared to 4). 
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The incidence of some important fringe benefits is particularly high among these two groups of 
workers, again slightly higher for the WTC group possibly reflecting their more established work 
history (95 per cent and 90 per cent have paid holidays, 82 per cent and 75 per cent have sick pay, 
80 per cent and 70 per cent have time off for family reasons). Most of these jobs are of a permanent 
type (96 per cent and 90 per cent), around one-quarter entail formal supervisory responsibilities  
(23 per cent and 18 per cent) and the majority is liked a great deal/quite a lot by workers (70 per 
cent). For around 45 per cent of them the job offers opportunities for promotions and indeed 27 per 
cent of them have had one since starting the job. Four-fifths of the WTC workers and over two-thirds 
of the NDLP workers have actually had a pay rise.
In terms of advancement steps, around 60 per cent of these control group workers have taken steps 
to improve their work situation or pay. Most have tried to increase hours (43 per cent) and to obtain 
new training or qualifications (40 per cent), and one-quarter has taken steps to look for another job 
while in work, mostly on their own. Around 43 per cent of them will want to improve pay and terms 
at some point, and hardly anyone sees themselves as likely to stop working in the next year.
Only around seven per cent of these control group workers are self-employed.
The average weekly cost of getting to work is £11 for the NDLP control group workers and almost 
£13 for the WTC control group workers (these costs look reasonably in line with those given in 
Fujiwara, 2010). Most of these workers are able to arrive to work on time (93 per cent).
While the WTC control group workers have obviously spent a much higher share of the five years 
since RA in work (97 per cent against 77 per cent of the NDLP workers who by contrast had started 
out as unemployed), the share of that time spent in full-time work (slightly less than one-third) is 
the same between the two groups.
Finally, life satisfaction is low overall, with 74 per cent of both working groups claiming to be very 
dissatisfied or dissatisfied with life as a whole; given that 63 per cent report that their child’s life is 
going very well, such overall dissatisfaction is most likely to stem from financial worries (53 per cent 
of the WTC and 60 per cent of the NDLP control group workers reporting to be facing a very or quite 
difficult financial situation at the time of the interview) and stress- or fatigue-related health issues 
(45 per cent of workers reporting to always or often feel tired, depressed or suffering from a bad 
headache).
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Table 5.1 Baseline average outcomes of control group lone parents employed  
 at year 5
NDLP WTC
Hours
Hours per week for main current job 25.9 26.6 
Works ≤15 hours in main current job (%) 9.6 5.6
Works 16-29 hours in main current job (%) 44.1 52.6
Works ≥30 hours in main current job (%) 46.4 41.8
Hours per week for all current jobs 26.5 27.2
Works ≤15 hours in all current jobs (%) 7.8 4.4
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs (%) 44.8 51.9
Works ≥30 hours in all current jobs (%) 47.4 43.7
Would like to work part-time, <30 (%) 12.3 12.7
Would like to work full-time, ≥30 (%) 25.8 26.8
Earnings 
Hourly wage for main current job 7.7 8.4
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 207.7 226.8
Education/training 
Education/training while in work in years 3-5 (%) 51.0 58.1
Education/training while in work since RA (%) 56.5 66.2
Has obtained work-related qualifications in years 3-5 (%) 24.8 22.7
Has obtained work-related qualifications since RA (%) 40.0 40.3
Very/fairly likely to do training next year (%) 66.5 67.1
Fringe benefits
Fringe benefits: any (%) 96.4 98.4
Fringe benefits: number 4.0 4.5
Fringe benefits: pension (%) 58.6 69.9
Fringe benefits: paid holidays (%) 89.6 95.9
Fringe benefits: flexible hours (%) 59.1 59.0
Fringe benefits: time off for family (%) 70.6 79.1
Fringe benefits: sick pay (%) 74.6 82.4
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use (%) 4.7 4.4
Fringe benefits: crèche/nursery (%) 5.3 8.7
Fringe benefits: trade union membership (%) 39.9 49.7
Job quality
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work features 11.6 12.1
Permanent job (%) 90.1 95.6
Shift work most of the time (%) 20.5 14.7
Usual work pattern during day (%) 92.4 94.8
Working pattern is inconvenient (%) 22.9 19.3
Has formal supervisory responsibilities (%) 18.7 23.4
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures at work (%) 14.0 17.4
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how they work (%) 69.0 68.6
Job is very/extremely stressful (%) 17.6 17.6
Likes job a great deal/quite a lot (%) 71.2 70.3
Continued
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Table 5.1 Continued
NDLP WTC
Advancement prospects
Employer offers training for advancing (%) 40.0 37.6
Any promotions since started work (%) 27.8 26.8
Any opportunities for promotions (%) 45.0 42.3
Had had a pay rise (%) 68.6 80.3
Advancement behaviour 
Took steps to improve work situation/pay (%) 60.0 56.7
Tried to increase hours (%) 41.8 44.0
Tried to get a pay raise (%) 26.0 29.8
Tried to negotiate better terms (%) 30.1 28.6
Tried to change to work with same employer (%) 19.1 22.3
Tried to get better job with different employer (%) 28.1 26.0
Tried to get new training or qualifications (%) 39.8 40.0
Took steps to look for other job while in work, since RA (%) 26.9 25.3
Looked for other job while in work: private recruitment agency (%) 6.8 5.6
Looked for other job while in work: career office etc (%) 3.9 3.2
Looked for other job while in work: on own (%) 26.0 24.4
Looked for other job while in work: something else (%) 8.4 8.2
Will want to improve pay and terms at some point (%) 42.7 44.6
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year (%) 3.0 4.1
Miscellaneous 
Self-employed (%) 6.4 7.0
Cost of travel to work per week 11.2 12.7
Had days off work other than holidays in past four weeks (%) 25.5 19.4
Has not been late to work in the last month (%) 92.5 92.7
Time in employment
Share of 5 years since RA spent in employment (%) 77.0 96.1
Share of 5 years since RA spent in part-time work (%) 45.3 62.7
Share of 5 years since RA spent in full-time work (%) 31.3 32.9
Well-being
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole (%) 73.9 73.9
Always/often tired/depressed/bad headache (%) 44.8 46.5
Child’s life is going very well (%) 63.1 62.4
Spends >2.5h helping child with homework, etc. (%) 28.3 21.9
Very/quite difficult financial situation now (%) 59.5 52.5
Very/quite easy financial situation now (%) 7.8 9.3
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5.1.2 Observed outcomes of ERA and control group workers
Moving on to consider differences in the observed outcomes of the ERA and control subgroups of 
workers, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the distributions by treatment status of the two most important 
work outcomes – hourly wages and hours worked.
For both NDLP and WTC workers, the ERA and control subgroups who are employed either at year 2 
or at year 5 display exactly the same distribution of hourly wages. Not only are the distributions of 
wages of ERA and control group workers visibly the same at both points in time, but a formal test of 
the equality of the distribution functions cannot be rejected at any level.6
The story in terms of hours per week is, however, more complex. For both the NDLP and WTC 
workers at year 2, the hour distributions of the ERA and control groups are visibly and statistically 
different, highlighting a clear ‘move’ by the programme group away from part-time to full-time 
work. In particular, a sharp decrease in the proportion working 16 hours per week is accompanied by 
a doubling of the proportions of those working 30 and 35 hours per week. 
However, by the fifth year following RA, the story is different between the two lone parent groups 
(note that the findings at the two points in time are not necessarily comparable as they pertain to 
potentially different samples of workers). The distributions of hours per week are now statistically 
the same for ERA and control workers among the NDLP group, while the differences have persisted 
for the WTC group. ERA workers from the WTC group are still much less likely to work 16 hours per 
week and still double as likely to work 30 hours per week as the employed control group.
These raw differences indicate that there has been no raw impact of ERA on wages, but a sizeable 
raw effect on hours in the second year, which persists in the fifth year for the WTC group.
Will these raw differences remain once account has been taken of the potentially different 
composition of programme participants who are in work compared to control group members  
who are in work?
The first step taken in the next subsection is to assess just how different the composition of the  
two worker subgroups is in terms of the rich set of observed characteristics that are available.
6 As the charts show, a non-trivial proportion of workers appear to have been earning below 
the minimum wage of £5.35 for year 2 and £5.73 for year 5. Specifically, 12 per cent of WTC 
workers have gross hourly wages below the minimum wage at both years, while as many as 
23 per cent of NDLP year 2 workers and 18 per cent of NDLP year 5 workers earn below the 
minimum wage. It has to be noted that gross hourly wage may not be perfectly measured,  
as it has been derived from weekly earnings and weekly hours reported by survey respondents.
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Figure 5.1 Hourly wage rate for the main current job of lone parent workers
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Figure 5.2 Hours per week in all current jobs of lone parent workers
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Figure 5.2 Continued
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5.2 Balancing of characteristics between employed subgroups
Selection of individuals into work or continued employment is clearly present and very strong for 
both lone parent groups: looking at the control group members who are employed at year 2 (or 5) 
compared to those control group members who are not in work at year 2 (or 5) reveals two highly 
selected sub-samples. In particular, the control group members who are in work are systematically 
different from the non-employed control group members, displaying much more favourable labour 
market characteristics (see Appendix B). To appreciate just how different the two subgroups are 
in terms of pre-RA characteristics, consider those control group members employed at year 5. 
Compared to control group members not in work at year 5, the former are less likely to live in 
deprived areas, they are served by Jobcentre Plus offices with a lower New Deal caseload, they are 
older, less likely to be single, less likely to belong to an ethnic minority group, more likely to have 
only one child, their youngest child is older, they are much more highly educated (and more likely 
to have academic education), far more likely to have access to a car or to have a driving licence, 
more likely to live in private housing, less likely to have a transport, basic skill or housing problem 
and stronger labour market histories (in terms of a higher probability of being in work at RA, having 
been in work and having had jobs in the three years prior, longer work experience and a lower 
likelihood to have been on inactive benefits during the previous three years). Indeed, the groups of 
employed versus non-employed controls are unbalanced at any confidence level in terms of pre-RA 
characteristics. The same is true when looking at the composition of employed compared to non-
employed ERA group members.
The issue, however, is not whether strong selection into employment is present or not, but whether 
there is differential selection into work between ERA and control group members. If that were not 
the case and the biases from selection into work were similar for the programme and control groups 
(the balancing biases scenario of Section 4.2), then the subgroups of employed ERA and employed 
control group members could be directly compared, and the difference in their observed work-
related outcomes would provide an unbiased estimate of ERA impacts.
As argued in Section 4.2, this scenario is most plausible in the absence of ERA impacts on who it is 
that works. The absence of ERA impacts on employment probabilities can reliably be tested using 
experimental data. However, even in the presence of an ERA impact on employment probabilities, 
it is possible for the two sub-groups to still be balanced in terms of relevant observable and 
unobservable characteristics. Indirect support for this scenario can thus be obtained by considering 
whether observed characteristics are balanced between ERA and control workers. If all outcome-
relevant characteristics one can observe happened to be balanced, it might be defensible to argue 
that those characteristics that happen not to be recorded in the data are likely to be balanced as 
well. Several indicators are available to measure the extent of balancing in terms of observable  
(see Section 4.2).
Let us start by considering ERA impacts on the probability of belonging to the employed sample in 
year 2 and in year 5. As shown in Table 5.2, for both NDLP and WTC respondents, at both years 2 
and 5, no ERA impact could be detected. The point estimates are very similar for both lone parent 
groups, 2.7 percentage points in year 2 falling to 0.3 percentage points in year 5, none of the 
estimates being even remotely significant.
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And indeed, while the employed and non-employed control (or programme) group members are 
systematically different, the employed programme and employed control group members are 
statistically indistinguishable in terms of observed characteristics, for both target groups and both at 
year 2 and year 5 (see Table 5.2 and for more details Appendix B). Indeed, even the distributions of 
important continuous observables are balanced between ERA and control group workers  
(see Appendix B).
Similarly, no ERA impacts could be detected on the probability that respondents are employed at 
two points in time; balancing of observed characteristics between employed treated and employed 
controls was also found to hold when restricting attention on those employed at two points in time.
The only case where characteristics were found to be overall unbalanced (at the 5% level) are for 
WTC year 2 respondents with non-missing hourly wage information at year 2 and for those with 
non-missing wage information at both year 2 and RA. For the specific analyses looking at this 
outcome for the WTC group at year 2, reliance on models properly adjusting for observables is thus 
crucial to correct the observed imbalance.
Box 5.1 looks in some detail at a candidate conditioning variable derived for NDLP participants from 
the first year survey – having looked for a job on their own while unemployed. 
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Box 5.1: NDLP survey 1 respondents: Looked for a job on their own while 
unemployed 
Per cent looking for a job on their own in the first year since RA and marginal effects
ERA Controls p>|t| δ given X p-value 
Full sample of year 1 respondents 70.4 71.4 0.579 -0.013 0.580
Full sample of year 2 respondents 70.6 71.7 0.566 -0.018 0.484
Full sample of year 5 respondents 70.0 70.6 0.770 -0.003 0.924
Employed sample at year 2 68.6 73.0 0.085 -0.089 0.017
Employed sample at year 5 67.6 69.8 0.447 -0.038 0.334
Note: δ given X is the marginal effect of having searched on one’s own on the probability of belonging to 
the ERA as opposed to the control group, from a Probit model controlling for all other covariates.
Non-
Employed employed p>|t| δ given X p-value 
Control group at year 2 73.0 70.1 0.291 0.107 0.007
Control group at year 5 69.8 71.7 0.555 0.038 0.387
Note: δ given X is the marginal effect of having searched on one’s own on the probability that a control 
group member belongs to the employed as opposed to the non-employed, from a Probit model 
controlling for all other covariates.
It was thought that information on whether unemployed NDLP participants had looked for 
a job on their own in the first year after RA could provide important information on generally 
unobserved individual motivation and initiative. The only concern was that this variable – 
recorded in the year 1 survey – could potentially have been affected by ERA and would thus  
not be appropriate as a conditioning variable. The first table above, however, completely dispels 
such a concern, as this variable is perfectly balanced between ERA and controls from the full 
sample of year 1 respondents, from the full sample of year 2 respondents and from the full 
sample of year 3 respondents.
The second issue relates to whether having looked for a job on one’s own would indeed capture 
some interesting heterogeneity. The results from the tables above indicate that the answer is 
affirmative at year 2, but no longer so at year 5, a time when individual search behaviour four 
years before no longer seems to matter much. Specifically, control group NDLPs who searched 
on their own were ceteris paribus 11 percentage points more likely to be employed at year 
2 than control group NDLP who did not look for a job on their own whilst unemployed (this 
difference only arising once controlling for other characteristics.) However, NDLP control group 
members who are employed and non-employed at year 5 do not systematically differ in terms 
of their individual search behaviour four years before. 
Similarly, ERA group NDLPs who are employed at year 2 are significantly less likely to have 
searched on their own than employed NDLP from the control group (4.5 percentage points in 
the raw data, increased to nine percentage points once controlling for other characteristics), 
though by year 5 such differences have disappeared.
In conclusion, this variable seemed to qualify to be among the conditioning set, this being 
especially the case for year 2.
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5.3 Overall impacts for the lone parent groups
5.3.1 Introduction
This section presents the results concerning the impact of ERA on the outcomes of NDLP and WTC 
workers. While impacts at both year 2 and year 5 have been estimated and are discussed and 
contrasted in the following, impacts at year 5 are of special interest, given that they are the ones 
that show whether ERA has had any impact that lasted beyond the period of ERA participation.  
Since participants were entitled to receive ERA services and incentives for up to 33 months, the  
five year results show impacts for more than two years post-programme. Impacts at year 5 thus 
offer a sufficiently long post-programme period to assess whether the financial incentives and 
adviser support provided under ERA were enough to have a lasting impact on placing and keeping 
its participants in well-paying and good quality jobs, or else whether any impacts disappeared once 
that support was withdrawn.
Survey	data
Impact estimates presented in this section are based on survey data7, relating to the time of 
interview or to the fifth year post-RA. As a notational shortcut, in the following estimates are 
referred to as pertaining to year 2 (year 5). This has to be interpreted as pertaining to the time of the 
Wave 2 (Wave 3) survey interviews, which for some participants fell before or after the second (fifth) 
anniversary of having been randomly assigned.8
The	‘common	subgroup’
In presenting impacts at these two points in time it may come natural to compare and contrast 
the results. It has, however, to be kept in mind that the two sets of impact estimates pertain to 
two potentially different samples of workers – those who responded to the 2nd year survey and 
were employed at that time, and those who responded to the 5th year survey and were employed 
at that time. To allay some of these concerns, some additional analyses have been performed to 
check whether year 5 survey respondents were different from year 2 survey respondents in terms of 
observables and more importantly whether 5 year survey respondents who were employed at year 5 
were different from year 2 survey respondents who were employed at year 2 (note that non-overlap 
in the latter case includes both those who have not been interviewed at one wave and/or who were 
not employed at one wave). In both cases, the samples being compared were balanced in terms of 
the rich set of observed characteristics used in the impact analysis. 
Further sensitivity analyses have been performed on the common subset of the two samples, i.e. on 
the subset of year 5 survey respondents who were employed both at year 5 and (having responded 
to the year 2 survey) were employed at year 2 as well. For this ‘common subset’:
• ERA impacts have been assessed on their year 5 outcomes and compared to the impacts on the 
year 5 outcomes of the full year 5 sample employed at year 5;
• ERA impacts have been assessed on their year 2 outcomes and compared to the impacts on the 
year 2 outcomes of the full year 2 sample employed at year 2.
7 Although there are some concerns about the reliability of year 5 survey data when examining 
effects over time, they can be used to provide estimates of the impact of ERA on outcomes at 
the time of the 5-year interview (see Hendra et	al., 2011).
8 In particular, many WTC group members responded to the Wave 3 survey before their five year 
follow-up point was reached. Measures captured ‘at interview’ are thus typically captured late 
in year 4 through year 5.
42 Impacts of ERA on working lone parents
These results, contained in Appendix C, only show some marginal differences in impacts. Together 
with the findings on the balanced nature of the background characteristics, the similar impact story 
that emerged on the ‘common subgroup’ would seem to allow one to albeit cautiously compare ERA 
impact estimates across the two years.
Methodological	approaches	and	sensitivity	checks
The favourable balancing results in the previous section have encouraged estimation of ERA 
impacts on the wide-range of survey outcomes (see Table 2.3) under the selection-on-observables 
assumption (how the rich set of background variables summaries in Table 2.1 supports the 
selection-on-observables assumption is discussed in Section 4.3). A number of methods focusing on 
controlling for observed characteristics were used, in particular accounting for observables linearly 
(Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)), as well as allowing the impact of ERA to depend on all observed 
characteristics (fully interacted linear model (FILM)). For binary outcomes, the marginal effects from 
a Probit model are also presented (all methods are discussed in Section 4.3).
For the most important work-related outcomes – hourly wages and the probability that a worker 
works full-time as opposed to part-time (and for tax year earnings from administrative data in 
Section 5.6) – additional sensitivity checks have been performed by experimenting with a control 
function model that allows for selection into work based on unobserved characteristics. As discussed 
more fully in Section 4.4, such a model is useful also because under its assumed structure it allows 
one to test for the presence of residual selection into work. The model was further relaxed to allow 
for selection into work based on unobserved individual ERA impacts, for the binary nature of some 
outcomes, for ERA impacts that are heterogeneous in terms of observed characteristics, and for 
non-normality. Control function models need a (strong) instrument to drive identification of the 
impacts; instruments are observed variables that (strongly) affect the propensity to be in work but 
do not directly affect the outcome of interest (e.g. wages). 
Candidate instruments in the available data that have been experimented with are: 
• the local unemployment rate (at RA);
• whether the lone parent has an employed partner at year 2 and/or year 5;
• whether there is another employed adult (over 16) in the household at year 2 and/or year 5;
• childcare problems as barriers to work (at RA);
• transport problems as barrier to work (at RA);
• no access to car and/or no driving licence (at RA);
• financial situation when teenager; and
• mother’s labour supply when teenager.
Overview	of	results	tables
In the next subsections, the results of the various analyses of ERA impacts are discussed for both 
time periods and both lone parent groups organised by outcome type. To avoid burdening the 
discussion, no references to specific tables are made. 
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Instead, Table 5.3 summarises in words the findings relating to the whole range of work-related 
outcomes and a few measures of well-being of NDLP and WTC group members who were in 
employment at year 2 and of those who were in employment at year 5.9
Table 5.4 displays the main estimates based on OLS regression (for continuous outcomes) or Probit 
models (for binary outcomes). Results obtained via FILM produced extremely close estimates. The 
full sets of impact estimates (including raw differences, OLS, Probit and FILM models) can in any 
case be found in Appendix D.
Box 5.2 contains the control function results for ERA’s impacts on wages and full-time work for both 
lone parent workers at year 5. 
9 Impact estimates for the common subset, i.e. those employed both at year 2 and at year 5, 
are presented in Appendix C. Impacts for these workers were found to be exactly the same as 
those summarised in Table 5.4 except as follows:
 NDLP: After two years, the common subset does not experience a significant increase in 
training, nor an increase in total time spent in employment and it experiences a decrease in 
pension as a fringe benefit. After five years, there is weak evidence of an increase in the desire 
to work full-time and of a decrease in the likelihood of having tried to increase hours.
 WTC: After two years, there is very weak evidence of a decrease in the probability of having 
received a pay rise, there is no impact on tenure and ERA has impacted fewer dimensions 
of advancement behaviour, though for this subgroup it has had an impact on the desire to 
improve pay and terms. After five years, the increase in weekly earning reaches ten per cent 
significance, there is weak evidence of a decrease in crèche/nursery among fringe benefits, an 
increase in promotions since starting work, an increase in the cost of travel and weak evidence 
of a decrease in the share of time spent in employment since random assignment.
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5.3.2 ERA’s impacts on hours worked
Since the ERA retention bonus was contingent on full-time work (defined as at least 30 hours per 
week), ERA should induce participants to take up full-time jobs or to work multiple part-time jobs  
to reach a total number of weekly hours of at least 30.
NDLP
NDLP participants who were in work at year 2 appear to be working an extra one and a half 
hour per week due to ERA. More impressive is the fact that such an increase in hours has been 
induced by a clear move away from part-time to full-time work, as ERA seems to have increased 
workers’ propensity to work full-time by ten percentage points and correspondingly reduced their 
propensity to work part-time (16-29 hours per week), leaving the propensity to work 15 hours or less 
unchanged. To put these impacts in context, it is important to consider that at the time of RA NDLP 
participants were either not working or working fewer than 16 hours per week.
Indeed, an ERA impact could be detected even on workers’ desired hours, decreasing the share 
intending to look for a part-time job in the future by six percentage points and correspondingly 
increasing the share looking for a full-time job. 
This sizeable impact of ERA on the hours of NDLP workers does not, however, appear to be sustained 
beyond the programme period: for workers at year 5, no impact could be detected on either current 
or desired hours, a result robust to allowing for selection into work based on unobservables. It is 
important to note that ERA workers did not reduce their hours after the withdrawal of ERA support. 
The disappearance of the impact on hours was instead due to the control group workers catching 
up, i.e. increasing their hours and full-time participation to the levels reached by the ERA workers. 
The raw data plotted in Figure 5.3 give some indication of the underlying trends. The proportion of 
ERA workers in full-time work increased from 45.8 per cent in year 2 to 48.8 per cent in year 5, but 
while only 35.7 per cent of control group workers were in full-time work in year 2, by year 5 the gap 
had largely closed, with 47.4 per cent of control group workers in full-time jobs.
Looking at the five-year follow-up period, ERA has left the overall time spent in employment 
unchanged, but has induced a shift to full-time (with a corresponding drop in part-time) in the 
earlier part of the follow-up. In other words, workers spent five per cent more time working full 
time over the five-year follow-up period due to ERA, though this impact was concentrated in the 
programme period, leaving the propensity to be working full-time at year 5 unchanged.
The fact that ERA has had no impact on year 5 workers’ share of the past five years spent in 
employment is a disappointing finding, as the total time spent in employment is the most obvious 
and direct measure of work retention. (As a reminder, the retention bonuses, payable for at most 
two years, were contingent upon working about 75 per cent of the time within a four-month period; 
the design of this ERA incentive thus suggests that uninterrupted employment was not what the 
programme necessarily aimed at encouraging.10)
10 The ERA design aimed at maximising time in work, while recognising that for many people 
this would not mean continuity with one employer (and indeed shifting jobs was viewed as 
an obvious route to advancement) and that a retention bonus scheme which demanded 
complete continuity would be unreasonable. Specifically, the bonus was framed in a way 
that if a worker lost their job for whatever reason, they would have a strong incentive to find 
another one rather than just give up.
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Figure 5.3 Proportion of workers in full-time work, by RA status and year
WTC
At year 2, ERA’s impact on WTC workers’ hours and probability of working full-time is remarkably 
similar to the one it had on NDLP workers: it induced an increase in hours of 1.5 and in the share 
working full-time of around 13 percentage points, again with a corresponding decrease in the share 
working part-time (16-19 hours), leaving the share working 15 hours or less unchanged. Similarly to 
NDLP workers at year 2, ERA also increased the desire to work full-time in the future by around six 
percentage points.
The similarities with NDLP workers are, however, limited to year 2, as in contrast to their NDLP 
counterparts, WTC workers do appear to still enjoy a positive ERA impact on hours well into the 
post-programme period. Workers at year 5 appear to work an extra hour thanks to ERA and indeed 
to be 8.2 percentage points more likely to be in a full-time job rather than in one involving less than 
30 hours per week (at year 5 there is also a small reduction in the probability of working less than 
16 hours). The underlying raw data in Figure 5.3 show that while the incidence of full-time work 
has increased over time for both ERA and control group workers and indeed much faster for control 
group workers, the gap remained far from being closed. 
Though workers from the ERA group and from the control group are well balanced in terms of their 
observed characteristics (see Section 5.2), the persistence of the ERA impact on full-time work is 
an important result warranting further investigation. Its robustness to selection into work based on 
unobserved characteristics was tested using the control function approach (see Box 5.2); despite 
some very weak evidence of negative selection into work, the slightly reduced estimate of a  
6.8 percentage points increase in the probability of working full-time remains highly significant.
It thus appears that ERA has had a sustained effect on work hours among WTC workers. 
Though weakened compared to year 2, there is still some evidence of an increase (four percentage 
points) in the desire to work full-time.
As was the case for NDLP workers, though, while ERA has increased the share of the previous five 
years spent in full-time employment by eight per cent (with a corresponding drop in the share spent 
in part-time work), the programme has had no impact on year 5 workers’ share of the past five years 
spent in employment, indicating that ERA had no impact on retention.
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5.3.3 ERA’s impacts on hourly and weekly earnings 
The ERA package was aimed at increasing individual productivity and hence hourly wages through 
a number of channels: incentives to complete work-related training courses and adviser support, 
encouragement and advice to retain work (hence gain labour market experience) and to advance to 
better paying jobs.
If ERA is effective in increasing workers’ hours and/or hourly wages, weekly earnings should increase 
accordingly.
NDLP	and	WTC
For both lone parent workers, ERA appears to have had no impact on hourly wages at either point 
in time, a result robust to allowing for selection into work based on unobserved characteristics, 
unobserved impacts and impact heterogeneity in terms of observables (see Box 5.2).
Only for the NDLP workers at year 2 is there weak evidence of an increase in weekly earnings (£13 
significant at the 10% level), fully driven by the increase in hours.
For WTC workers at both periods, by contrast, the point estimates of ERA’s impact on weekly 
earnings are positive but never reach statistical significance. Thus despite ERA’s positive impact 
on hours, no evidence was found for a corresponding effect on workers’ weekly earnings. This is 
explained by the fact that in spite of a relatively large increase (over eight percentage points) in the 
share of workers working full-time as opposed to part-time, ERA’s	impact	on	hours	worked	per	week	
was	never	particularly	large (+1.1 hour for WTC workers at year 5). Given the absence of an impact 
on hourly wages and an average hourly wage of the ERA group of £8.4 per hour, ERA workers should 
earn £9.2 (=1.18.4) more per week than control workers. Indeed, OLS regression yields exactly the 
same point estimate (£9.3), which, as mentioned, does not reach any statistical significance. 
5.3.4 ERA’s impacts on education and training
Conditional on working at least 16 hours per week, ERA offered two financial incentives to induce 
participants to engage in work-related training: it offered to pay up to £1,000 towards tuition fees 
and the training completion bonus would pay £8 for every hour of training completed (up to a 
maximum of £1,000).
NDLP
For workers at year 2, ERA increased the take-up of training by a significant 6.6 percentage points, 
though without any concomitant increase in the attainment of educational qualifications over that 
two-year period. ERA also appears to have led to a sizeable increase in the proportion claiming to be 
very or fairly likely to do training the following year. 
By year 5, however, no evidence was found that the increased training in the first two years has 
translated into qualifications. Not only that, but the positive impact on workers’ training take-up has 
completely disappeared. Indeed, the point estimates of ERA’s impact on having been on training in 
years 3-5 are negative (though nowhere near statistical significance), while the point estimates of 
the training impact since RA are literally zero. 
The picture that emerges is thus one where ERA has only served to change the timing of training: 
the programme has increased training among workers in the first two years (while the programme 
was operational), but during the post-programme period, i.e. 3-5 years post-RA, the workers from 
the control group have been catching up, so that overall, between RA and five years, ERA has had no 
impact on training take-up. It would thus seem that ERA has mostly led to a reallocation over time 
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of training activities that would have taken place in any case over the five years; to take advantage 
of the ERA training incentives, ERA workers simply appear to have undertaken training during the 
programme period rather than later.
Not only has ERA failed to foster the attainment of qualifications among workers, but the extra 
training undertaken in the first two years never seems to have translated into a productivity  
(i.e. wage) gain.
WTC
In the first two years post-RA, ERA increased WTC workers’ participation in training by 14.4 
percentage points, double the impact found for NDLP workers over the same period. While this 
increase was entirely concentrated in the first two years (when ERA’s training incentives were 
available), WTC workers from the control group did not fully catch up with observationally similar 
workers from the ERA group, so that overall, ERA still appears to have had a sizeable ten percentage 
points impact on the probability that a year 5 worker has undertaken training since RA. As opposed 
to NDLP workers, at least over a five-year follow-up period, the ERA-induced training of WTC workers 
thus appears to have indeed been additional, suggesting that ERA succeeded in encouraging 
training among those in work over and above what they would have done anyway over such a 
comparatively long time horizon.
Also quite encouraging are the findings in terms of qualifications. For workers at year 2 and even 
more importantly for workers at year 5, ERA appears to have increased the likelihood of having 
obtained work-related qualifications since RA by a sizeable six to seven percentage points. There 
does thus seem to have been an impact on qualifications which was sustained after the end of the 
programme.
5.3.5 ERA’s impacts on job quality
A wide variety of outcomes have been considered to capture several dimensions of job quality, in 
particular in terms of fringe benefits, stability of the job, work patterns, supervisory responsibilities 
and the worker’s own assessment of the job. 
NDLP
The overall picture emerging from the results is that ERA has not affected any dimension of job 
quality, either for workers at year 2 or for workers at year 5.
WTC
The overall impression is that ERA has had little effect on the various dimensions of job quality, but 
with a few exceptions.
For WTC workers at year 2, there is weak evidence of ERA having increased the likelihood of receiving 
some employment benefits, in particular of being entitled to sick pay (+2.6 percentage points) 
and to paid holidays (+3.4 percentage points). By year 5, the impact on the latter has completely 
disappeared, but the impact on the likelihood of being entitled to sick pay remains, increased in size 
and significance (+4.4 percentage points). 
Other weakly significant ERA impacts are found for workers at year 2 and relate to a tiny increase in 
the likelihood that the usual work pattern is during the day (+1.4 percentage points) and an increase 
in perceived stress (+3.3 percentage points in the probability of viewing one’s job as extremely 
or very stressful). The latter impact seems to be driven by these workers’ large increase in the 
probability of working full-time (conditional on working full-time, ERA workers are just as likely to 
report a stressful job as observationally-equivalent control group workers.)
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For workers at year 5, apart from the significant impact on sick pay entitlement, only a marginally 
significant increase in the probability of an inconvenient work pattern (+3.7 percentage points) could 
be found.
5.3.6 ERA’s impacts on advancement 
Assessing the impact of ERA on the job characteristics of workers is an indirect way of assessing 
ERA’s contribution to workers’ advancement, as these job characteristics reflect whether workers  
are indeed advancing into higher quality jobs. As discussed in the previous subsection, however, 
ERA’s impact on these dimensions has been absent for NDLP workers and mostly negligible for  
WTC workers.
In addition to assessing how much advancement workers have already achieved in terms of their 
job quality, it is useful to determine whether ERA has affected the advancement prospects offered 
by the job (employer offers training for advancing, any opportunities for promotions), the probability 
of having obtained a promotion, and indeed the steps that workers have taken to try to advance. 
Finally, direct measures of advancement once in (continued) work directly relate to growth in hours, 
in hourly wages and in fringe benefits (where growth in the latter can only be evaluated for NDLP 
workers).
NDLP
No impact on any advancement measure was detected for NDLP participants employed at year 2 or 
at year 5. Specifically, no evidence was found that ERA affected their probability of having obtained 
a promotion, advancement prospects, or any form of advancement behaviour. 
WTC
The evidence on ERA’s impacts on the advancement of WTC workers was more encouraging, with a 
significant increase in the advancement efforts of workers at year 2 and at year 5. 
Specifically, ERA increased by 4.2 percentage points the proportion of year 2 workers who took steps 
to improve their work situation or pay and indeed by ten percentage points the share that tried to 
increase their working hours. The two advancement channels that appear to have been encouraged 
by ERA are trying to increase one’s working hours (a ten percentage points increase in the share of 
workers reporting to have tried to do this) and trying to get a better job with a different employer  
(a six percentage points increase). Indeed, the share of year 2 workers that has taken steps since RA 
to look for another job while in work increased by 6.6 percentage points. Interestingly, though the 
use of a range of job search channels was fostered by ERA, the largest increase was registered in the 
probability of having looked for another job while in work on one’s own (increased by 6.3 percentage 
points, compared to an increase of 2.4 percentage points in the use of a private recruitment agency 
and of 2.8 percentage points in the use of a career office). There is also some weak evidence of a 4.5 
percentage points increase in the share of year 2 workers very or fairly likely to look for a different 
job in the following year.
For WTC workers at year 2, additional impacts were detected on promotion chances (increased by 
four percentage points) and on the growth rate in hours (increased by around 10 percentage points 
from a baseline of a 20 per cent growth rate between RA and year 2).
Moving forward to year 5, the impact of ERA on some dimensions of advancement behaviour 
appears to have lasted for over two years after the end of the ERA programme: workers from 
the ERA group are still significantly more likely to have tried to increase their working hours than 
observationally equivalent workers from the control group (at 5.6 percentage points, the increase 
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is halved in size compared to the impact for year 2 workers, though still highly significant) and still 
seven to eight percentage points more likely to have taken steps while in work to look for a better 
job with a different employer. Interestingly, the impact of ERA on the channels used in the latter 
endeavour has slightly changed: the use of a private recruitment agency is no longer fostered, 
reliance on a career office has been increased by only 1.1 percentage points, a 2.8 percentage points 
increase in resorting to ‘something else’ has emerged, though the main channel remains a 6.8 
percentage points increase in having looked for another job on one’s own.
Notable areas that do not appear to have been affected by ERA in neither year are efforts to find 
different work with the same employer, to negotiate better terms or indeed to get a pay rise. Growth 
rates of wages were never affected, nor growth rates of hours for workers at year 5. At that time, 
while ERA has fostered several forms of advancement efforts undertaken by workers, it does not 
appear to have affected future advancement intentions (the point estimates on wanting to improve 
pay and terms at some point being negative but insignificant). Thus, though ERA’s impact on 
workers’ advancement behaviour appears to have lasted until the 5th year post RA, it might in fact 
have come to an end. 
The nature of recruitment into the NDLP and WTC groups was fundamentally different. Members 
of the former group were already in the Jobcentre and had decided to join NDLP. Irrespective of 
their jobs aspirations, they had nothing to lose from participating in ERA, and hence the substantial 
majority chose to participate. Members of the WTC group, by contrast, were not in the Jobcentre, 
and unless they had a real interest in advancement there was no reason for them to join a 
programme which would require some additional time and effort. It is, therefore, hardly surprising 
that there was a greater appetite for advancement in the WTC group. Indeed qualitative research 
(summarised in Hendra et	al., 2011) on participants’ attitudes to advancement clearly highlights the 
fact that WTC participants were further along and more established in their work paths than their 
NDLP counterparts, and thus proved to be more receptive to advancement. This positive attitude 
towards advancement was reflected in measureable changes in their behaviour: they were more 
likely to undertake training and combine it with work, as well as to take important advancement 
steps than their NDLP counterparts. 
It thus seems to be the case that ERA has been effective in providing the necessary advisory and 
financial support to help a pre-existing desire to advance come true within the group of WTC one 
parents who had come forward, while the programme has not been effective in giving rise to such  
a desire in lone parents (NDLP) who were not particularly focused on advancement from the outset.
As discussed in the previous section, though, there is not much evidence to suggest that the training 
and advancement efforts undertaken by the more advancement-oriented lone parent group have 
indeed translated into an improved job quality or indeed higher wages.
5.3.7 ERA’s impacts on additional work-related outcomes
An additional outcome considered in this subsection is the extent of contact with Jobcentre Plus 
once in work during the first two years (when the programme was operational). Assessing how 
much more contact and help the workers from the ERA group had compared to the workers from 
the control group allows one to gauge the actual ‘intensity’ of the ERA in-work treatment.
ERA might have had an impact on workers’ cost of travel per week if the retention bonus has 
induced individuals to accept jobs further away.
Finally, ERA’s impact on year 2 workers’ tenure in the current job is assessed. It is not a priori obvious 
what kind of impact ERA would have on tenure. Advisers could be encouraging retention in a given 
job – with its attendant wage returns in the form of tenure, a stronger long-term relationship and 
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more training – or else promoting mobility between jobs towards increasingly better job matches 
and faster employment advancement.
NDLP	and	WTC
For year 2 workers in both target groups, ERA has had an unsurprisingly large impact on having 
contact with and receiving help from Jobcentre Plus during the two post-RA years. The probability of 
having had contact with Jobcentre Plus while in work was increased by 43 and 68 percentage points 
for NDLP and WTC workers respectively, of receiving unprompted advice or help from staff while in 
work by 45 and 67 percentage points and of receiving (unprompted or requested) help or advice 
while in work by 53 and 74 percentage points. While large impacts were expected, it is interesting 
to note that as many as 44 per cent of NDLP workers from the control group did have contact with 
Jobcentre Plus while in work during the two post-RA years, that one-fifth of them reported to have 
received advice or help from Jobcentre Plus when in work during the same period and that for 12 per 
cent of control workers, such advice/help was unsolicited. For workers from the WTC control group, 
contact with Jobcentre Plus was, as one would expect, much lower. It is still the case, though, that 
over one-fifth (22 per cent) reported to have had contact with Jobcentre Plus while in work and that 
five per cent received advice or help while in work.
ERA impacts on contact with Jobcentre Plus thus point to a quite intense in-work ERA intervention, 
this being particularly the case for WTC workers.
Some evidence of an increased cost of travel to work was uncovered, but restricted only to NDLP 
participants employed at year 5 (+£2.3 per week) and for WTC participants employed at year 2 
(+£1.3 per week).
As to tenure in the job held by workers at year 2, no ERA impact could be detected for NDLP workers, 
while evidence of a reduction of 14.6 days in tenure was uncovered for WTC workers. These findings 
are consistent with those on the different impacts that ERA has had on NDLP versus WTC workers’ 
efforts to get a better job with a different employer. A shorter tenure for WTC ERA workers might be 
the result of WTC workers having been induced by ERA to consider mobility between jobs as a form 
of advancement. This conjecture is supported also by the ERA-induced increase in the share of year 2 
WTC workers reporting to be very or fairly likely to look for a different job in the following year.
5.3.8 ERA’s impacts on well-being
This final subsection considers the impact that ERA has had on selected measures of workers’ well-
being, including personal well-being (overall life satisfaction and health/stress assessment), financial 
well-being and, most importantly, children‘s well-being. 
Children‘s well-being (available for year 5 workers) is a critical outcome to consider, as it is typically 
feared that inducing parents and especially lone parents to increase their labour force participation 
and working hours may come at the expense of their parental responsibilities and may thus have 
detrimental consequences for their children’s well-being. Given that ERA has visibly succeeded to 
permanently encourage WTC workers to increase their working hours, even the absence of any 
negative effects on the welfare of the children of these workers could be considered a favourable 
finding.
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NDLP
No statistically significant ERA impacts could be found on the overall life satisfaction and financial 
situation of NDLP workers at year 2.
The findings for workers at year 5 are mostly as expected, given the absence of ERA impacts on 
work outcomes. Specifically, ERA has not affected workers’ self-assessed financial situation or their 
probability of being always or often tired, depressed or suffering from a bad headache. Similarly, 
no significant evidence was found of an ERA-induced reduction in parental involvement in their 
child or in the child’s well-being, which again is as expected, given the absence of post-programme 
impacts on workers’ hours. However, ERA did appear to have had a statistically significant impact 
on year 5 workers’ well-being in terms of an increase in their overall life satisfaction (reducing by six 
percentage points the probability of being very or just dissatisfied with life as a whole).
WTC
The evidence for WTC workers at year 5 is by contrast quite mixed.
ERA appears to have increased by six percentage points the proportion of workers viewing their 
current financial situation as very or quite difficult. Such an impact is hard to rationalise, though,  
as ERA does not seem to have adversely (or otherwise) affected these workers’ weekly earnings. 
Also, no significant ERA impact could be detected on these workers’ overall life satisfaction. 
Despite the fact that ERA has significantly encouraged WTC workers to increase their working hours 
and indeed to work full-time, no adverse impact could be detected on the probability that a worker 
would report to always or often feel tired, depressed or suffering from a bad headache.
On the other hand, ERA did appear to decrease the proportion of workers reporting that their child‘s 
life was going very well by 5.2 percentage points (significant at the 10% level). The mechanism 
behind this effect is unclear, as at the same time a 4.8 percentage points increase (again significant 
at the 10% level) in the probability that the worker spends over 2.5 hours per week helping 
their child with homework was uncovered. Some studies in the US have, however, found that 
programmes which increase work without increasing income can have negative effects on children, 
particularly adolescents (see the discussion in Hendra et	al., 2011).
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Table 5.4 Lone parents employed at year 5: ERA impacts on year 5 outcomes 
NDLP WTC
Hours per week for all current jobs 0.735 1.123**
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.011 -0.009**
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs 0.008 -0.063**
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.005 0.082***
Would like to work part-time, <30 -0.017 -0.015
Would like to work full-time, >=30 0.043 0.040*
Hourly wage for main current job 0.255 -0.031
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 11.007 9.283
Education/training while in work in years 3-5 -0.027 0.030
Education/training while in work since RA 0.016 0.099***
Has obtained work-related qualifications in years 3-5 0.012 0.020
Has obtained work-related qualifications since RA 0.022 0.068**
Very/fairly likely to do training next year 0.008 -0.013
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work features -0.174 0.107
Fringe benefits: any 0.001 0.000
Fringe benefits: number -0.163 0.117
Fringe benefits: pension -0.041 0.025
Fringe benefits: paid holidays 0.008 0.003
Fringe benefits: flexible hours -0.043 0.017
Fringe benefits: time off for family -0.044 0.015
Fringe benefits: sick pay -0.018 0.044**
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use -0.013*** 0.011
Fringe benefits: crèche/nursery 0.010 -0.016
Fringe benefits: trade union membership -0.018 0.018
Permanent job 0.012 -0.002
Shift work most of the time 0.020 0.016
Usual work pattern during day 0.002 0.004
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.005 0.031
Has formal supervisory responsibilities -0.013 -0.005
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures at work -0.011 0.019
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how they work -0.010 0.029
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.002 0.030
Likes job a great deal/quite a lot 0.013 0.015
Employer offers training for advancing 0.002 0.019
Any promotions since started work -0.039 0.039
Any opportunities for promotions 0.003 0.026
Had had a pay rise -0.018 0.000
Took steps to improve work situation/pay -0.018 0.027
Tried to increase hours -0.035 0.056**
Tried to get a pay raise 0.042 0.035
Tried to negotiate better terms -0.033 0.019
Continued
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Table 5.4 Continued
NDLP WTC
Tried to change work with same employer -0.020 0.003
Tried to get better job with different employer 0.013 0.081***
Tried to get new training or qualifications 0.019 0.034
Took steps to look for other job while in work, since RA 0.019 0.072***
Looked for other job while in work: private recruitment agency 0.010 0.017
Looked for other job while in work: career office etc -0.003 0.011**
Looked for other job while in work: on own 0.025 0.068***
Looked for other job while in work: something else 0.012 0.028**
Will want to improve pay and terms at some point -0.031 -0.038
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year 0.000 -0.009
Self-employed 0.005 -0.006
Cost of travel to work per week 2.341** 1.153
Had days off work other than holidays in past four weeks -0.016 0.008
Has not been late to work in the last month -0.010 0.013
Share of 5 years since RA spent in employment 0.911 -0.421
Share of 5 years since RA spent in part-time work -4.387* -9.224***
Share of 5 years since RA spent in full-time work 5.319** 8.836***
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.060** -0.032
Always/often tired/depressed/bad headache 0.019 0.004
Child’s life is going very well -0.051 -0.052*
Spends >2.5h helping child with homework, etc -0.048 0.048*
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.027 0.059**
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.013 -0.008
Notes: OLS or, for binary outcomes, marginal effect from Probit; * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table 5.5 Lone parents employed at year 2: ERA impacts on year 2 outcomes
NDLP WTC
Hours per week for all current jobs 1.373** 1.656***
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.011 -0.005
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.088*** -0.136***
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.104*** 0.145***
Likely to look for different job next year and work pt, <30 -0.064*** -0.025
Likely to look for different job next year and work ft, ≥30 0.047* 0.064***
Hourly wage for main current job -0.181 -0.372
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 8.167 8.262
Education/training while in work since RA 0.066** 0.144***
Has obtained work-related qualifications since RA 0.032 0.061***
Very/fairly likely to do training next year 0.083*** 0.072***
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work features -0.106 0.133
Fringe benefits: any 0.004 0.019*
Fringe benefits: number -0.070 0.126
Fringe benefits: pension -0.019 0.012
Fringe benefits: paid holidays 0.006 0.026*
Fringe benefits: flexible hours -0.041 0.033
Fringe benefits: time off for family -0.018 0.014
Fringe benefits: sick pay -0.012 0.034*
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use -0.001 0.005
Fringe benefits: crèche/nursery -0.011 0.001
Fringe benefits: trade union membership 0.004 0.005
Permanent job 0.003 -0.006
Shift work most of the time 0.002 -0.015
Usual work pattern during day 0.010 0.014*
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.000 0.015
Has formal supervisory responsibilities 0.005 -0.008
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures at work 0.004 -0.014
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how they works -0.009 -0.021
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.023 0.033*
Likes job a great deal 0.000 0.004
Employer offers training for advancing -0.013 0.007
Any promotions since started work 0.002 0.023
Any opportunities for promotions 0.019 0.042*
Had pay rise since w1/first started job after w1 -0.031 -0.016
Took steps to improve work situation/pay 0.026 0.042**
Tried to increase hours 0.015 0.108***
Tried to get a pay raise -0.024 0.006
Tried to negotiate better terms 0.004 0.029
Tried to get a pay raise 0.042 0.035
Tried to negotiate better terms -0.033 0.019
Continued
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Table 5.5 Continued
NDLP WTC
Tried to change work with same employer 0.030 0.003
Tried to get better job with different employer 0.016 0.062***
Took steps to look for other job while in work, since RA 0.010 0.066***
Looked for other job while in work: private recruitment agency 0.005 0.024***
Looked for other job while in work: career office etc 0.010 0.028***
Looked for other job while in work: on own 0.010 0.063***
Looked for other job while in work: something else 0.018 0.017
Wants to improve pay and terms 0.030 0.029
Very/fairly likely to look for different job next year -0.019 0.046*
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year 0.001 0.000
Contact with Jobcentre Plus when in work since RA 0.431*** 0.684***
Advice/help from Jobcentre Plus when in work since RA 0.526*** 0.748***
Unprompted help/advice when in work since RA 0.453*** 0.668***
Self-employed 0.001 -0.012
Cost of travel to work per week 0.957 1.346**
>5 days off work in past four weeks -0.010 0.003
Tenure of main current job 4.813 -14.539**
Share of two years since RA spent in employment 2.488* 0.374
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.021 -0.019
Very/quite difficult financial situation now -0.028 0.01
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.004 -0.001
Notes: OLS or, for binary outcomes, marginal effect from Probit; * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Box 5.2: Control function results for workers at year 5
NDLP workers at year 5
Instruments:  No license/car 
   First stage: F=12.4 p=0.000
Hourly wages
Model allows for heterogeneity in ERA impacts based on X (p=0.091);  
no evidence of selection on unobserved ERA impacts (p=0.985);  
no evidence of non-normality
Selection     Negative** 
ATT – ERA workers    0.21 
ATNT – control workers   0.26 
ATE – workers     0.24
Probability of working full-time
Selection     Positive 
ERA impact (coefficient)   0.016
WTC workers at year 5
Instruments:  Employed adult at Wave 3 
   First stage: F=8.2 p=0.004
Hourly wages
No evidence of heterogeneity in ERA impacts based on X (p=0.116);  
no evidence of selection on unobserved ERA impacts (p=0.869);  
no evidence of non-normality
Selection     Negative 
ERA impact     -0.03
Probability of working full-time
Selection     Negative* 
ERA impact (coefficient)   0.183*** 
ERA impact (marginal effect)  0.068***
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
5.4 Subgroup and district-level impacts on workers at year 5
This section presents the results of analyses meant to assess whether the impact of ERA on year 5  
workers’ outcomes has varied across districts and across different subgroups of lone parents.  
In general, one might not expect everyone to be affected by a given programme in the same way, 
as individual programme impacts may depend on individuals’ pre-existing skills, disposition or family 
circumstances.
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When running the analyses across subsamples, the greatly reduced sample sizes decrease the 
likelihood of detecting statistically significant impacts as well as differences in impacts across 
subsamples. For this reason, the primary focus in the following analysis is not whether the impact in 
a given district or for a given subgroup is statistically significant, but whether the variation in effects 
across districts/subgroups is statistically significant.
The analyses were performed in a parsimonious hence slightly restrictive way; OLS regression was 
used throughout, not allowing the effect of all the other characteristics to vary by subgroup, nor the 
ERA impact for a given subgroup to vary according to the other characteristics. When the employed 
ERA and controls appeared to be unbalanced for a given subgroup and when a suitable instrument 
was found, the sensitivity of the results to the presence of selection on unobservables was tested.
Appendix E contains the detailed balancing information and the full set of OLS results at the district 
and subgroup levels. 
5.4.1 NDLP workers at year 5
District
Comparing the impact for a given district to the impact for all other districts, some heterogeneity in 
impacts has been uncovered, as in different districts ERA seems to have affected workers through 
different channels and to varying degrees. The exceptions are Scotland and the East Midlands, which 
do not stand out from the average.
North East England is the only district where ERA appears to have had a large positive impact on 
the probability of having undertaken training or education while in work during years 3 to 5, having 
increased this probability for workers by 22.7 percentage points. Correspondingly, ERA has induced 
for workers in this district a net increase in their chances of having participated in training while 
in work since RA (+21.5 percentage points). Both these impacts are significant at the 1% level 
and statistically different from the corresponding impacts in all the other districts. Indeed, North 
East England is also the only district to show a significant positive impact on the attainment of 
qualifications since RA (+17.5 percentage points). Maybe because workers in this district appear 
to have been encouraged to such a strong degree by ERA to take the training route towards 
advancement, this district shows a reduction in efforts taken to improve one’s work situation and 
pay, in particular in terms of increasing one’s working hours (-14.5 percentage points, significant at 
the 10% level and significantly different from the impact in all other districts).
In North West England, although ERA does not seem to have affected workers’ past propensity to 
undertake training while in work, it seems to have increased their future intentions (+19 percentage 
points, significant individually as well as significantly different from the impact in the other districts). 
Evidence was also uncovered of an impact on workers’ receipt of fringe benefits (mainly pension).
As for the remaining districts, Wales and London, results need to be viewed with extra caution given 
the unbalanced nature of the employed subgroups in these districts and the fact that given due 
to the large number of regressors coupled with limited sample sizes matching did not successfully 
manage to redress such imbalance. Results for these districts thus not only rely on the selection-on-
observables assumption, but on the functional form assumptions made by OLS. 
With this caveat in mind, in Wales ERA seems to have greatly reduced workers’ likelihood of having 
undertaken training while in work in the three to five years after RA (a significant 34 percentage 
points reduction, which is also statistically significantly different from the impact in all other 
districts). ERA indeed appears to have had a net negative impact on the likelihood to combine 
training with work since RA. 
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Reporting on the experimental impact findings for the entire sample in Wales, Hendra et	al. (2011) 
found that despite a large negative impact on employment there was no earnings impact. This 
seeming contradiction was deemed suggestive of employed people in the ERA group working either 
more hours or at a higher wage than employed people in the control group. The analyses performed 
here seem to corroborate the latter supposition, as evidence has been found of a weakly significant 
increase in hourly wages for workers in Wales (£2.5), while hours seem to have been unaffected (if 
anything, the point estimate is negative). This wage impact appears in fact to be robust to selection 
into work based on unobservables11, though how well the regression-based model could deal with 
the documented imbalance in observables remains unknown.
How such an increase in productivity could have been brought about given the strong and negative 
impact on training could be explained via increased job mobility, as ERA appears to have significantly 
increased workers’ efforts to try to get a better job with a different employer (+15 percentage points).
Though it has to be interpreted with caution, the evidence of ERA’s impacts on the outcomes of 
workers in London is rather mixed, as apart from a weakly significant increase in hours (driven by 
a move to full-time work), there is evidence of a weakly significant reduction in hourly wages, of 
a sharp drop in the probability of undertaking training while in work since RA, of a reduction in the 
number of employment benefits, of a weakly significant reduction in job mobility and of an increase 
in the cost of travel to work. 
Ethnicity
Non-white workers appear to have experienced much larger and more favourable impacts than 
white workers. Specifically, the picture for ethnic minority workers emerging across all outcomes 
considered is one of increased hours, earnings, training take-up and experience – the latter gained 
in full-time jobs. More specifically, the share of the five post-RA years spent in employment has been 
increased by 15 per cent, driven by a 34 per cent increase in the share spent in full-time work (the 
share spent in part-time employment decreased by 20 per cent). These impacts are both significant 
for non-white workers as well as statistically different from the ones for white workers.
Given such strong impacts on labour supply, non-white workers also experience a sizeable and 
significant increase of £87 in weekly earnings. As to hourly wages, the impact of ERA for non-white 
workers is close to a one pound increase, though not statistically significant. The control function 
approach using local unemployment as an instrument (first stage p=0.022) shows no selection 
(p=0.139), and hence an impact estimate (+£1.22) very close to the OLS one, though it has now 
reached weak statistical significance (p=0.092).
As opposed to whites, non-white workers also appear to have been encouraged in their education/
training efforts in years 3 to 5 (+32 percentage points, significant at five per cent) and hence possibly 
over the whole period since RA (though the point estimate for non-whites does not reach statistical 
significance due to the much smaller sample size of this subgroup).
While very encouraging, the results for non-white workers have to be viewed with caution, given 
that matching could not be performed due to small sample sizes and lack of common support. The 
concern here is not so much about selection on unobservables (which has not been detected by the 
control function model), but the fact that we know we are using the linear regression approximation 
to control for different observed characteristics between employed ERA non-whites and employed 
control non-whites. Looking at the raw impact estimates (i.e. not controlling for any observed 
11 Using the absence of access to a car or lack of a driving licence as instrument (first stage 
p= 0.056) shows no selection on unobservables (p=0.427), returning an impact estimate  
which is very close to the OLS one: an increase of £2.4 in hourly wages, significant at the  
1% level (p=0.004). 
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characteristics) might provide some indication as to the direction of any potential remaining bias. 
The results of this exercise quite reassuringly show that not controlling for observables leads to 
downward-biased estimates of the impact of ERA on non-white workers’ outcomes, suggesting that 
non-white ERA workers display weaker labour market related characteristics than employed non-
whites from the control group. 
Child’s	age,	education	and	disadvantage
The breakdown of impacts by child’s age, education and disadvantage has uncovered few 
noteworthy findings.
First, the increase in the share of the previous five years spent in full-time work as well as in cost of 
travel to work that were uncovered for the full sample of workers appear to be driven by the impacts 
on the highly educated workers (i.e. those with A-level qualifications or above). Indeed, the high 
education group benefited from an almost £1 increase in hourly wages both at year 2 and 5, which 
despite failing to reach statistical significance is statistically significantly different from the small 
negative impact for the low-education group.
There is some weak evidence that ERA has induced lone parent workers whose children were 
aged five to six years at RA to increase both the share of the past five years spent in full-time 
work as well as the share of time in part-time work, with an overall increase in the share of time 
spent in employment (for lone parent workers with children of a different age, ERA has by contrast 
substituted time in part-time work with time in full-time work, leaving the share of time spent in 
employment unaffected).
Finally, some interesting findings have been uncovered for workers who were severely disadvantaged 
at RA (defined as having only GCSE qualifications or lower, no work in the three years prior to RA 
and at least one barrier to employment). For this group, ERA seems to have encouraged the take-up 
of part-time work (16-29 hours), participation in education and training since RA (+22 percentage 
points), while having discouraged advancement behaviour, especially in terms of increasing one’s 
hours. It thus appears that ERA (through advice and/or the training bonus) has encouraged the 
most disadvantaged group to aim at entering the labour market via a part-time job and to focus on 
improving their skills via training. The point estimate of the impact of ERA on these workers’ hourly 
wage is sizeable (and over ten times the estimate for the non-disadvantaged group), but fails to 
reach statistical significance. The control function model does by contrast produce an estimated 
wage effect of £1.60 which is significant at the 1% level (the model does not uncover any selection 
on unobservables, though, so that, strictly speaking, the OLS model should be preferred). Finally, 
it is worth noting that while unbalanced in the raw samples, the observables can be rebalanced 
extremely well (p=0.987), so that these results do not necessarily hinge on the OLS specification.
5.4.2 WTC workers at year 5
District
Due to small sample sizes, differential ERA impacts have been assessed for the East Midlands 
compared to all other districts taken together. Heterogeneity in ERA impacts for workers has been 
uncovered only in terms of workers’ efforts to get a pay rise: past efforts have been significantly 
increased only in the East Midlands, but accompanied there by a decrease in future intentions to 
improve pay and terms of roughly the same size. This analysis has also clearly shown that it is the 
effectiveness of ERA in the East Midlands that is driving all the significant ERA impacts for the full 
sample of workers that were discussed in the previous section. 
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Ethnicity,	education	and	child’s	age
No noteworthy impact heterogeneity has been uncovered in terms of ethnicity (in contrast to NDLP). 
This is likely to stem from the very small sample size of barely 100 non-whites in work at year 5. The 
only comment regarding these results is that in terms of sign and large size, the estimates would 
point to an inadequate if not counterproductive intervention for non-white workers.
The only impact heterogeneity according to educational level that was uncovered relates to a  
13 percentage points increase in the share of high-education workers (i.e. with A levels or above) 
who find their financial situation to be very or quite difficult; the low-education workers do not seem 
to have been affected in this dimension. Given, however, that no ERA impact could be detected 
on the hours, wages and weekly earnings of the high-education workers, the finding of their 
increasingly hard financial situation is difficult to rationalise.
The breakdown by subgroup clearly allows one to see that it is the low-education group that is 
driving the main overall impacts (except of course the increase in financial difficulties), and that 
this applies both at year 2 and year 5. Low-education workers are the ones driving ERA’s impact 
on hours; enjoying a corresponding, statistically significant increase in weekly earning; displaying 
increased advancement efforts (having tried to increase hours and to get a better job with another 
employer and having taken steps to look for other job while in work and to be likely to look for 
different job next year). They are the ones whom ERA induced to look for jobs further away (i.e. 
whose cost of travel to work has increased) and whose tenure in their main current job has been 
significantly decreased. Indeed, they are the ones whom ERA significantly encouraged to look for a 
different and full-time job in the following year. 
Low-education WTC workers are thus those who have been greatly affected by ERA’s incentives to 
increase their hours and indeed to do so mostly by changing jobs.
As to the age of the lone parent’s child at the time of RA, impact heterogeneity was uncovered 
again in terms of perceived financial situation, which was significantly improved for workers whose 
children were aged five to six, while significantly worsened for workers with children of other ages. 
ERA’s impact on full-time work is in fact exclusively concentrated among workers in the former 
group, who experience a sizeable though insignificant increase in weekly earnings (£23 compared 
to £5 for the other workers). Heterogeneous impacts have also been uncovered on the timing of 
workers’ efforts to improve pay and terms. ERA appears to have reduced the likelihood that workers 
with children aged five to six at RA have actively pursued job mobility as a way to advance in the 
past, but the programme seems to have increased their intentions to improve pay and terms at 
some point in the future. The opposite type of impacts were found for workers with children of other 
ages, for whom past advancement efforts appear to have been increased while future intentions 
correspondingly decreased.
5.5 Correlating individual ERA impacts on wages and on the  
 take-up of training (or the attainment of qualifications)  
 for workers
This section aims to shed some light on whether an unusually large (small) individual ERA impact 
on the take-up of education/training or on obtaining educational qualifications is accompanied by 
an unusually large (small) individual ERA impact on wages. The idea behind the existence of such a 
correlation is that work-related training and the subsequent attainment of qualifications are the ERA 
components most likely to increase individual productivity (as reflected in hourly wages). 
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Appendix F outlines a way to proceed and presents the full set of results, the latter informally 
summarised in Table 5.6.
It cannot be stressed enough that this type of analysis can at most be viewed as indicative – both 
for methodological and empirical reasons. First, focus is on workers, so that non-experimental 
considerations apply. In particular, it is assumed that when looking at subgroups defined by 
observables, the corresponding ERA and control group can at most differ in terms of the other 
observables. On an empirical front, it has to be kept in mind that as shown in the previous 
subsections, there is very strong evidence for the impact on workers’ wages to be zero both after 
2 and 5 years, however, the data have been cut. Strong demands are thus made of the data when 
trying to correlate basically non-existent impacts with other impacts.
Nonetheless, some interesting insights could be drawn.
The first two rows in Table 5.6 relate to the correlation between contemporaneous impacts on 
educational investments and on wages. The last row allows for a time gap between impacts on 
individual educational investments and on individual wages. Note that the latter results pertain  
to the subgroup of year 5 respondents who responded to the year 2 survey and were employed  
at year 2.
Table 5.6 Sign of the correlation between wage impacts and educational  
 impacts
NDLP WTC LP
Education/training 
take up Qualifications
Education/training 
take up Qualifications
Year 2 positive negative negative large positive
Year 5 negative negative no correlation small positive
Year 2 educational 
impacts on year 5 
wage impacts
small negative  
(positive then 
negative) negative
small negative 
(negative then 
positive) positive
Note: The entries summarise the overall linear correlations. If the sign of the correlation visibly changes over 
the range of individual training/education impacts, this is summarised in brackets. 
The findings of this exercise for the WTC group are quite intuitive, especially given the rather well 
established fact that wage returns accrue to certified training. The results indeed point to a positive 
relationship between impacts on the achievement of qualifications and impacts on individual 
productivity as measured by wages. Such a correlation is strongest at year 2, remains though 
weakened at year 5 and also when allowing for a time lag between the impact on qualifications 
and the impact on wages. By contrast, the relationship between impacts on the take-up of training 
while working and on individual wages is either absent or negative. A possible explanation for the 
strong negative correlation at year 2 could be that workers who took part in training while working 
in this relatively short period of time (two years since RA) are still in the negative part of the wage-
education profile (i.e. the one characterised by the loss of experience, tenure and possibly having 
had to contribute to training by accepting a lower wage) and that the returns might accrue later on. 
The latter prediction, however, is not fully borne out by the data looking at the correlation between 
impacts on the take up of training in year 2 and impacts on wages in year 5. The overall (linear) 
correlation is still slightly negative, but the corresponding graph shows that the negative slope 
only applies over the range of negative impacts on training; when ERA encourages the take-up of 
training, the correlation turns positive, so that the larger the impact on training take-up, the larger 
the impact on future wages.
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In contrast to the WTC group, the results are hard to rationalise for the NDLP group. Particularly 
suspect is the finding of a mostly strong and always negative correlation between individual impacts 
on qualifications and contemporaneous as well as future impacts on wages. A negative correlation 
between impacts on the achievement of qualifications in year 2 and wage impacts in year 5 is 
particularly hard to explain. A negative correlation with contemporaneous wage impacts could by 
contrast be explained if workers who managed to take part in training and achieve qualifications all 
the while working are still paying a wage price in terms of loss of experience, tenure and possibly 
having had to contribute to training by accepting a lower wage. This story does not, however, seem 
to be consistent with the findings for year 2 of a positive correlation between impacts on the take up 
of training and contemporaneous wage impacts. 
In year 5, the counterintuitive NDLP result of a negative correlation between impacts on education/
training while in work and impacts on hourly wages is, however, likely to be driven by Wales. The 
disaggregated results discussed in Section 5.4.1 have highlighted how NDLP workers in Wales were 
the only subgroup for whom evidence of a significant, positive ERA impact on wages (+£2.5, robust 
to modelling selection) could be found. However, ERA in this district also seems to have greatly 
reduced workers’ likelihood of having undertaken training while in work in the three to five years 
after RA (a significant 34 percentage point reduction, which is also statistically significantly different 
from the impact in all other districts). ERA indeed appears to have had a net negative impact on the 
likelihood to combine training with work since RA. With a negative impact on training and a positive 
impact on hourly wages, Wales is thus most likely to be the driving force behind the negative 
correlation between individual training impacts and individual wage impacts for the NDLP. At the 
same time, the results in Wales offer a potential mechanism to explain such negative correlation. 
While workers can advance not just by undertaking training but also by changing jobs, i.e. by moving 
to better paying jobs, it could be that such channels are mutually exclusive. In other words, workers 
who have been focusing on job mobility efforts have not had the time and/or mental resources to 
additionally get involved in training. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that a reduction in training 
activities has to be interpreted as somehow ‘causing’ an increase in wages. What the results in 
Wales by contrast suggest is that it is possible that a reduction in training activities could allow a 
more intense and effective on-the-job search and mobility, which might in turn cause an increase  
in wages. 
5.6 ERA impacts on administrative outcomes
This section considers the impacts of ERA on tax year earnings taken from administrative sources. 
Unlike survey data, administrative data have the advantage of being available for the full sample and 
of not suffering from either non-response or respondent recall error. As mentioned in Section 2.2,  
however, while P14 earnings data are very accurate in capturing income under the PAYE scheme 
for employees, they do not include any income from self-employment and might not include some 
earnings as low as to fall below the ‘NIC Lower Earnings Limit’12 (for further details on these data 
see Hendra et	al., 2011). Note that the earnings impact estimates discussed refer to labour market 
earnings and thus do not include any additional income from the ERA bonuses. 
For both lone parent groups, there appears to be no significant ERA impact on the yearly earnings 
of workers in any tax year post RA (Tables 5.8 and 5.9). Controlling for X reduces the size of the point 
estimates consistently across all years for both groups, with all methods based on controlling for 
observables reaching similar conclusions, and indeed very close point estimates.
12 Although there is no formal obligation for employers to send in returns for the very low 
earners, it is likely that the latter will appear in the data as in this end of year process and 
employers are prone to just send in returns for all employees.
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For the NDLP target group, despite a sizeable ERA impact (+2.5 percentage points, significant at the 
5 per cent level) on the probability of being ever employed in the 2005/06 tax year (as measured by 
having positive P14 earnings in the corresponding tax year) and an almost negligible effect on the 
probability of being ever employed (+0.02 percentage points, significant at the 10 per cent level), 
the observable characteristics of the employed ERA and employed subgroups are perfectly balanced 
even in the raw data.
For the WTC group, by contrast, despite the fact that ERA has had no impact on the employment 
probabilities throughout the follow-up period, the intervention still seems to have affected the 
composition of who it is that is ever employed in the ERA compared to the control group: significant 
imbalances in observed characteristics are present in the raw samples in all tax years considered 
individually (no imbalance is present among the ever-employed between 2005/06 and 2008/09). 
These imbalances are, however, easy to correct; the matched samples obtained using kernel-based 
propensity score matching methods are balanced at all levels of significance. The corresponding 
matching estimates are very close, in terms of both point estimates and the absence of statistical 
significance, to the ones arising from the fully interacted regression model. It can thus confidently 
be ruled out that the original imbalance in terms of observables could be biasing the estimates of 
ERA’s impacts on workers’ earnings.
For both lone parent groups, though, one cannot of course rule out that some selection on still 
uncontrolled for factors has taken place and is biasing the results.
The sensitivity checks performed with the control function approach do not change the story for 
either lone parent group (see Boxes 5.3 and 5.4). No selection into work based on unobserved 
characteristics has been detected for the WTC group, while for the NDLP group it seems that 
negative selection has taken place (implying that those in work display less favourable wage-related 
characteristics than those not in work). In both cases, though, there is no evidence of any impact of 
ERA on the earnings of those employed in the post-programme tax year, both point estimates being 
negative, small in absolute value and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Table 5.7 NDLP – Impact of ERA on the probability of being ever employed  
 in a given post RA tax year and balancing of observables between  
 employed ERA and controls
ERA impact 
on employed 
probability 
Balancing between employed  
ERA and controls
% of 
sample
Impact 
(ppt) p-val. % ERA R2 p-value
Med 
bias
Ever employed in 2005/06 53.3 2.50** 0.044 51 0.012 0.626 2.4
Ever employed in 2006/07 49.6 0.00 0.976 50 0.013 0.600 2.6
Ever employed in 2007/08 49.1 1.00 0.419 50 0.011 0.921 2.7
Ever employed in 2008/09 52.7 -0.70 0.559 49 0.012 0.615 2.7
Ever employed 2005/06 to 2008/09 72.2 0.02* 0.098 50 0.009 0.675 2.4
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table 5.8 NDLP – Impacts for workers based on selection on observables
RAW OLS FILM N
Earnings 2005/06; 1/2y post-RA 200 143 163 3,620
Earnings 2006/07; 2/3y post-RA 202 70 92 3,369
Earnings 2007/08; 3/4y post-RA -75 -250 -262 3,330
Earnings 2008/09; 4/5y post-RA -83 -244 -283 3,579
Cumulative earnings 2005/06 to 2008/09 -98 -279 -302 4,902
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%;
(h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
Box 5.3: NDLP – Control function model for earnings in 2008/09
Instruments:  No license/car 
First stage:   F=12.4 p=0.000 
Model:    No evidence of selection on observed or unobserved impacts 
   No evidence of non-normality
lambda    negative** (p=0.011) 
Impact of ERA   –78  (p=0.853)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table 5.10 WTC – Impacts for workers based on selection on observables
RAW OLS FILM PSM N
Earnings 2005/06; 1/2y post-RA 350 291 306 348 2,273
Earnings 2006/07; 2/3y post-RA 435* 328 264 282 2,151
Earnings 2007/08; 3/4y post-RA 295 225 195 198 2,023
Earnings 2008/09; 4/5y post-RA 89 -26 -153 -78 2,115
Cumulative earnings 2005/06 to 2008/09 727 268 285 221 2,545
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%;
(h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
Box 5.4: WTC – Control function model for earnings in 2008/09
Instruments:  Local unemployment rate 
First stage:  F=4.9 p=0.027
Model:    No evidence of selection on observed or unobserved impacts 
   No evidence of non-normality
selection    negative (p=0.350) 
Impact of ERA  –68  (p=0.849)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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6 Impacts of ERA on ND25+  
 workers
Chapter 5 has been devoted to assessing the impact of Employment Retention and Advancement 
(ERA) on a varied number of outcomes for the two lone parent groups. This chapter presents and 
discusses the ERA impacts experienced by the third target group of the programme – the New Deal 
25 Plus (ND25+) participants. 
Before discussing the impact results for this target group, it is important to appreciate just how 
different the ND25+ target group is compared to the two lone parent groups:
1 The ND25+ group faces significantly higher barriers to work than the lone parent groups – even 
conditional on having found work.13 With the obvious exception of childcare problems (and with 
a weak labour market experience prior to inflow which is comparable to the New Deal for Lone 
Parents (NDLP) group), the ND25+ group who is employed displays far more disadvantaged 
characteristics than the other two target groups who found work (see Table 6.1). Nearly half of 
employed ND25+ participants are age 40 or older, 22 per cent are ethnic minorities (compared 
to 7-11 per cent among the employed lone parent groups), more than half have no or basic 
educational qualifications, over one-fifth have disabilities, 70 per cent do not have a driving 
licence or access to a vehicle, and they suffer from transport, housing, basic skills and other 
problems in a much larger proportion than the employed lone parents.
2 The intake process differed drastically between the groups. While the NDLP participants had 
volunteered for their New Deal programme wishing to enter the labour market and the Working 
Tax Credit (WTC) participants were already in work and had to come to the Jobcentre Plus offices 
to volunteer for the chance to become eligible for ERA, the ND25+ participants were mandated 
to start the New Deal programme. ND25+ participants were thus much harder to engage and 
generally not particularly interested in advancement.
Thus, not only did the ND25+ group face far more severe labour market disadvantages and multiple 
barriers to work, but it was also the most hard-to-help group. 
13 These differences are even more pronounced unconditional on being in work. Looking at the 
full ND25+ sample at the time of entering the study reveals that over a third does not have 
any educational qualification at all and almost half had never worked in the three previous 
years. Nationally, about 30 per cent of ND25+ participants report suffering from some long-
term illness or disability, while others have criminal records, drug or alcohol dependence, or 
mental or physical health problems. Additionally, this group has particularly low employment 
retention rates, with only one in four ND25+ participants leaving benefits for sustained work.
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Table 6.1 Average characteristics at the time of random assignment (RA) of the 
 sample subsequently in employment (during the 2008/09 tax year for  
 ND25+ and at year 5 for the two lone parent groups)
ND25+ NDLP WTC
Top quintile of local deprivation 0.521 0.501 0.323
Female 0.201 0.951 0.978
Age at RA 39.5 33.1 33.1
Age>=40 0.463 0.219 0.359
Ethnic minority 0.215 0.114 0.065
Education Level 0-1 0.525 0.348 0.301
Academic education 0.363 0.524 0.532
Has disability/claims Incapacity Benefit (IB) at inflow 0.210 0.082 N/A
No driving license or lack of access to car 0.716 0.608 0.295
Housing problem 0.094 0.081 0.042
Transport problem 0.266 0.189 0.177
Childcare problem 0.040 0.510 0.509
Basic skills problem 0.079 0.028 0.045
Health problem 0.190 0.063 0.071
Other problem 0.170 0.064 0.108
No job in last three years 0.346 0.450 0.011
Total work experience in last three years 1.5 1.5 3.6
For the ND25+ group only administrative outcome data are available; as opposed to the two lone 
parent groups, one cannot thus paint a detailed and in-depth picture of the impact that ERA has 
had on the work and life experiences of its working participants. Still, administrative data do allow 
a crucial outcome like yearly earnings to be assessed, whilst being available for the full sample of 
workers and not suffering from either survey non-response or respondent recall error. Note that the 
earnings impact estimates discussed in the following refer to labour market earnings and thus do 
not include any additional income from the ERA bonuses.
Focus is on the post-programme impact of ERA, that is, on ND25+ workers’ earnings in the 2008/09 
tax year, a time period where nobody had been receiving any ERA services. Impacts on previous 
tax years are also shown and briefly touched upon. It is important to bear in mind though, that 
the findings for workers across tax years cannot directly be compared as they relate to a largely 
different sample each time. Specifically, only between 50.5 per cent and 52.5 per cent of those ever 
employed in a given tax year is accounted for by the same subgroup, i.e. by those who are employed 
at some time in each of the tax years considered.14
Table 6.2 shows that the ERA group is more likely to be ever employed in a given tax year (as measured 
by having positive P14 earnings in that tax year) than the control group. In the first three post-RA tax 
years, the ERA impact on employment chances is significant but decreasing in size, dwindling to an 
insignificant 1.4 percentage points increase in the post-programme phase (tax year 2008/09).
14 Less than one-fifth of the full ND25+ sample (18.6 per cent of the full ERA group and 17.5 per 
cent of the full control group) is employed at some time in each of the tax years considered.
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Maybe surprisingly, despite a significant ERA impact on employment rates, the subsamples of 
employed ERA and employed controls are perfectly balanced in terms of the rich set of observables 
in the first two post-RA tax years; and despite the absence of an impact on employment, the 
working subsamples are unbalanced in the last tax year considered.
In terms of the estimates of interest, no significant ERA impact has been detected on the earnings 
of workers in the first two post-RA tax years; though the point estimates are positive and represent 
a sizeable proportion of the controls’ average earnings, they are far from reaching any statistical 
significance (see Table 6.3).
There is, however, some weak evidence of positive earnings impacts for workers in the 2007/08 and 
2008/09 tax years; however, these two years are ones where there exists a significant imbalance 
of observed characteristics between ERA and control workers. As was the case for the WTC LP 
group, however, this imbalance in terms of observables is one which is easy to correct; using kernel 
matching methods it is indeed possible to obtain matched samples which are balanced at any level 
of significance. The corresponding matching estimates in Table 6.3 (PSM) are almost identical, in 
terms of both point estimates and very weak statistical significance, to the ones arising from the 
fully interacted regression model. So it can confidently be ruled out that any remaining imbalance 
in terms of observables could be at the root of the weakly significant impact ERA seems to have had 
on the earnings of workers in those two years.
Still, it cannot of course be ruled out that some selection on unobservable factors has taken place.
As to the impact on earnings in the post-programme period, the extensive sensitivity analysis that 
has been carried out does point to the presence of significant and negative selection into work 
(p=0.000). Indeed in the preferred specification of the control function model (one allowing for 
heterogeneity in ERA earnings impacts depending on observed characteristics), such selectivity 
effect halves the point estimates and reduces them to insignificance, implying that the earnings of 
the working ERA group have not been statistically significantly enhanced by ERA and similarly that 
the earnings of the working control group would not have been statistically significantly enhanced 
by ERA had they received such intervention (see Box 6.1). 
Selection into work similarly explains away the weak positive impact of ERA on the earnings of 
workers in the 2007/08 tax year (see Box 6.1).
Taken together, the findings from the various types of analysis mostly point to the absence of ERA 
impacts on workers’ earnings. 
Indeed, it would have been hard to rationalise any significant impact on the earnings of those in 
work, as the two candidate channels for such an increase do not seem to be particularly open to 
ND25+ workers. First, conditional on being in work, an increase in hours (e.g. a move to full-time 
work) would have seemed unlikely. As shown by the control group, when they do work, the majority 
of ND25+ participants work full-time, leaving less room for a large change in hours worked (see Table 
4.4 in Miller et	al., 2008). As for the second potential channel, an increase in hourly wages, it would 
not have been easy to envisage how increases in productivity could have been brought about, as 
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research has suggested that ND25+ participants were the hardest to engage once they were in work 
and indeed were generally not interested in advancement, as obtaining a steady job was viewed as 
accomplishment enough (see Hendra et	al., 2011).15
6.1 Impacts by district
Results at the district level are presented in Table 6.4 (Appendix G contains the corresponding 
sample sizes and detailed balancing information).
No impact estimate is remotely statistically significant in the post-programme tax year.
A noteworthy finding is the large, significant increase in earnings in the 2007/08 tax year for workers 
in the East Midlands. The ERA impact of £1,700 is significant at the 5% level and is statistically 
significantly different from ERA impacts in the other districts. The robustness of this finding to 
selection on unobservables could not be tested given that no candidate instrument had any 
explanatory power; it is still worth noting though that the employed subsamples were balanced 
(p=0.748) even in the raw data for that year. They were by contrast unbalanced at the 10% level in 
the subsequent tax year, the 2008/09 post-programme year. For this case, the local unemployment 
rate provided a reasonable instrument and the corresponding control function model found no 
evidence of selection on unobservables while yielding a positive but non-significant impact estimate. 
Other findings worth mentioning are the negative, large, though insignificant point estimates for 
ERA impacts on workers’ earnings in North East England and in Wales. Indeed, the £1,500 reduction 
in earnings reaches ten per cent significance in North East England in the first post-RA tax year. The 
underlying employed subsamples are unbalanced at the 10% level, but can perfectly be balanced 
by matching (see Appendix G). Unfortunately, the control function analysis to exclude any residual 
selection on unobservables could not be performed due to the lack of a suitable instrument. 
Overall, the picture emerging from this analysis does not point to drastically different stories  
across district.
15 An underlying mechanism that might have produced positive in-work impacts for the ND25 
group relates to the fact that due to a steady fall in the numbers flowing into the ND25+ 
programme, substantially fewer participants were available in the six districts than forecast 
in the ERA design. Additionally, this also meant that the target group was made up of the 
hardest to help, resulting in even lower-than-envisaged entries into work. Having to deal with 
fewer post-employment cases could have resulted in higher quality and greater density of 
service (Dorsett and Robins, 2011, have explicitly looked at links between Jobcentre Plus office 
caseload and ERA impacts).
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75Impacts of ERA on ND25+ workers
Box 6.1: ND25+ – Preferred specification of the control function model
Earnings in 2008/09
Instruments:  No license/car, local unemployment rate 
   First stage: F=7.2 p=0.001
Model:   Allows for heterogeneity in ERA impacts based on X (p=0.060) 
   No evidence of selection on unobserved ERA impacts (p=0.601) 
   No evidence of non-normality
Selection   Negative*** 
ATT – ERA workers  344 
ATNT – control workers 239 
ATE – workers   293
Earnings in 2007/08
Instruments:  No license/car, 
   First stage: F=5.9 p=0.003
Model:   Relaxing normality 
   No evidence of selection on observed or unobserved ERA impacts 
Selection   Negative** 
ERA impact   -161 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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7 Summary and conclusions
Since the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) intervention was explicitly intended 
and designed to make a difference once people are in work, findings on its impact on its intended 
beneficiaries – i.e. on workers – are of critical interest. This report has extensively analysed the 
impact that ERA has had on a variety of outcomes experienced by working members of the New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and Working Tax Credit (WTC) target groups, as well as on the tax 
earnings of working members of the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) target group. 
Focusing on the employed subgroups has required use of non-experimental methods to overcome 
the potential bias arising from post-random assignment (RA) selection into work.
Impacts on workers’ outcomes have been assessed both while the programme was in operation and 
afterwards. Findings relating to the later point in time are of special policy interest, as they are the 
ones relevant for judging whether ERA’s impacts have been maintained or else have quickly faded 
once the in-work assistance and financial incentives were withdrawn.
In summarising the findings that emerged from the various analyses that have been performed, this 
section separately considers the two lone parent groups – for whom the detailed survey outcome 
measures were available – and the ND25+ group – for whom ERA could only be assessed in terms of 
its impact on administrative tax year earnings.
7.1 Lone parents
• ERA appears to have had a sizeable impact on workers’ hours – in particular in terms of 
encouraging full-time work – for both lone parent groups during the programme period. For NDLP 
workers, though, such impact has subsequently faded away as control group workers naturally 
increased their hours. By contrast, ERA appears to have induced WTC workers to work longer hours 
(and indeed to work full-time) well into the post-programme period. In contrasting the findings 
about the sustainability of ERA’s impacts on workers’ hours, it is useful to keep in mind that at the 
time of RA members of the WTC group were already working between 16 and 29 hours per week, 
while NDLP participants were out of work (or working at most 16 hours per week). It thus seems 
that the time-limited in-work support offered by ERA was able to encourage a permanent move  
to full-time only among the group of lone parents who were already in part-time work.
• ERA has had no impact on NDLP or WTC workers’ retention, as measured by the share of the 
five follow-up years spent in employment. (There is some weak evidence of a positive impact on 
retention for NDLP workers whose children were aged five to six years at RA.) 
• For both lone parent workers, ERA has had no impact on hourly wages either during or after the 
programme. (There is some indication that ERA might have increased wages for NDLP workers in 
Wales through increased job mobility.) 
• In the absence of a wage impact, any impact on weekly earnings would need to be driven by 
impacts on hours worked. Even though the impact on hours was found to persist post-programme 
for the WTC workers, it was relatively small (+1.1 hours/week), not allowing the corresponding 
impact on weekly earnings (+£9.3) to reach statistical significance.
• There is no evidence of improved job quality as a result of ERA for NDLP workers both during and 
after the programme. For WTC workers, the overall impression is that ERA did not affect job quality 
in any dimension except for a sustained increase in sick pay eligibility. 
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• ERA impacts on the take-up of training while in work and on workers’ attainment of qualifications 
were found to critically differ between the two lone parent groups.
– For NDLP workers, the picture that emerges is one where ERA has only served to change the 
timing of training: the programme has increased training among workers while the programme 
was operational, but during the post-programme period, the workers from the control group 
have been catching up, so that overall, between RA and five years, ERA has had no impact on 
training take-up. It would thus seem that ERA has mostly led to a reallocation over time of 
training activities that would have taken place in any case over the five years. Furthermore, 
ERA failed to foster the attainment of qualifications among workers. An exception appear to be 
NDLP workers in North East England, a district where ERA has affected workers mainly through 
human capital acquisition channels (having undertaken education/training while in work and 
having obtained relevant qualifications since RA), while it has strongly discouraged taking steps 
towards advancement, in particular towards increasing one’s hours.
– While the increase induced by ERA on WTC workers’ participation in training was entirely 
concentrated during the time when ERA’s training incentives were available, WTC workers from 
the control group did not fully catch up. As opposed to NDLP workers, at least over a five-year  
follow-up period, the ERA-induced training of WTC workers thus appears to have indeed been 
additional, suggesting that ERA succeeded in encouraging training among those in work 
over and above what they would have done anyway over such a comparatively long time 
horizon. Furthermore, there seems to have been an impact on the attainment of work-related 
qualifications which was sustained after the end of the programme.
• No impact on any advancement measure was detected for NDLP workers either during or after 
the programme. ERA has by contrast given rise to a significant increase in the advancement 
efforts of WTC workers both during and, most crucially, after the programme. In particular, a 
sustained effect has been uncovered on the likelihood that WTC workers tried to increase working 
hours and have taken steps to look for a better job with a different employer. ERA does not, 
however, appear to have affected their future advancement intentions. Thus, though ERA’s impact 
on workers’ advancement behaviour appears to have lasted until the fifth year post RA, it might in 
fact have come to an end. 
• As to the well-being of workers five years after RA, ERA appears to have raised overall life 
satisfaction for NDLP workers, leaving their self-assessed financial situation, health, parental 
involvement in their child and the child’s well-being unaffected. The evidence for WTC workers at 
year 5 is by contrast quite mixed, as while no adverse impact could be detected on self-reported 
health, ERA did appear to decrease the proportion of workers reporting that their child‘s life was 
going very well.
• Some impact heterogeneity has been uncovered for NDLP workers, with ERA at times displaying 
larger effects (even in absolute terms) for more disadvantaged subgroups.
– Non-white workers appear to have experienced much larger and more favourable impacts than 
white workers, enjoying increased hours, weekly earnings (via increased hours only), training 
take-up and experience (gained in full-time jobs).
– Through specific advice and/or the training bonus, ERA seems to have encouraged the most 
disadvantaged group (with at most GCSE qualifications, without work in the three years prior 
to RA and with at least one barrier to employment) to aim at entering the labour market via a 
part-time job and to focus on improving their skills via training. For this group, there is also weak 
evidence of an increase in hourly wage.
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– Finally, it is interesting to note that ERA impacts appear to have been driven by the low-
education group of WTC workers and by the high-education group of NDLP workers.
• For both lone parent groups, no significant ERA impact could be detected on the yearly earnings 
of workers in any tax year post RA.
7.2 New Deal 25 Plus
The earnings of those ND25+ participants who were employed in any of the tax years considered 
have not been affected by ERA. This finding might not be very surprising given the absence of an 
effect for lone parent workers and once it is considered that the ND25+ group was facing far more 
severe labour market disadvantages and higher barriers to work, in addition to being the most  
hard-to-help group. 
7.3 Conclusions
The only two effects that ERA appears to have had on NDLP workers are in terms of an increase 
in hours worked while the programme was in operation which disappeared once participation in 
full-time work caught up among control group workers, and of a reallocation over time of training 
activities that would have taken place anyway over the five-year follow-up period. For NDLP workers 
ERA has thus accelerated changes that in time would have occurred anyway, but has not any long-
term impacts.
For WTC workers, by contrast, the impact on hours was sustained, and so was the impact on 
advancement efforts in terms of increasing one’s working hours and in terms of job mobility. 
Furthermore, ERA appears to have induced a net increase in training take-up together with a 
sustained increase in the attainment of work-related qualifications. There is, however, no evidence 
to suggest that such increased training participation, concomitant rise in qualifications, renewed 
advancement efforts, enhanced job mobility and indeed the increased incidence of full-time 
work and attendant increase in work experience among workers have actually translated into 
demonstrable work advancement in terms of higher wages or an otherwise improved job quality.
Indeed, for either lone parent group no lasting nor temporary impact could be detected on hourly 
wages, on weekly earnings, on job quality, on yearly earnings or on the time spent in employment, 
all outcomes that one would expect to see increase if there were an effect on retention and 
advancement. 
A final comment relates to the delicate issue of whether having induced WTC lone parent workers 
to increase their hours and work full-time has had any adverse consequence on their children. The 
non-experimental analysis in this report has found that ERA did appear to decrease the proportion 
of WTC workers reporting that their child‘s life was going very well. The mechanisms behind such an 
impact remain unclear though, as workers’ overall life satisfaction was left unaffected and indeed 
the time they reported spending helping their child with homework appears to have been increased.
Finally, no impact of ERA could be detected on the earnings of ND25+ workers. 
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Appendix A 
Control function models
A.1 Standard control function approach 
The problem of post-random assignment (RA) selection bias can be fruitfully framed as the classical 
sample selection problem (selectivity model of Heckman, 1979): the wage outcome is observed for 
the Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) and control members who are employed at a 
given time, but is not observed for the non-employed ERA and control members.16
The model for the observed outcome for the full population is:
Y
i
 = α + β ERA
i
 + γ’X
i
 + u
i
   u
i
 ~ N(0, σ
u
2 )
Outcomes Y such as hourly wages or weekly hours are, however, only observed for employed 
participants. Allowing the employment decision (or the chance to be employed) to depend on ERA 
participation (ERA), on observed outcome-related characteristics X, on observed variables Z that do 
not affect outcomes and on unobservable factors (v), the observability rule for Y (or equivalently, the 
rule for being employed) can be written as:
employed
i
 = 1(δ’W
i
 + v
i
 ≥0)   with Wi ≡ [1, ERA
i
, X
i
, Z
i
], v
i
 ~ N(0, 1) and Corr(v
i
, u
i
) = ρ
The model thus allows for selection into employment based on both observed (W) and unobserved 
(v) factors. 
The crucial set of assumptions implicit in this model is: 
(A1)  (u
i
, v
i
) is a mean zero normal random vector that is statistically independent of W 
 (note that Var(v
i
) is normalised to 1); and δ
z
 ≠ 0.
Apart from the parametric choice of the distribution of the unobservables implied by this assumption 
(in particular, joint normality and homoskedasticity), the control function model crucially relies on 
an exclusion restriction for non-parametric identification. Specifically, it needs at least an observable 
variable Z which is contained in W, i.e. which affects the decision to work, but which is not contained 
in X, i.e. does not affect work outcomes directly. A way to rewrite assumption (A1) to make these 
conditions explicit is: 
(A1) (a) P(employed=1 | X, ERA, Z) is a non-trivial function of Z
 (b) E(Y | X, ERA, Z) = E(Y | X, ERA)
 
(c)
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16 Since the work-related outcomes are survey based, it also is the case that they are only 
observed for the ERA and control members who are employed and who have answered the 
question on the outcome of interest.
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The power of the instrument in the first stage, i.e. condition (A1.a), can be tested. The parametric 
assumptions in (A1.c) can in principle be relaxed (and thus tested). Assumption (A1.b) is an 
untestable identifying condition.
Going back to the standard selection model, from the joint normality assumption it follows that:
u
i
 = ρ σ
u
 v
i
 + ξ
i
 with ξ
i
 ⊥v
i
For the selected sample of employed ERA and controls:
E(Y | employed=1, W) = α + β ERA + γX + E(u | v > –δW)
   = 
The model can be easily estimated via the following simple two-step procedure:
1. Estimate γ from a first-step Probit on the pooled subsample of employed treated and controls 
compared to the pooled subsample of non-employed treated and controls, controlling for X and 
for Z; construct the inverse Mills ratio H(δˆ  W) for each employed individual. 
2. Estimate α, β, γ and λ by OLS in the augmented regression on the employed subsample. 
Specifically, for the employed subsample, observed outcomes are regressed on the ERA 
treatment indicator, observed characteristics X and the inverse Mills ratio H.
3. A t-test on λ provides a test for selection into work based on unobserved factors (e.g. innate 
ability, drive, motivation).
While the two-step estimator is consistent and √N-asymptotically normal, it is not fully efficient 
under normality; one can thus also estimate it via maximum likelihood to obtain full efficiency.
A.2 Allowing for selection into work based on unobserved  
 ERA impacts
Allowing for both observable (b(X
i
)) and idiosyncratic (b
i
) heterogeneity in ERA impacts, let the model 
for the observed outcome for the full population be:
Y
i
 = α + (β(X
i
) + b
i
) ERA
i
 + γ’X
i
 + u
i
 = α + β(X
i
) ERA
i
 + γ’X
i
 + {b
i
 ERA
i
 + u
i
}  u
i
 ~ N(0, σ
u
2)
As before, outcomes Y conditional on work such as hourly wages are, however, only observed for 
employed participants. Let the observability rule for Y (or equivalently, the rule for being employed) be:
employed
i
 = 1(δ’W
i
 + μ ERA
i
 + v
i
 ≥0)
with  W
i
 ≡ [1, X
i
, Z
i
]
 v
i
 ~ N(0, 1) 
 Corr(v
i
, u
i
) = ρ
uv
 Corr(v
i
, b
i
) = ρ
bv
The model thus allows for selection into employment based on observed characteristics X and on 
both unobserved characteristics (ρ
uv
) and unobserved impacts (ρ
bv
).
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Going back to the standard selection model, from the joint normality assumption it follows 
that: 
 
ui =  u vi  i with i vi 
 
For t lected sample of employed ERA and controls: 
 
E(Y | empl     ERA + γX + E(u | v > –δW)  
 
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The model can be easily estimated via the following simple two-step procedure: 
 
1. Estimate  from a first-  bit on the pooled subsample of employed treated 
and controls versus the pooled subsample of non-employed treated and controls, 
controlling for X and for Z; construct the inverse Mills ratio H(ˆW) for each 
employed individual.  
 
2. Estimate α, , γ and  by OLS in the augmented regression on the employed 
subsample. Specifically, for the employed subsample, observed outcomes are 
regressed on the ERA treatment indicator, observed characteristics X and the 
inverse Mills ratio H. 
 
3. A t-test on  pro ides a test for selection into work based on unobserved factors 
(e.g. innate ability, drive, motivation). 
 
While the two-step estimator is consistent and N-asymptotically normal, it is not fully 
efficient under normality; one can thus also estimate it via maximum likelihood to obtain full 
efficiency. 
 
 
A2. Allowing for selection into work based on unobserved ERA impacts 
 
Allowing for both observable (b(Xi)) and idiosyncratic (bi) heterogeneity in ERA impacts, let 
the model f the observ d outcome for the full population be:
 
Yi  = α + ((Xi) + bi) ERAi + γ’Xi +  ui      
 = α + (Xi) ERAi + γ’Xi + {bi ERAi + ui}  ui ~ N(0, u2)   
 
As before, outcomes Y conditional on work such as hourly wages are however only 
observed for employed participants. Let the observability rule for Y (or equivalently, the 
rule for being employed) be: 
 
employedi = 1(δ’Wi + μ ERAi + vi 0)   
 
with  Wi ≡ [ , Xi, Zi] 
vi ~ N(0, 1)  
Corr(vi, ui) = uv   
Corr(vi, bi) = bv   
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The crucial set of assumptions implicit in this model is: 
(A1’) (u
i
, v
i
, b
i
) is a mean zero normal random vector that is statistically independent of Z, 
 X and ERA and δ
z
≠0 (note that Var(v
i
) is normalised to 1).
The three requirements implicit in (A1’) can we made explicit by rewriting this assumption as
(A1’) (a) P(employed=1 | X, ERA, Z) is a non-trivial function of Z
 (b) E(Y | X, ERA, Z) = E(Y | X, ERA)
 (c) 
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As before, the power of the instrument in the first stage, i.e. condition (A1.a = A1’.c), can be tested. 
The parametric assumptions in (A1.c = A1’.c) can be relaxed (and thus tested), while assumption 
(A1.b = A1’.b) is an untestable identifying condition.
Going back to the selection model, from the joint normality assumption it follows that:
u
i
 = ρ
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u
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i
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u
 with ξ
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For the selected sample of employed ERA and employed controls:
E(Y | employed=1, X, ERA, Z)
= α + β(X)ERA + γ’x + E(u | X, ERA, Z, v ≥ –δ’W–μERA) +
          + E(b ERA | X, ERA, Z, v ≥ –δ’W–μERA)
= α + β(X)ERA + γ’x + E(u | X, ERA, Z, v ≥ –δ’W–μERA) +
          + E(b | X, ERA=1, Z, v ≥ –δ’W–μ)·ERA 
= α + β(X)ERA + γ’x + λ
uv
 H(δ’W+μERA) + λ
bv
 H(δ’W+μ)·ERA
where λ
kv
 ≡ ρ
kv
 σ
k
 for k =u, b and H(c) ≡ ׀o (c)/Φ(c).
The model can be easily estimated via the following simple two-step procedure:
1. Estimate δ and μ from a first-step Probit on the pooled subsample of employed treated and 
controls versus the pooled subsample of non-employed treated and controls, controlling for X, 
ERA status and Z; construct the two inverse Mills ratio H(.) for each employed individual. 
2. Estimate α, β(X), γ and the two λ’s by OLS in the augmented regression on the employed 
subsample. Specifically, for the employed subsample, observed wage outcomes are regressed  
on the ERA treatment indicator (possibly interacted with X to allow for observed heterogeneity 
in ERA impacts), observed characteristics X and the two additional control function terms H 
(one evaluated at the linear index, the other at the linear index once setting all observations  
to treated).
Note that a t-test on λ
uv
 provides a test for selection into work based on unobserved characteristics, 
such as ability, that also affect work outcomes; while a t-test on λ
bv
 provides a test for selection into 
work based on unobserved ERA impacts.
Note, how we have throughout exploited the randomised nature of the regressor of interest (ERA), 
which is the one that allows us to separately identify the two λ’s by conferring separate variation to 
the two inverse Mill’s ratios.
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Arriving at the ATT, ATNT and ATE for workers once observable heterogeneity in 
ERA impacts is allowed
When the underlying wage model allows for heterogeneity in ERA impacts based on observed 
characteristics, the conditional treatment effect needs to be averaged over the characteristics of the 
relevant subpopulation of workers (i.e. ERA workers, control workers or all workers).
Y
i
 = α + β(X
i
) ERA
i
 + γ’X
i
 + {b
i
 ERA
i
 + u
i
}
If b
i
 = 0 for all i (or equivalently σ
b
 = 0), then the conditional ERA impact is averaged among
1) ERA workers as:
 E(β(X) | employed=1, ERA=1) = β
0
 + Σ 
k
{β
k
 E(X
k
 | employed=1, ERA=1)}
2) Control workers as:
 E(β(X) | employed=1, ERA=0) = β
0
 + Σ 
k
{β
k
 E(X
k
 | employed=1, ERA=0)}
3) All workers as:
 E(β(X) | employed=1)   = β
0
 + Σ 
k
{β
k
 E(X
k
 | employed=1)}
If allowance is made for unobserved heterogeneity in impacts (σb ≠ 0), then the ATT is obtained by 
adding to the average above the extra control function term E(b | employed=1, ERA=1), appropriately 
averaged. The impact of ERA on ERA workers is thus obtained as:
E(β(X) | employed=1, ERA=1)
 = β
0
 + Σ 
k
{β
k
 E(X
k
 | employed=1, ERA=1)} + λ
bv
 E(H(δ’W+μ) | employed=1, ERA=1).
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Appendix B 
Composition of working samples 
and balancing results 
B.1 Composition of working samples by RA status
Table B.1 Average characteristics at the time of RA of the sample subsequently  
 in employment
NDLP employed  
at year 5
ND25+ employed 
in 2008/09 tax 
year
Control ERA Control ERA
Scotland 0.170 0.153 0.121 0.158***
North East England 0.209 0.204 0.160 0.139
North West England 0.166 0.168 0.207 0.193
Wales 0.105 0.133 0.075 0.068
East Midlands 0.185 0.188 0.224 0.229
London 0.166 0.155 0.213 0.213
Total New Deal caseload at 
office (100) 4.478 4.856** 4.938 4.728
Share of lone parent in New 
Deal caseload at office 0.548 0.547 0.452 0.447
Bottom quintile of local 
deprivation 0.037 0.044 0.031 0.036
2nd quintile of local deprivation 0.068 0.055 0.050 0.062
3rd quintile of local deprivation 0.146 0.129 0.133 0.128
4th quintile of local deprivation 0.253 0.254 0.232 0.264*
Top quintile of local deprivation 0.491 0.510 0.541 0.503*
TTWA-level unemployment 
rate 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.061*
October 2003 – March 2004 0.419 0.344** 0.344 0.353
April 2004 – June 2004 0.230 0.276* 0.212 0.228
July 2004 – September 2004 0.228 0.262 0.249 0.235
October 2004 – December 
2004 0.123 0.118 0.196 0.184
Male 0.045 0.053 0.802 0.796
Age <30 0.337 0.344 0.182 0.170
Age 30-39 0.448 0.433 0.348 0.373
Age ≥40 0.214 0.223 0.470 0.457
Continued
84 Appendices – Composition of working samples and balancing results
Table B.1 Continued
NDLP employed  
at year 5
ND25+ employed in 
2008/09 tax year
Control ERA Control ERA
Ethnic minority 0.107 0.120 0.224 0.206
Single 0.680 0.659 0.592 0.578
One child 0.520 0.499 Has children 0.251 0.263
More than one child 0.462 0.494
Youngest child ≤1 year at RA 0.064 0.059 Child ≤5 0.066 0.079
Youngest child (1-5) years  
at RA 0.277 0.308
Youngest child (5-16) years  
at RA 0.620 0.602
Youngest child over 16 years 
at RA 0.008 0.006
Missing child age/no child 0.031 0.026 0.846 0.820*
Education Level 0-1 0.366 0.331 0.535 0.515
Education Level 2 0.374 0.427* 0.193 0.231**
Education Level 3 0.119 0.087* 0.079 0.083
Education Level 4-5 0.140 0.155 0.193 0.172
Academic education 0.517 0.530 0.358 0.368
Social housing 0.669 0.667 0.407 0.418
Private housing 0.242 0.252 0.334 0.346
Has disability/claims IB at 
inflow 0.043 0.057 0.210 0.200
Missing disability status 0.431 0.429 0.038 0.040
No driving license/lack of 
access to vehicle 0.604 0.611 0.709 0.722
Housing problem 0.092 0.072 0.101 0.087
Transport problem 0.175 0.203 0.271 0.261
Childcare problem 0.511 0.510 0.037 0.043
Basic skills problem 0.023 0.033 0.084 0.074
Health problem 0.076 0.052 0.197 0.184
Other problem 0.064 0.064 0.175 0.164
Currently in work 0.129 0.133 0.053 0.047
In work before now/previous to 
current jobs 0.865 0.866 0.896 0.909
Pay in previous job: Lowest 
quintile 0.195 0.171 0.195 0.187
Pay in previous job: 2nd quintile 0.277 0.269 0.154 0.135
Pay in previous job: 3rd quintile 0.080 0.092 0.168 0.201**
Pay in previous job: 4th quintile 0.152 0.151 0.256 0.272
Pay in previous job: Top quintile 0.162 0.182 0.122 0.113
In work before the previous job 0.497 0.499 0.590 0.600
No job in last three years 0.433 0.466 0.323 0.367**
Continued
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Table B.1 Continued
NDLP employed  
at year 5
ND25+ employed in 
2008/09 tax year
Control ERA Control ERA
One job in last three years 0.370 0.339 0.414 0.400
Many jobs in last three years 0.197 0.195 0.263 0.233*
Work experience <6 months 0.117 0.116 0.226 0.182***
Work experience 7-12 months 0.109 0.085 0.188 0.163
Work experience 13-24 months 0.135 0.129 0.185 0.196
Work experience 25-36 months 0.207 0.204 0.078 0.091
Hours per week over past three 
years <16 0.158 0.153 0.085 0.069
Hours per week over past three 
years [16-30) 0.203 0.182 0.060 0.055
Hours per week over past three 
years ≥30 0.207 0.199 0.532 0.509
Spent 0% of past three years 
on active benefits 0.848 0.856
Spent ≥0 & <50% on active 
benefits 0.156 0.142
Spent (0, 50%) of past three 
years on active benefits 0.096 0.092 0.625 0.647
Spent >50% of past three years 
on active benefits 0.057 0.052 Spent 100% on active benefits 0.218 0.211
Spent >50% of past three years 
on inactive benefits 0.634 0.630 0.089 0.102
Past participation in same New 
Deal program 1.583 1.692 2.115 2.050
Past participation in basic skills 0.215 0.204
Show up same day 0.509 0.525 0.092 0.080
Show up within 30 days 0.172 0.180 0.650 0.652
Show up after >30 days 0.097 0.127 0.104 0.125
Missing show up time 0.222 0.168** 0.155 0.143
Early ND25+ entrant 0.201 0.186
Past designation as special 
group category customer 0.030 0.039
Special group category 
customer at RA 0.207 0.204
Looked for job on own while 
unemployed 0.698 0.676 0.868 0.835
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Table B.1 Continued
WTC employed at year 5
Control ERA
Scotland 0.103 0.101
North East England 0.106 0.109
North West England 0.052 0.066
Wales 0.077 0.081
East Midlands 0.591 0.574
London 0.072 0.068
Total New Deal caseload at office (100) 4.090 4.224
Share of lone parent in New Deal caseload at office 0.537 0.528
Bottom quintile of local deprivation 0.079 0.082
2nd quintile of local deprivation 0.148 0.144
3rd quintile of local deprivation 0.176 0.181
4th quintile of local deprivation 0.272 0.264
Top quintile of local deprivation 0.321 0.324
TTWA-level unemployment rate 0.058 0.058
December 2003 – July 2004 0.268 0.269
August 2004 – November 2004 0.332 0.328
December 2004 – January 2005 0.400 0.403
Male 0.016 0.028
Age <30 0.257 0.212**
Age 30-39 0.407 0.408
Age ≥40 0.336 0.380*
Ethnic minority 0.052 0.077
Single 0.407 0.409
One child 0.440 0.492**
More than one child 0.499 0.468
Youngest child <=1 year at RA 0.019 0.023
Youngest child (1-5] years at RA 0.184 0.186
Youngest child (5-16] years at RA 0.678 0.673
Youngest child over 16 years at RA 0.060 0.081*
Missing child age/no child 0.060 0.037**
Education Level 0-1 0.297 0.304
Education Level 2 0.381 0.381
Education Level 3 0.121 0.139
Education Level 4-5 0.201 0.175
Academic education 0.528 0.536
Social housing 0.336 0.356
Private housing 0.604 0.583
No driving license or lack of access to vehicle 0.289 0.300
Housing problem 0.050 0.034
Transport problem 0.176 0.179
Childcare problem 0.527 0.492
Basic skills problem 0.053 0.037
Health problem 0.068 0.074
Other problem 0.118 0.099
Continued
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Table B.1 Continued
WTC employed at year 5
Control ERA
Not in work at RA 0.045 0.047
Has currently >1 paid job 0.095 0.114
Hours (16-20) 0.421 0.380
Hours (20-30) 0.502 0.539
Non eligible hours 0.032 0.034
Tenure 6-12 months 0.086 0.093
Tenure 1-2 years 0.155 0.136
Tenure 2-3 years 0.110 0.089
Tenure 3-4 years 0.097 0.090
Tenure 4-5 years 0.089 0.082
Tenure 5-8 years 0.117 0.133
Tenure >8 years 0.142 0.195***
Pay in current job: Lowest quintile 0.195 0.200
Pay in current job: 2nd quintile 0.167 0.165
Pay in current job: 3rd quintile 0.185 0.193
Pay in current job: 4th quintile 0.183 0.191
Pay in current job: Top quintile 0.193 0.176
In work before now/previous to current jobs 0.780 0.763
Hours in previous job: 16 0.144 0.109**
Hours in previous job: (16-20) 0.216 0.195
Hours in previous job: (20-30) 0.172 0.180
Hours in previous job: ≥30 0.248 0.279
Pay in previous job: Lowest quintile 0.223 0.184*
Pay in previous job: 2nd quintile 0.176 0.186
Pay in previous job: 3rd quintile 0.097 0.112
Pay in previous job: 4th quintile 0.144 0.134
Pay in previous job: Top quintile 0.140 0.147
In work before the previous job 0.452 0.436
One job in last three years 0.591 0.589
Many jobs in last three years 0.400 0.398
Work experience <6 months 0.050 0.044
Work experience 7-12 months 0.053 0.039
Work experience 13-24 months 0.123 0.101
Work experience 25-36 months 0.764 0.802*
Hours per week over past three years <16 0.052 0.041
Hours per week over past three years (16-30) 0.905 0.894
Hours per week over past three years ≥30 0.034 0.053*
On benefits at inflow 0.064 0.084
Has been on inactive benefits in past three years 0.317 0.298
Past participation in NDLP 0.335 0.317
Past participation in NDLP more than once 0.269 0.252
Notes: Difference in means significant * at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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B.2 Balancing summaries 
Employed at Wave x compared to non-employed at Wave x by treatment group and
ERA group versus control group by employment status at Wave x.
In the tables that follow, each cell summarises differences in observed characteristics between the 
corresponding subgroups:
Employed Non-employed
ERA group
• employed ERA group 
compared to
• employed control group
• employed ERA group 
compared to 
• non-employed ERA 
group
• non-employed ERA 
group compared to
• non-employed control 
group
Control group
• employed control group 
compared to
• non-employed control 
group
Indicators included are:
• Pseudo R2 (probit) gives an indication of how well the observed characteristics explain belonging 
to one group versus the other, i.e. how unbalanced the characteristics are.
• p>chi2 if the p-value of the likelihood-ratio test, testing the hypothesis that the characteristics are 
jointly insignificant, i.e. well balanced in the two groups.
• Mean bias is the mean standardised percentage difference (mean taken over all the 
characteristics). For a given characteristic X, the standardised difference is the difference of the 
sample means in the two groups as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in the two groups pooled. 
So, the lower the pseudo R2, the higher p>chi2 and the lower the mean bias, the more unbalanced 
are the groups.
If p>chi2 > 0.010, the groups can be regarded as balanced.
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B.3 Balancing of continuous variables between year 5  
 employed ERA and employed controls 
Figure B.1 NDLP workers at year 5: distribution of continuous covariates 
For the hypothesis that educational qualifications (20 levels) and RA are independent: 
Pearson chi2 p=0.175 and likelihood-ratio chi2 p=0.125
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Note: Combined K-S p is the p-value of a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
equality of distribution functions.
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Figure B.2 WTC workers at year 5: Distribution of continuous covariates 
For the hypothesis that educational qualifications (20 levels) and RA are independent: 
Pearson chi2 p=0.209 and likelihood-ratio chi2 p=0.124
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Appendix C 
Survey results for respondents 
employed at year 2 and year 5
Table C.1 NDLP subset of employed at year 5 who are also employed at year 2:  
 year 5 outcomes
RAW OLS FILM N
Hours per week for all current jobs 1.310* 0.867 0.878 713
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.006 -0.004 0.005 713
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.02 -0.011 -0.016 713
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.025 0.015 0.011 713
Would like to work part-time, <30 -0.008 -0.014 -0.009 696
Would like to work full-time, >=30 0.069** 0.064* 0.069* 696
Hourly wage for main current job 0.146 0.006 -0.086 708
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 16.397 8.087 5.765 706
Education/training while in work in years 3-5 -0.012 -0.023 -0.032(h) 712
Education/training while in work since RA 0.035 0.031 0.023 714
Has obtained work-related qualifications in  
years 3-5 0.030 0.011 0.023(h) 714
Has obtained work-related qualifications since RA 0.040 0.024 0.021(h) 714
Very/fairly likely to do training next year -0.031 -0.017 0.001 711
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work features -0.276 -0.164 -0.062(h) 660
Fringe benefits: any 0.009 0.008 0.006 660
Fringe benefits: number -0.147 -0.159 -0.104(h) 660
Fringe benefits: pension -0.040 -0.037 -0.024 660
Fringe benefits: paid holidays -0.005 -0.009 -0.014 660
Fringe benefits: flexible hours -0.016 -0.029 -0.021(h) 660
Fringe benefits: time off for family -0.045 -0.034 -0.037(h) 660
Fringe benefits: sick pay -0.014 -0.012 0.010 660
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use -0.035** -0.040** -0.043** 660
Fringe benefits: crèche/nursery 0.006 0.005 0.017 660
Fringe benefits: trade union membership 0.003 -0.002 0.008(h) 660
Permanent job 0.004 0.011 0.024 714
Shift work most of the time 0.017 0.012 0.046 714
Usual work pattern during day 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 714
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.028 0.013 0.031(h) 713
Has formal supervisory responsibilities 0.014 0.004 0.037(h) 714
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures at work 0.003 -0.015 -0.013 701
Continued
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Table C.1 Continued
RAW OLS FILM N
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how they work -0.044 -0.020 -0.007(h) 702
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.002 -0.025 -0.022 702
Likes job a great deal/quite a lot 0.016 0.026 0.047 700
Employer offers training for advancing -0.019 -0.020 -0.023(h) 692
Any promotions since started work -0.055 -0.059 -0.039(h) 704
Any opportunities for promotions -0.019 -0.02 -0.021(h) 694
Had had a pay rise -0.037 -0.043 -0.027 704
Took steps to improve work situation/pay -0.010 -0.011 -0.027(h) 682
Tried to increase hours -0.080** -0.069* -0.043 714
Tried to get a pay raise 0.037 0.041 0.058 714
Tried to negotiate better terms -0.028 -0.011 -0.003(h) 714
Tried to change work with same employer 0.001 -0.027 -0.028(h) 714
Tried to get better job with different employer 0.039 0.018 0.014(h) 714
Tried to get new training or qualifications 0.024 0.012 0.030 714
Took steps to look for other job while in work,  
since RA 0.040 0.017 0.014(h) 714
Looked for other job while in work: private 
recruitment agency 0.010 -0.011 -0.009 714
Looked for other job while in work: career office, etc 0.018 0.010 0.015 714
Looked for other job while in work: on own 0.044 0.024 0.021(h) 714
Looked for other job while in work: something else -0.002 -0.009 0.005 714
Will want to improve pay and terms at some point -0.014 -0.016 -0.060(h) 608
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year 0.000 0.002 0.003 700
Self-employed 0.004 0.003 0.000 714
Cost of travel to work per week 2.936*** 2.392** 2.402**(h) 673
Had days off work other than holidays in past  
four weeks -0.021 -0.015 -0.032 700
Has not been late to work in the last month -0.012 -0.022 -0.015 701
Share of five years since RA spent in employment 0.858 0.766 0.533(h) 699
Share of five years since RA spent in  
part-time work -7.388** -6.395** -6.407**(h) 699
Share of five years since RA spent in  
full-time work 8.327*** 7.173** 6.935**(h) 699
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.090*** -0.092*** -0.084**(h) 714
Always/often tired/depressed/bad headache 0.026 0.000 -0.009 539
Child’s life is going very well -0.004 -0.015 0.000 538
Spends >2.5h helping child with homework, etc -0.039 -0.044 -0.053(h) 522
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.016 0.043 0.054 714
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.003 0.000 -0.003 714
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%;
(h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
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Table C.2 NDLP subset of employed at year 5 who are also employed at year 2:  
 year 2 outcomes
RAW OLS FILM N
Hours per week for all current jobs 2.119** 2.104** 2.167** 711
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.010 -0.008 -0.016 711
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.145*** -0.148*** -0.143***(h) 711
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.159***(h) 711
Likely to look for different job next year and work 
part-time, <30 -0.065** -0.063** -0.045 695
Likely to look for different job next year and work 
full-time, >=30 0.062* 0.067* 0.026(h) 695
Hourly wage for main current job -0.208 -0.443 -0.508 624
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 19.040** 9.269 10.654 623
Education/training while in work since RA 0.070* 0.062 0.060(h) 712
Has obtained work-related qualifications since RA 0.041 0.040 0.022(h) 714
Very/fairly likely to do training next year 0.070* 0.076** 0.074*(h) 711
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work features -0.179 -0.125 -0.047 714
Fringe benefits: any 0.018 0.020 0.021 714
Fringe benefits: number -0.193 -0.128 -0.147 714
Fringe benefits: pension -0.080** -0.078** -0.086** 710
Fringe benefits: paid holidays -0.022 -0.007 -0.010 710
Fringe benefits: flexible hours -0.025 -0.011 -0.002 710
Fringe benefits: time off for family -0.032 -0.034 -0.051 710
Fringe benefits: sick pay -0.053 -0.040 -0.049 710
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use -0.012 -0.011 -0.018 710
Fringe benefits: crèche/nursery -0.005 0.002 0.010 710
Fringe benefits: trade union membership -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 710
Permanent job -0.005 0.002 -0.011 713
Shift work most of the time -0.017 -0.018 0.001 714
Usual work pattern during day -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 714
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.032 0.036 0.035 714
Has formal supervisory responsibilities 0.013 -0.006 -0.003 713
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures at work -0.006 -0.017 -0.040 712
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how they work -0.001 -0.008 0.004(h) 711
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.015 0.011 -0.014 713
Likes job a great deal 0.006 0.010 0.037 713
Employer offers training for advancing 0.010 0.010 0.022 649
Any promotions since started work 0.018 0.006 0.006(h) 675
Any opportunities for promotions 0.036 0.029 0.051 654
Had pay rise since week 1/first started job after  
week 1 0.003 0.009 0.009(h) 672
Took steps to improve work situation/pay 0.050 0.042 0.039(h) 713
Tried to increase hours 0.008 0.010 0.011(h) 713
Tried to get a pay raise -0.011 -0.010 -0.023 713
Continued
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Table C.2 Continued
RAW OLS FILM N
Tried to negotiate better terms 0.028 0.014 0.003(h) 713
Tried to change work with same employer 0.042 0.034 0.023(h) 713
Tried to get better job with different employer -0.002 0.019 0.033 713
Took steps to look for other job while in work,  
since RA -0.006 0.013 0.026 713
Looked for other job while in work: private 
recruitment agency 0.028 0.023 0.017 713
Looked for other job while in work: career office, etc 0.021 0.024 0.023 713
Looked for other job while in work: on own -0.005 0.015 0.030 713
Looked for other job while in work: something else 0.014 0.014 0.020 713
Wants to improve pay and terms 0.008 -0.009 -0.021 712
Very/fairly likely to look for different job next year -0.002 0.001 -0.021 711
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year 0.009 0.006 0.006 712
Contact with Jobcentre Plus when in work since RA 0.425*** 0.438*** 0.460***(h) 714
Advice/help from Jobcentre Plus when in work  
since RA 0.495*** 0.489*** 0.504***(h) 713
Unprompted help/advice when in work since RA 0.430*** 0.422*** 0.435*** 712
Self-employed 0.015 0.011 0.012 713
Cost of travel to work per week 1.415 1.238 1.764 699
>5 days off work in past four weeks 0.002 0.007 0.009 714
Tenure of main current job -3.161 -3.069 -8.723 712
Share of two years since RA spent in employment 1.347 1.765 1.089 714
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.010 -0.003 -0.015 714
Very/quite difficult financial situation now -0.050 -0.042 -0.066 713
Very/quite easy financial situation now 0.003 0.000 0.016 713
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%;
(h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
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Table C.3 WTC subset of employed at year 5 who are also employed at year 2:  
 year 5 outcomes
RAW OLS FILM N
Hours per week for all current jobs 1.480*** 1.267** 1.189** 1,321
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.022** -0.022** -0.016 1,321
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.080*** -0.072*** -0.075** 1,321
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.102*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 1,321
Would like to work part-time, <30 -0.032* -0.017 -0.013 1,303
Would like to work full-time, >=30 0.042* 0.039 0.035(h) 1,303
Hourly wage for main current job 0.004 0.011 0.069 1,314
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 12.367* 11.252* 11.640* 1,313
Education/training while in work in years 3-5 0.034 0.032 0.028(h) 1,322
Education/training while in work since RA 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.096***(h) 1,323
Has obtained work-related qualifications in years 3-5 0.015 0.015 0.014 1,320
Has obtained work-related qualifications since RA 0.066** 0.071** 0.063** 1,323
Very/fairly likely to do training next year -0.027 -0.017 -0.017 1,319
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work features 0.018 0.075 0.078 1,229
Fringe benefits: any 0.002 0.005 0.006 1,229
Fringe benefits: number 0.073 0.089 0.113 1,229
Fringe benefits: pension 0.027 0.020 0.021 1,229
Fringe benefits: paid holidays 0.001 0.004 0.006 1,229
Fringe benefits: flexible hours 0.010 0.027 0.026 1,229
Fringe benefits: time off for family -0.005 0.010 0.012 1,229
Fringe benefits: sick pay 0.042** 0.047** 0.052** 1,229
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use 0.019 0.016 0.018 1,229
Fringe benefits: creche/nursery -0.029* -0.028* -0.029* 1,229
Fringe benefits: trade union membership 0.008 -0.007 0.006(h) 1,229
Permanent job -0.013 -0.009 -0.011 1,321
Shift work most of the time 0.019 0.012 0.004 1,323
Usual work pattern during day 0.008 0.015 0.007 1,323
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.037* 0.036 0.043* 1,322
Has formal supervisory responsibilities -0.012 -0.007 -0.003(h) 1,322
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures at work 0.029 0.029 0.026 1,314
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how they work 0.000 0.015 0.002 1,314
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.022 0.019 0.025 1,316
Likes job a great deal/quite a lot 0.015 0.024 0.017 1,317
Employer offers training for advancing 0.029 0.019 0.022(h) 1,298
Any promotions since started work 0.050** 0.056** 0.064** 1,315
Any opportunities for promotions 0.029 0.028 0.030 1,301
Had had a pay rise -0.004 0.006 -0.004 1,315
Took steps to improve work situation/pay 0.010 0.014 0.015 1,267
Tried to increase hours 0.052* 0.059** 0.058** 1,323
Continued
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Table C.3 Continued
RAW OLS FILM N
Tried to get a pay raise 0.037 0.032 0.032 1,323
Tried to negotiate better terms 0.009 0.019 0.026 1,323
Tried to change work with same employer -0.010 -0.001 0.001 1,323
Tried to get better job with different employer 0.067*** 0.074*** 0.066** 1,323
Tried to get new training or qualifications 0.008 0.019 0.017 1,323
Took steps to look for other job while in work,  
since RA 0.063** 0.069*** 0.061** 1,323
Looked for other job while in work: private 
recruitment agency 0.030** 0.027* 0.021 1,323
Looked for other job while in work: career  
office, etc 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.025** 1,323
Looked for other job while in work: on own 0.058** 0.063** 0.055** 1,323
Looked for other job while in work: something else 0.022 0.029* 0.027 1,323
Will want to improve pay and terms at some point -0.058* -0.050 -0.050 1,098
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 1,311
Self-employed -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 1,323
Cost of travel to work per week 1.368 1.830** 1.806** 1,249
Had days off work other than holidays in past  
four weeks 0.008 0.008 0.001 1,317
Has not been late to work in the last month 0.010 0.015 0.015 1,317
Share of five years since RA spent in employment -0.754* -0.783* -0.996** 1,002
Share of five years since RA spent in part-time work -10.421*** -10.072*** -9.634*** 1,002
Share of five years since RA spent in full-time work 9.641*** 9.277*** 8.591*** 1,002
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.032 -0.030 -0.030 1,323
Always/often tired/depressed/bad headache -0.019 -0.007 0.000 979
Child’s life is going very well -0.040 -0.056* -0.051 979
Spends >2.5h helping child with homework etc 0.044 0.043 0.049* 950
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.062** 0.074*** 0.073** 1,320
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.017 -0.018 -0.014 1,320
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%;
(h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
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Table C.4 WTC subset of employed at year 5 who are also employed at year 2:  
 year 2 outcomes
RAW OLS FILM N
Hours per week for main current job 1.347*** 1.108** 0.888* 1,320
Works <=15 hours in main current job -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 1,320
Works 16-29 hours in main current job -0.114*** -0.101*** -0.085*** 1,320
Works >=30 hours in main current job 0.116*** 0.106*** 0.089*** 1,320
Hours per week for all current jobs 1.629*** 1.280*** 1.028** 1,320
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.001 -0.001 0.001 1,320
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.140*** -0.125*** -0.110*** 1,320
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.142*** 0.126*** 0.109*** 1,320
Likely to look for different job next year and work 
part-time, <30 -0.015 -0.007 -0.007 1,294
Likely to look for different job next year and work 
full-time, >=30 0.056** 0.054** 0.044* 1,294
Hourly wage for main current job 0.005 0.190 0.295 1,169
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 10.106 9.037 8.976 1,166
Education/training while in work since RA 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.123*** 1,322
Has obtained work-related qualifications since RA 0.049* 0.058** 0.049*(h) 1,323
Very/fairly likely to do training next year 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 1,312
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work features 0.197 0.147 0.149 1,323
Fringe benefits: any 0.026* 0.029** 0.031** 1,323
Fringe benefits: number 0.141 0.109 0.125(h) 1,323
Fringe benefits: pension 0.020 0.010 0.019(h) 1,323
Fringe benefits: paid holidays 0.027 0.030* 0.028 1,323
Fringe benefits: flexible hours 0.011 0.013 0.012 1,323
Fringe benefits: time off for family 0.036 0.035 0.034 1,323
Fringe benefits: sick pay 0.048** 0.045** 0.043*(h) 1,323
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use 0.005 0.005 0.007 1,323
Fringe benefits: creche/nursery -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 1,323
Fringe benefits: trade union membership 0.003 -0.021 -0.011(h) 1,323
Permanent job -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 1,323
Shift work most of the time -0.018 -0.024 -0.025 1,323
Usual work pattern during day 0.001 0.002 0.000 1,323
Working pattern is inconvenient -0.016 -0.011 -0.016 1,322
Has formal supervisory responsibilities -0.014 -0.013 -0.019 1,323
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures at work -0.013 -0.010 -0.016 1,319
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how they work 0.003 0.003 -0.006 1,321
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.035* 0.035* 0.035 1,320
Likes job a great deal 0.012 0.005 0.007(h) 1,322
Employer offers training for advancing 0.000 -0.006 -0.006 1,209
Any promotions since started work 0.017 0.019 0.014 1,241
Continued
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Table C.4 Continued
RAW OLS FILM N
Any opportunities for promotions 0.035 0.030 0.027 1,215
Had pay rise since week 1/first started job after  
week 1 -0.034 -0.042* -0.036 1,238
Took steps to improve work situation/pay 0.032 0.028 0.020 1,323
Tried to increase hours 0.091*** 0.082*** 0.067** 1,323
Tried to get a pay raise 0.013 0.007 0.003 1,323
Tried to negotiate better terms 0.001 0.012 0.016 1,323
Tried to change work with same employer 0.018 0.018 0.006(h) 1,322
Tried to get better job with different employer 0.034 0.041 0.032 1,322
Took steps to look for other job while in work,  
since RA 0.039 0.047* 0.039 1,322
Looked for other job while in work: private 
recruitment agency 0.032** 0.032** 0.029** 1,322
Looked for other job while in work: career office, etc 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 1,321
Looked for other job while in work: on own 0.037 0.045 0.036 1,322
Looked for other job while in work: something else 0.025 0.029* 0.024 1,321
Wants to improve pay and terms 0.066** 0.070** 0.072** 1,314
Very/fairly likely to look for different job next year 0.050* 0.056** 0.048* 1,312
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year 0.004 0.005 0.006 1,313
Contact with Jobcentre Plus when in work since RA 0.674*** 0.674*** 0.667***(h) 1,323
Advice/help from Jobcentre Plus when in work  
since RA 0.748*** 0.751*** 0.743***(h) 1,323
Unprompted help/advice when in work since RA 0.672*** 0.673*** 0.666***(h) 1,320
Self-employed -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 1,323
Cost of travel to work per week 1.279* 1.644** 1.531** 1,280
>5 days off work in past four weeks 0.013 0.016 0.016 1,323
Tenure of main current job 4.081 1.731 2.890 1,319
Share of two years since RA spent in employment -0.432 -0.203 -0.396 1,315
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.014 -0.012 -0.011 1,320
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.004 0.012 0.001 1,320
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.006 -0.012 -0.007 1,320
Note: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%;
(h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
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Appendix D 
ERA impacts on lone parent 
workers’ outcomes 
Table D.1 NDLP employed at year 5: ERA impacts on year 5 outcomes
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Hours per week for main current job 1.003 0.868 0.704 1,054
Works <=15 hours in main current job -0.027 -0.028 -0.022 -0.027 1,054
Works 16-29 hours in main current job 0.016 0.024 0.028 0.031 1,054
Works >=30 hours in main current job 0.011 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 1,054
Hours per week for all current jobs 0.908 0.735 0.587 1,054
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.017 -0.016 -0.011 -0.013 1,054
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.012 1,054
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.002 1,054
Would like to work part-time, <30 -0.012 -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 1,034
Would like to work full-time, >=30 0.041 0.037 0.043 0.038 1,034
Hourly wage for main current job 0.238 0.255 0.214 1,043
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 13.094 11.007 8.976 1,040
Education/training while in work in years 3-5 -0.018 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028(h) 959
Education/training while in work since RA 0.044 0.015 0.016 0.018 1,056
Has obtained work-related qualifications in 
years 3-5 0.019 0.012 0.012 0.019 1,056
Has obtained work-related qualifications 
since RA 0.029 0.019 0.022 0.026 1,056
Very/fairly likely to do training next year 0.009 0.013 0.008 0.012 1,050
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work 
features -0.205 -0.174 -0.172(h) 969
Fringe benefits: any 0.010 0.008 0.001 0.007 969
Fringe benefits: number -0.141 -0.163 -0.169(h) 969
Fringe benefits: pension -0.038 -0.036 -0.041 -0.044 969
Fringe benefits: paid holidays 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.004 969
Fringe benefits: flexible hours -0.029 -0.039 -0.043 -0.038 969
Fringe benefits: time off for family -0.048 -0.044 -0.044 -0.055*(h) 969
Fringe benefits: sick pay -0.006 -0.009 -0.018 -0.003 969
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use -0.027** -0.031** -0.013*** -0.035*** 969
Fringe benefits: crèche/nursery 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.014 969
Fringe benefits: trade union membership -0.015 -0.024 -0.018 -0.011(h) 969
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Table D.1 Continued
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Permanent job 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.021 1,056
Shift work most of the time 0.026 0.020 0.020 0.035(h) 1,056
Usual work pattern during day 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 1,056
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.015 0.005 0.005 0.011(h) 1,054
Has formal supervisory responsibilities -0.005 -0.016 -0.013 0.002(h) 1,056
Often/always has unrealistic time pressures 
at work -0.003 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008 1,043
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how  
they work -0.009 -0.003 -0.010 0.001 1,044
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.014 0.005 0.002 0.006 1,044
Likes job a great deal/quite a lot 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.019 1,039
Employer offers training for advancing 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.000 1,034
Any promotions since started work -0.020 -0.027 -0.039 -0.021 1,046
Any opportunities for promotions 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005(h) 1,036
Had had a pay rise -0.002 -0.020 -0.018 -0.007 1,046
Took steps to improve work situation/pay -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 -0.024(h) 1,007
Tried to increase hours -0.042 -0.038 -0.035 -0.020 1,055
Tried to get a pay raise 0.044 0.040 0.042 0.047 1,055
Tried to negotiate better terms -0.026 -0.027 -0.033 -0.017(h) 1,055
Tried to change work with same employer -0.009 -0.021 -0.020 -0.029(h) 1,055
Tried to get better job with different 
employer 0.030 0.016 0.013 0.011 1,055
Tried to get new training or qualifications 0.020 0.015 0.019 0.027 1,055
Took steps to look for other job while in work, 
since RA 0.037 0.022 0.019 0.017(h) 1,056
Looked for other job while in work: private 
recruitment agency 0.015 0.006 0.010 0.003 1,055
Looked for other job while in work: career 
office, etc 0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 1,055
Looked for other job while in work: on own 0.040 0.028 0.025 0.022 1,055
Looked for other job while in work: 
something else 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.018 1,055
Will want to improve pay and terms at  
some point -0.026 -0.031 -0.031 -0.056(h) 897
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 1,038
Self-employed 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.001 1,056
Cost of travel to work per week 2.525** 2.341** 2.210** 1,000
Had days off work other than holidays in 
past four weeks -0.020 -0.010 -0.016 -0.009 1,042
Has not been late to work in the last month -0.007 -0.015 -0.010 -0.007 1,040
Share of five years since RA spent in 
employment 1.084 0.911 1.795 939
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Table D.1 Continued
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Share of five years since RA spent in part-
time work -5.201** -4.387* -3.645 939
Share of five years since RA spent in full-time 
work 6.345*** 5.319** 5.452** 939
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.062** -0.058** -0.060** -0.054* 1,055
Always/often tired/depressed/bad headache 0.025 0.014 0.019 0.023 785
Child’s life is going very well -0.048 -0.048 -0.051 -0.048 784
Spends >2.5h helping child with  
homework, etc -0.051 -0.051 -0.048 -0.041(h) 765
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.003 0.016 0.027 0.023 1,055
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.021 1,055
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; (h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
Table D.2 NDLP employed at year 2: ERA impacts on year 2 outcomes 
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Hours per week for main current job 1.611*** 1.355** 1.706*** 1,236
Works <=15 hours in main current job -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.019 1,236
Works 16-29 hours in main current job -0.086*** -0.076*** -0.087*** -0.080***(h) 1,236
Works >=30 hours in main current job 0.095*** 0.084*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 1,236
Hours per week for all current jobs 1.651*** 1.373** 1.753*** 1,236
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.023 1,236
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.086*** -0.076*** -0.088*** -0.082***(h) 1,236
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.101*** 0.089*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 1,236
Likely to look for different job next year 
and work part-time, <30 -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.055** 1,202
Likely to look for different job next year 
and work full-time, >=30 0.041 0.044* 0.047* 0.030 1,202
Hourly wage for main current job 0.019 -0.181 -0.085 1,079
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 16.874** 8.167 13.319* 1,076
Education/training while in work since RA 0.062** 0.057** 0.066** 0.061** 1,241
Has obtained work-related qualifications 
since RA 0.032 0.030 0.032 0.024(h) 1,245
Very/fairly likely to do training next year 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 1,238
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work 
features -0.150 -0.106 -0.059 1,245
Fringe benefits: any 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.007 1,245
Fringe benefits: number -0.086 -0.070 -0.056 1,245
Fringe benefits: pension -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.014 1,239
Fringe benefits: paid holidays -0.005 0.003 0.006 0.005 1,239
Fringe benefits: flexible hours -0.042 -0.040 -0.041 -0.036 1,239
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Table D.2 Continued 
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Fringe benefits: time off for family -0.021 -0.015 -0.018 -0.021 1,239
Fringe benefits: sick pay -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 1,239
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use -0.012 -0.008 -0.001 -0.009 1,239
Fringe benefits: crèche/nursery -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 -0.008 1,239
Fringe benefits: trade union membership 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.006 1,239
Permanent job -0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.011 1,243
Shift work most of the time 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.010 1,245
Usual work pattern during day 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.017 1,245
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.008 0.001 0.000 -0.002 1,242
Has formal supervisory responsibilities 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.003 1,243
Often/always has unrealistic time 
pressures at work 0.011 0.003 0.004 -0.001 1,241
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how 
they work -0.017 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 1,239
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.013 1,242
Likes job a great deal -0.008 -0.000 0.000 0.020 1,243
Employer offers training for advancing -0.009 -0.012 -0.013 -0.007 1,148
Any promotions since started work 0.009 0.001 0.002 -0.001 1,185
Any opportunities for promotions 0.021 0.017 0.019 0.020 1,156
Had pay rise since week 1/first started job 
after week 1 -0.028 -0.029 -0.031 -0.027 1,180
Took steps to improve work situation/pay 0.034 0.024 0.026 0.030 1,244
Tried to increase hours 0.009 0.014 0.015 0.012 1,244
Tried to get a pay raise -0.008 -0.020 -0.024 -0.018 1,244
Tried to negotiate better terms 0.017 0.004 0.004 0.006 1,244
Tried to change work with same 
employer 0.037 0.027 0.030 0.024 1,244
Tried to get better job with different 
employer 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.019 1,244
Took steps to look for other job while in 
work, since RA 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.014 1,244
Looked for other job while in work:  
private recruitment agency 0.011 0.002 0.005 0.009 1,244
Looked for other job while in work:  
career office, etc 0.021 0.021* 0.010 0.021 1,244
Looked for other job while in work:  
on own 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.015 1,244
Looked for other job while in work: 
something else 0.027* 0.022 0.018 0.025 1,244
Wants to improve pay and terms 0.039 0.027 0.030 0.023 1,239
Very/fairly likely to look for different job 
next year -0.010 -0.017 -0.019 -0.023 1,236
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.004 1,234
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Table D.2 Continued 
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Contact with Jobcentre Plus when in work 
since RA 0.412*** 0.412*** 0.431*** 0.422***(h) 1,245
Advice/help from Jobcentre Plus when in 
work since RA 0.488*** 0.479*** 0.526*** 0.493***(h) 1,243
Unprompted help/advice when in work 
since RA 0.430*** 0.418*** 0.453*** 0.428***(h) 1,241
Self-employed 0.018 0.010 0.001 0.012 1,244
Cost of travel to work per week 1.384* 0.957 1.272* 1,222
>5 days off work in past four weeks -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.003 1,245
Tenure of main current job 5.933 4.813 1.553 1,238
Share of two years since RA spent in 
employment 2.861* 2.488* 2.236(h) 1,245
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.017 -0.018 -0.021 -0.021 1,241
Very/quite difficult financial situation now -0.024 -0.025 -0.028 -0.036 1,240
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 1,240
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; (h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
Table D.3 NDLP employed at years 1 and 2: ERA impacts on change in outcomes  
 between year 1 and year 2 (year 2 survey respondents)
RAW OLS FILM N
Growth rate: Hours/week, main job -0.046 -0.049 -0.066 941
Growth rate: Hours/week, all jobs -0.033 -0.036 -0.044 941
Growth rate: Hourly wage, main job -0.027 -0.022 -0.012 798
Increase in number fringe benefits -0.030 -0.020 -0.021 950
Any improvement in non-pecuniary work/ 
life conditions 0.001 0.010 0.015 950
Table D.4 NDLP employed at years 1 and 3: ERA impacts on change in outcomes  
 between year 1 and year 5 (year 5 survey respondents)
RAW OLS FILM N
Growth rate: Hours/week, all jobs -0.123 -0.111 -0.145 659
Growth rate: Hourly wage, main job 0.028 0.029 0.024 588
Increase in number fringe benefits -0.009 -0.034 0.000 615
Any improvement in non-pecuniary work/ 
life conditions 0.003 0.005 0.013(h) 660
Notes: (h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
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Table D.5 WTC employed at year 5: ERA impacts on year 5 outcomes
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Hours per week for main current job 1.204** 1.154** 0.880* 1,542
Works <=15 hours in main current job -0.022** -0.026** -0.015** -0.018* 1,542
Works 16-29 hours in main current job -0.061** -0.057** -0.061** -0.055** 1,542
Works >=30 hours in main current job 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.073*** 1,542
Hours per week for all current jobs 1.259** 1.123** 0.918* 1,542
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.017* -0.018** -0.009** -0.012 1,542
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.063** -0.059** -0.063** -0.059** 1,542
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.082*** 0.071*** 1,542
Would like to work part-time, <30 -0.023 -0.014 -0.015 -0.006 1,524
Would like to work full-time, >=30 0.035 0.036 0.040* 0.031 1,524
Hourly wage for main current job -0.038 -0.031 0.020 1,526
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 10.230 9.283 8.695 1,524
Education/training while in work in  
years 3-5 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.023(h) 1,396
Education/training while in work since RA 0.097*** 0.093*** 0.099*** 0.095***(h) 1,544
Has obtained work-related qualifications 
in years 3-5 0.015 0.019 0.020 0.017 1,541
Has obtained work-related qualifications 
since RA 0.057** 0.064** 0.068** 0.058** 1,544
Very/fairly likely to do training next year -0.023 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 1,537
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work 
features 0.073 0.107 0.078 1,433
Fringe benefits: any 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.007 1,433
Fringe benefits: number 0.117 0.117 0.130 1,433
Fringe benefits: pension 0.033 0.025 0.025 0.025 1,433
Fringe benefits: paid holidays 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.007 1,433
Fringe benefits: flexible hours 0.003 0.016 0.017 0.013 1,433
Fringe benefits: time off for family 0.004 0.016 0.015 0.015(h) 1,433
Fringe benefits: sick pay 0.045** 0.047** 0.044** 0.050** 1,433
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use 0.018 0.016 0.011 0.016 1,433
Fringe benefits: crèche/nursery -0.022 -0.023 -0.016 -0.023 1,433
Fringe benefits: trade union membership 0.032 0.016 0.018 0.027(h) 1,433
Permanent job -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 1,542
Shift work most of the time 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.007 1,544
Usual work pattern during day -0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.004 1,544
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.036* 0.030 0.031 0.037* 1,542
Has formal supervisory responsibilities -0.012 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010(h) 1,543
Often/always has unrealistic time 
pressures at work 0.029 0.030 0.019 0.025 1,535
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Table D.5 Continued
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how 
they work 0.018 0.030 0.029 0.019 1,535
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.014 0.013 0.030 0.016 1,537
Likes job a great deal/quite a lot 0.006 0.015 0.015 0.011 1,538
Employer offers training for advancing 0.027 0.019 0.011 1,519
Any promotions since started work 0.031 0.035 0.039 0.034 1,536
Any opportunities for promotions 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.014 1,522
Had had a pay rise -0.012 -0.005 0.000 -0.012 1,536
Took steps to improve work situation/pay 0.020 0.026 0.027 0.026 1,477
Tried to increase hours 0.051** 0.053** 0.056** 0.054** 1,544
Tried to get a pay raise 0.042* 0.035 0.035 0.037 1,544
Tried to negotiate better terms 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.024 1,544
Tried to change work with same 
employer -0.006 0.000 0.003 0.002 1,544
Tried to get better job with different 
employer 0.070*** 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.070*** 1,544
Tried to get new training or qualifications 0.021 0.033 0.034 0.030 1,544
Took steps to look for other job while in 
work, since RA 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.063*** 1,544
Looked for other job while in work:  
private recruitment agency 0.024* 0.023* 0.017 0.018 1,544
Looked for other job while in work:  
career office, etc 0.023** 0.021** 0.011** 0.019* 1,544
Looked for other job while in work:  
on own 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.058** 1,544
Looked for other job while in work:  
something else 0.024 0.031** 0.028** 0.027* 1,544
Will want to improve pay and terms at 
some point -0.043 -0.037 -0.038 -0.044 1,279
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.012 1,531
Self-employed -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 1,544
Cost of travel to work per week 0.894 1.153 1.182 1,464
Had days off work other than holidays in 
past four weeks 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.002 1,538
Has not been late to work in the last 
month 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.021 1,538
Share of five years since RA spent in 
employment -0.535 -0.421 -0.830 1,064
Share of five years since RA spent in  
part-time work -9.458*** -9.224*** -8.300*** 1,064
Share of five years since RA spent in  
full-time work 8.932*** 8.836*** 7.472*** 1,064
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Table D.5 Continued
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.034 -0.031 -0.032 -0.028 1,544
Always/often tired/depressed/bad 
headache -0.009 0.003 0.004 0.009 1,144
Child’s life is going very well -0.034 -0.048* -0.052* -0.049 1,144
Spends >2.5h helping child with 
homework, etc 0.047* 0.048* 0.048* 0.057** 1,112
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.048* 0.055** 0.059** 0.055** 1,541
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 1,541
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; (h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
Table D.6 WTC employed at year 2: ERA impacts on year 2 outcomes
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Hours per week for main current job 1.614*** 1.411*** 1.248*** 1,889
Works <=15 hours in main current job -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 1,889
Works 16-29 hours in main current job -0.115*** -0.110*** -0.118*** -0.104*** 1,889
Works >=30 hours in main current job 0.124*** 0.118*** 0.126*** 0.109*** 1,889
Hours per week for all current jobs 1.924*** 1.656*** 1.501*** 1,889
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.010 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 1,889
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.137*** -0.127*** -0.136*** -0.123*** 1,889
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.146*** 0.135*** 0.145*** 0.128*** 1,889
Likely to look for different job next year 
and work part-time, <30 -0.027* -0.023 -0.025 -0.022 1,843
Likely to look for different job next year 
and work full-time, >=30 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 1,843
Hourly wage for main current job -0.368 -0.372 -0.440 1,638
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 10.093* 8.262 7.223 1,635
Education/training while in work since RA 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.144*** 0.125*** 1,893
Has obtained work-related qualifications 
since RA 0.048** 0.058*** 0.061*** 0.050**(h) 1,895
Very/fairly likely to do training next year 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 1,882
Number of desirable non-pecuniary work 
features 0.166 0.133 0.117 1,895
Fringe benefits: any 0.020 0.020 0.019* 0.022* 1,895
Fringe benefits: number 0.151* 0.126 0.122(h) 1,895
Fringe benefits: pension 0.017 0.011 0.012 0.013(h) 1,895
Fringe benefits: paid holidays 0.026* 0.026* 0.026* 0.026* 1,895
Fringe benefits: flexible hours 0.028 0.031 0.033 0.026 1,895
Fringe benefits: time off for family 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.014 1,895
Fringe benefits: sick pay 0.038* 0.033* 0.034* 0.030 1,895
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RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Fringe benefits: car/van for own use 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 1,895
Fringe benefits: creche/nursery 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 1,895
Fringe benefits: trade union membership 0.019 0.004 0.005 0.009(h) 1,895
Permanent job -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.011 1,895
Shift work most of the time -0.006 -0.011 -0.015 -0.009(h) 1,895
Usual work pattern during day 0.016 0.017* 0.014* 0.018* 1,895
Working pattern is inconvenient 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015 1,893
Has formal supervisory responsibilities -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.014 1,895
Often/always has unrealistic time 
pressures at work -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.020 1,891
(Strongly) agrees has some say over how 
they work -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 -0.028 1,893
Job is very/extremely stressful 0.032* 0.031* 0.033* 0.036** 1,892
Likes job a great deal 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.000 1,894
Employer offers training for advancing 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.009 1,731
Any promotions since started work 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.021 1,775
Any opportunities for promotions 0.045* 0.040 0.042* 0.042* 1,739
Had pay rise since week 1/first started job 
after week 1 -0.009 -0.015 -0.016 -0.011 1,770
Took steps to improve work situation/pay 0.040** 0.042** 0.042** 0.041** 1,895
Tried to increase hours 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 0.097***(h) 1,895
Tried to get a pay raise 0.008 0.003 0.006 -0.004 1,895
Tried to negotiate better terms 0.018 0.028 0.029 0.030 1,895
Tried to change work with same 
employer 0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.003 1,894
Tried to get better job with different 
employer 0.045** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.057** 1,894
Took steps to look for other job while in 
work, since RA 0.049** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 1,894
Looked for other job while in work:  
private recruitment agency 0.027** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.028** 1,894
Looked for other job while in work:  
career office, etc 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 1,893
Looked for other job while in work:  
on own 0.046** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 1,894
Looked for other job while in work:  
something else 0.013 0.018 0.017 0.017 1,893
Wants to improve pay and terms 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.034 1,881
Very/fairly likely to look for different job 
next year 0.040* 0.044* 0.046* 0.044* 1,874
Very/fairly likely to stop working next year -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 1,882
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Table D.6 Continued
RAW OLS
Marg.
Effect FILM N
Contact with Jobcentre Plus when in work 
since RA 0.642*** 0.643*** 0.684*** 0.635***(h) 1,895
Advice/help from Jobcentre Plus when in 
work since RA 0.710*** 0.714*** 0.748*** 0.705***(h) 1,894
Unprompted help/advice when in work 
since RA 0.640*** 0.644*** 0.668*** 0.636***(h) 1,890
Self-employed -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 1,895
Cost of travel to work per week 1.025 1.346** 1.253* 1,827
>5 days off work in past four weeks 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.000 1,895
Tenure of main current job -8.490 -14.539** -14.644** 1,888
Share of two years since RA spent in 
employment 0.404 0.374 0.321 1,883
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.018 -0.020 -0.019 -0.016 1,891
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.006 0.009 0.01 0.005 1,888
Very/quite easy financial situation now -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 1,888
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%; (h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
Table D.7 WTC employed at year 2: ERA impacts on change in outcomes  
 between RA and year 2 (year 2 survey respondents)
RAW OLS FILM N
Growth rate: Hours/week, main job 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.076***(h) 1,734
Growth rate: Hours/week, all jobs 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.096*** 1,734
Growth rate: Hourly wage, main job 0.001 0.001 0.000 1,350
Notes: *** at 1%; (h) ERA impact is heterogeneous at least at the 5% level.
Table D.8 WTC employed at year 5: ERA impacts on change in outcomes  
 between RA and year 5 (year 5 survey respondents)
RAW OLS FILM N
Growth rate: Hours/week, main job 0.036 0.039 0.027 1,270
Growth rate: Hours/week, all jobs 0.034 0.039 0.026 1,270
Growth rate: Hourly wage, main job 0.003 0.001 0.006 1,054
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Appendix E 
Lone parent groups: Balancing 
and impacts at the district and 
subgroup levels
Table E.1 NDLP employed at Wave 3: balancing within subgroups
% ERA 
group R2 p-val
Median 
bias N
By district
Scotland 49 0.233 0.655 10.5 170
North East England 51 0.153 0.874 5.6 218
North West England 52 0.291 0.130 10.1 176
Wales 57 0.512 0.012 20.5 126
East Midlands 52 0.306 0.029 8.7 197
London 50 0.393 0.004 16.8 169
All 51 0.042 0.663 3.0 1,056
By ethnicity
White 51 0.045 0.751 3.5 936
Non-white 54 1.000 0.000 8.3 120
By education
Level 0-2 52 0.054 0.692 4.8 792
Level ≥3 50 0.153 0.798 6.4 264
By child’s age
Other 50 0.049 0.746 3.1 874
≥5 and <7 59 0.283 0.234 7.3 162
By severely disadvantaged status, i.e. with 
GCSE qualifications or lower, no work in  
the three years prior to RA and at least  
one barrier to employment
Not severely disadvantaged 51 0.053 0.422 3.8 931
Severely disadvantaged 58 0.469 0.015 2.8 125
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Table E.4 NDLP – ERA impacts on workers at year 5: by ethnicity
All Whites Non-whites
Non-whites 
RAW
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.028 -0.007 -0.118 
(d)
-0.102*
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs 0.007 0.007 -0.075 -0.001
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.009 -0.001 0.194 0.103
Would like to work full-time, >=30 0.037 0.020 0.225* 0.134
Hourly wage for main current job 0.255 0.210 0.980 0.398
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 11.007 4.993 87.882** 55.975*
Education/training while in work in years 3-5 -0.027 -0.044 0.320** 0.096
Education/training while in work since RA 0.015 0.004 0.194 0.168*
Has obtained work-related qualifications in  
years 3-5
0.012 0.012 0.098 -0.004
Has obtained work-related qualifications  
since RA
0.019 0.013 0.230 0.097
Very/fairly likely to do training next year 0.013 0.011 0.071 -0.009
Fringe benefits: any 0.008 0.005 0.030 0.053
Fringe benefits: number -0.163 -0.222* 0.658 0.506
Took steps to improve work situation/pay -0.018 -0.012 -0.133 -0.071
Tried to increase hours -0.038 -0.052 0.017 0.057
Tried to get a pay raise 0.040 0.027 0.167 0.136
Tried to get better job with different employer 0.016 0.039 -0.113 -0.150*
Took steps to look for other job while in work 0.022 0.040 -0.096 -0.113
Will want to improve pay and terms at  
some point
-0.031 -0.022 -0.111 -0.075
Cost of travel to work per week 2.341** 2.239** 3.092 3.272
Share of five years since RA spent in 
employment
0.911 -0.143 14.945* 
(dd)
8.438
Share of five years since RA spent in part-time 
work
-4.387* -3.701 -19.839** 
(dd)
-12.249**
Share of five years since RA spent in full-time 
work
5.319** 3.688 33.981*** 20.064***
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.058** -0.068** 0.057 0.015
Child’s life is going very well -0.048 -0.066* 0.021 0.117
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.016 0.023 0.056 -0.066
Notes: See notes to Table E.2.
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Table E.5 WTC employed at Wave 3: Balancing within subgroups
% ERA 
group R2 p-val
Median 
bias N
By district
East Midlands 50 0.060 0.268 3.4 899
Other districts 52 0.083 0.404 3.0 645
All 51 0.038 0.228 3.8 1,544
By ethnicity
White 50 0.043 0.133 4.1 1,444
Non-white 61 1.000 0.000 1.9 100
All 51 0.038 0.228 3.8 1,544
By education
Level 0-2 51 0.059 0.108 3.9 1,053
Level ≥3 51 0.097 0.652 5.9 491
All 51 0.038 0.228 3.8 1,544
By child’s age
Other 53 0.048 0.125 4.2 1,291
≥5 and <7 45 0.436 0.002 14.0 179
All 51 0.038 0.228 3.8 1,544
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Table E.7 WTC – ERA impacts on workers at year 5: By ethnicity 
No-whites 
All Whites Non-whites RAW
Works <=15 hours in all current jobs -0.018** -0.017* -0.019 -0.035
Works 16-29 hours in all current jobs -0.059** -0.065** 0.375 -0.028
Works >=30 hours in all current jobs 0.077*** 0.082*** -0.356 0.063
Would like to work full-time, >=30 0.036 0.041* -0.132 -0.032
Hourly wage for main current job -0.031 -0.057 -1.385 0.114
Weekly earnings for all current jobs 9.283 7.774 -61.664 35.138
Education/training while in work in years 3-5 0.028 0.023 -0.183 0.115
Education/training while in work since RA 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.154 0.120
Has obtained work-related qualifications in  
years 3-5 0.019 0.015 0.178 0.112
Has obtained work-related qualifications  
since RA 0.064** 0.064** 0.183 0.107
Very/fairly likely to do training next year -0.012 -0.016 0.080 0.020
Fringe benefits: any 0.006 0.003 0.065 0.051
Fringe benefits: number 0.117 0.125 0.079 0.112
Took steps to improve work situation/pay 0.026 0.036 -0.333 -0.069
Tried to increase hours 0.053** 0.051* 0.152 0.121
Tried to get a pay raise 0.035 0.046* -0.143 -0.101
Tried to get better job with difference employer 0.077*** 0.085*** 0.370 -0.003
Took steps to look for other job while in  
work, since 0.068*** 0.075*** 0.337 0.032
Will want to improve pay and terms at  
some point -0.037 -0.033 -0.238 -0.129
Cost of travel to work per week 1.153 1.372 -10.544* -3.257
Share of five years since RA spent in 
employment -0.421 -0.309 -7.064 -5.118*
Share of five years since RA spent in part-time 
work -9.224*** -9.687*** 6.187 -2.722
Share of five years since RA spent in full-time 
work 8.836*** 9.474*** -14.114 -3.642
(Very) dissatisfied with life as a whole -0.031 -0.032 0.043 -0.002
Child’s life is going very well -0.048* -0.058* 0.183 0.101
Very/quite difficult financial situation now 0.055** 0.051* 0.242 0.163
Notes: See notes to Table E.2.
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Appendix F 
Correlating individual ERA 
impacts on wages and on 
the take-up of training or the 
attainment of qualifications for 
workers
This appendix outlines a way to shed some light on whether an unusually large (small) individual 
Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) impact on the take-up of education/training or on 
obtaining educational qualifications is accompanied by an unusually large (small) individual ERA 
impact on wages. The idea behind the existence of such a correlation is that work-related training 
and the subsequent attainment of qualifications are the ERA components most likely to increase 
individual productivity (as reflected in hourly wages). 
One way to explore the existence of this link would be to look for subgroups of workers with very 
large/small impacts on either wages or training, and consider whether the impact on training or 
wages, respectively, is particularly large/small (see Hendra et	al., 2011). The problem with this way 
of proceeding is that it requires defining appropriate subgroups, which would always be a subjective 
cut of the data and be limited in the number of subgroups that can be analysed. 
An alternative and more systematic way to proceed is by looking at the level of individuals 
characterised by a certain combination of observable characteristics X, and estimate X-specific (or 
type-specific) impacts on wages, on training and on the attainment of educational qualifications. 
This approach thus simply ‘lets the data speak’, remaining a priori agnostic about where there could 
be heterogeneity in impacts.
Specifically, the following regression for y was run, where y can be individual hourly wages, take-up 
of education/training or obtaining qualifications (to exemplify, only two observed variables X are 
included):
y = a + b ERA + b
1
 ERA·X
1
 + b
2
 ERA·X
2
 + c X
1
 + d X
2
 + u
The above regression allows the impact of ERA on y to depend on observed characteristics X
1
 and X
2
, 
e.g. to vary according to the individual’s education level (X
1
) and youngest child’s age (X
2
).
For each individual with characteristics X, the type-specific ERA impact on y can thus be recovered as 
β(X) = b + b
1
 X
1
 + b
1
 X
2
where only statistically significant interactions (b
1
 and b
1
) have been kept in constructing it.
By running the above regression (with the full set of background variables X) three times for the 
three different outcomes and constructing the corresponding type-specific impacts, a type-specific 
impact on wages, on training and on qualifications are obtained for each individual of type X.
With these in hand, one can then draw a scatter plot, as well as look at linear correlations.
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Figure F.1 NDLP – Measures of correlation between individual ERA impacts  
 on wages and on the take up of training/education or the attainment  
 of qualifications, all impacts measured at year 2 for NDLP employed  
 at year 2
Note: The red line is lowess smoothing (i.e. a locally weighted regression of the impact 
on wages, of the impact on qualifications or on training).
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Figure F2 WTC – Measures of correlation between individual ERA impacts  
 on wages and on the take up of training/education or the attainment  
 of qualifications, all impacts measured at year 2 for WTC employed  
 at year 2 
Note: The red line is lowess smoothing (i.e. a locally weighted regression of the impact 
on wages, of the impact on qualifications or on training).
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Figure F.3 NDLP – Measures of correlation between individual ERA impacts  
 on wages and on the take up of training/education or the attainment  
 of qualifications, all impacts measured at year 5 for NDLP employed  
 at year 5 
Note: The red line is lowess smoothing (i.e. a locally weighted regression of the impact 
on wages, of the impact on qualifications or on training).
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Figure F.4 WTC – Measures of correlation between individual ERA impacts  
 on wages and on the take up of training/education or the attainment  
 of qualifications, all impacts measured at year 5 for WTC employed  
 at year 5 
Note: The red line is lowess smoothing (i.e. a locally weighted regression of the impact 
on wages, of the impact on qualifications or on training).
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Figure F.5 NDLP – Measures of correlation between individual ERA impacts  
 on wages and on the take up of training/education or the attainment  
 of qualifications, impacts on wages at year 5, impacts on training/ 
 qualifications at year 2, for those NDLP employed at years 2 and 5
Note: The red line is lowess smoothing (i.e. a locally weighted regression of the impact 
on wages, of the impact on qualifications or on training).
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Figure F.6 WTC – Measures of correlation between individual ERA impacts  
 on wages and on the take up of training/education or the attainment  
 of qualifications, impacts on wages at year 5, impacts on training/ 
 qualifications at year 2, for those WTC employed at years 2 and 5
Note: The red line is lowess smoothing (i.e. a locally weighted regression of the impact 
on wages, of the impact on qualifications or on training).
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Appendix G 
Balancing of characteristics at the 
district level for the ND25+ group
Table G.1 ND25+ – Balancing of characteristics between ERA and control  
 participants with positive P14 Earnings in the relevant tax year 
All Scotland
North East 
England
North West 
England Wales
East 
Midlands London
2005/06
% ERA 53 55 52 55 43 53 54
R2 0.024 0.129 0.169 0.089 0.363 0.071 0.118
p-val 0.191 0.513 0.052 0.481 0.017 0.680 0.318
N 2,428 352 353 521 182 597 423
2006/07
% ERA 52 57 50 51 46 53 54
R2 0.023 0.143 0.143 0.094 0.288 0.074 0.097
p-val 0.346 0.459 0.324 0.460 0.275 0.764 0.569
N 2,332 329 345 490 177 540 451
2007/08
% ERA 52 56 52 52 48 52 53
R2 0.028 0.128 0.155 0.104 0.280 0.073 0.104
p-val 0.042 0.711 0.227 0.280 0.281 0.748 0.304
N 2,364 322 337 487 181 557 480
2008/09
% ERA 52 58 48 50 49 52 52
R2 0.027 0.127 0.145 0.093 0.311 0.106 0.077
p-val 0.039 0.655 0.236 0.551 0.189 0.095 0.796
N 2,394 335 357 479 171 542 510
2005/09
% ERA 52 54 52 52 49 53 52
R2 0.017 0.099 0.121 0.065 0.235 0.044 0.063
p-val 0.077 0.366 0.043 0.296 0.028 0.881 0.498
N 3,601 493 505 775 268 831 729
 
P-values after matching 
All Scotland North East 
England
North West 
England
Wales East 
Midlands
London
Ever employed 2005/06 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
Ever employed 2006/07 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000
Ever employed 2007/08 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Ever employed 2008/09 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Ever employed 2005/09 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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